The true test of a military commander is the way he copes with adversity. Even the most experienced leader would be challenged to retain control of mutinous troops during a forced march on starvation rations. In 1671 a Welsh pirate demonstrated his abilities by operating under exactly these conditions, his men performing feats that regular troops would have regarded as impossible.
Henry Morgan, the greatest buccaneer of them all is perhaps one of the great unsung military commanders of the 17th century. During his campaign against Panama in 1671 his men assaulted an 'impregnable' fortress, marched through some of the most in-hospitable terrain in the world, then fought and won a full-scale battle, the largest seen in the Americas until the American Revolution. Of all these achievements, his march across Panama is the least known, and deserves to be among the epic marches of history.
The Brethren of the Coast
When the English captured Jamaica from the Spanish in 1655 they felt unable to defend the island from attack. Consequently the Governor actively encouraged 'buccaneers' to settle in Port Royal, the main harbour on the island's southern coast.
In return for official support they defended the island from attack, and by the mid-1660s buccaneers operated throughout the Caribbean basin, a region known as the 'Spanish Main'. As buccaneering raids became larger, leaders arose to command these expeditions. By 1670 Henry Morgan had become the effective leader of the Port Royal buccaneers, who called themselves 'the brethren of the coast'. In 1668 the Welshman led successful attacks on the Spanish city of Porto Bello on the isthmus of Panama and into Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela.
In late 1670 he proposed an attack on Panama, reputedly the richest Spanish city in the Americas. In August 1670, Governor Modyford gave Morgan permission to 'doe and performe all matter of exployts which may tend to the preservation and quiett of Jamaica'.
Morgan took this as official approval for his Panama scheme. During November and December of 1670 he gathered a fleet of 26 ships and 1,200 men. These buccaneers were a unique breed – sailors who specialised in raiding the ports of the Spanish Main. Most of the force gathering in Port Royal was English, although the expedition also included French Huguenot and Dutch buccaneers, Protestant seamen united in their hatred for the Spanish. Morgan sailed on 18 December, bound for the Spanish outpost of New Providence Island. Another force of four ships and 470 men commanded by Joseph Brodely sailed for the mouth of Panama's Chagres River. This was Morgan's chosen invasion route across the Panama isthmus, but guarding the river mouth was the formidable Spanish fortress of San Lorenzo.
The Assault on San Lorenzo
Columbus had discovered the mouth of the Chagres River in 1502, and by 1670 the river formed part of the transportation route across the isthmus from Panama to Porto Bello. Peru produced more silver than any other region in the world, and every year the treasure was shipped up the Pacific coast to Panama before being transported overland to Porto Bello by mule train. When river levels were high the Spaniards preferred to ship the treasure down the Chagres River for the last leg of its journey to Porto Bello, where it met the annual treasure fleet which transported it on to Spain. In 1603 a fortress called the Castillo San Lorenzo was built on top of the cliff dominating the river mouth. The summit formed a flat polygon, with steep cliffs on four sides. The final side led to a second plateau, separated from the fort by a twenty-foot deep ditch. A wooden double palisade filled with earth lined the perimeter of the plateau, and was pierced to carry 24 guns, manned by a garrison of 300 men. A six-gun battery lay at the foot of the cliff protecting the silver warehouses and the small attendant settlement.
Brodely anchored three miles from the river and approached the fortress from the east. At around 3am on 2 January the buccaneers attacked, but the garrison was ready for them, and they were repulsed with heavy losses. Brodely launched a second attack the following evening, and during the fighting a building in the fortress caught fire and the flames ignited the magazine, causing a large explosion. Brodeley's men added to the confusion by hurling grenadoes into the fort, and a section of the defences fell into the moat when a Spanish gun exploded, creating a bridge. The buccaneers swarmed into the breach, supported by covering fire. Point-blank cannon fire and musketry met them. Brodely fell in the breach, but his men swarmed on to cut down the defenders, leaving only 30 Spanish survivors. Over 100 the buccaneers were killed during the assault, or died of their wounds.
Morgan arrived a week later, losing four ships on an uncharted reef in the harbour entrance as he sailed in. Only ten men were drowned, but much of the buccaneers' provisions were lost. It took Morgan six more days to reorganise his forces and prepare for his advance on Panama. Without adequate food, the expedition would have to live off whatever they could plunder along the way. Morgan decided the risk was worth taking.
The March to Panama
On the afternoon of Sunday, 18 January 1671, Henry Morgan led his men south up the Chagres River – 1,200 men in 32 large canoes, accompanied by five small boats carrying artillery pieces. They covered less than twenty miles that day, the boats putting ashore at a small riverside hamlet, where the men could stretch their cramped limbs and sleep. Morgan had hoped to plunder supplies from the Spanish settlements he passed, but he quickly discovered that the Spanish had stripped the land of any supplies which could support his men. According to Morgan's biographer Esquemeling (or Exquemelin), the buccaneers had nothing but tobacco to help satisfy their hunger. At dawn on the following morning the flotilla continued upriver, and by mid-afternoon had reached the hamlet of Cruz de Juan Gallego. Morgan found that the summer weather had dried the river sufficiently to bar further progress, and in any case fallen trees had created an impenetrable barrier. The buccaneers would have to abandon their boats.
The buccaneers made camp in the village, and early on 20 January Morgan began the march inland, leaving a company of 160 men to guard the canoes and artillery. Progress through the jungle was excruciatingly slow and Morgan was eventually forced to abandon the attempt. Back on the river he marched his men along its banks, towing a handful of canoes containing the muskets and powder. The buccaneers made slow progress through the shallows, and on reaching the hamlet of Cedro Bueno he sent the canoes back to pick up more men and supplies. This gruelling process continued into the night, but eventually he had gathered all of his men in the village. It was another night of exhaustion and hunger, as no provisions could be found anywhere near the camp. At dawn the expedition continued south, while two light canoes travelled ahead of them, probing the banks for Spanish ambushes. At noon contact was made with the Spanish at the village of Torna Cavellos, and the buccaneers were heartened, hoping that the garrison would have supplies of food for the taking. When the main body arrived they found that the battalion-sized enemy force had fled, taking their provisions with them. This was a bitter disappointment, and Esquemeling reported that the men boiled and ate the leather equipment left behind by the Spaniards. In the late afternoon Morgan continued his march, reaching another settlement just behind the Spaniards, but again the buccaneers found the area stripped of all provisions. Morgan's men were now literally starving to death.
On the fifth day of the march (22 January) the buccaneers reached the village of Barbacoa, and this time the Spanish had been less thorough. In a storage cavern the English found a cache of food which had been overlooked: two sacks of meal, two vats of wine and a stack of plantains. Morgan divided the small haul amongst his men, with the majority going to those who appeared to be closest to death from starvation. It is a credit to Morgan's powers of leadership that these tough buccaneers allowed him to divide the supplies along humanitarian lines. The march continued in the late afternoon, with the worst affected men travelling in the canoes, the rest marching alongside on the bank. At nightfall Morgan camped on the site of an abandoned plantation.
At dawn on Friday 23 January Morgan's men continued along the river, reaching an abandoned plantation at midday, where they found salvation in the form of a warehouse containing maize, which Morgan divided in the same manner as before. This discovery probably did more than anything else to save the expedition, and to seal the fate of Panama. With a little food in their bellies and haversacks the buccaneers continued on, following their now established pattern of marching in the morning and late afternoon, with a rest stop around noon. That afternoon the scouts came upon a group of Indians, allies of the Spanish. The natives melted into the jungle when attacked, but a number of buccaneers were killed by arrows during the skirmish. The Indian ambush was laid at a river crossing and hamlet called Santa Cruz, important only in that it marked the point where the river curved to the east. Morgan crossed the river and pitched camp for the night on the southern bank. Esquemeling reports that during the evening many buccaneers complained about their predicament, but elected to continue rather than return empty-handed. They were now close to Venta de Cruces, a town astride the road from Panama to Porto Bello, and the terminus used when silver was shipped downstream to San Lorenzo. Morgan expected the town to be strongly defended, and indeed the Governor of Panama, Juan Peréz de Guzmán was there in person at the head of 800 militia and his Indian auxiliaries. He had ordered the 'scorched earth' policy that was proving so effective, and assured his men that the buccaneers were a starving rabble. His men remained unconvinced, and when the majority deserted during the night he had little option but to withdraw, leaving a rearguard to harass the invaders.
On the morning of 24 January Morgan made his men clean their firearms, and prepare themselves for battle. At noon they saw smoke rising above the trees as they approached the village from the west. The buccaneers hoped the smoke came from cooking fires, but when they entered the village they found it came from burning buildings. The Spanish had abandoned the town in accordance with their 'scorched earth' policy, destroying everything except the government warehouses and stables. These substantial buildings formed a staging post for the annual mule trains which carried silver from Panama to the Caribbean coast, but they were found to be empty apart from wine jars and a sack of bread. This feast was consumed in minutes, and the buccaneers spent the rest of the day searching the ruins for scraps of food, which included shooting any stray dog or cat they found. Some of the buccaneers roved outside the town, where they were attacked by Spanish soldiers, and one man was captured. To protect his men Morgan ordered that nobody was to leave the town perimeter unless as part of a company-sized unit. With his force in such bad condition, and so deep in enemy territory, he could ill afford to lose men in minor skirmishes, but intermittent firing continued throughout the day.
Morgan spent the night camped in the town ready for a Spanish attack which never came. The next morning he led his men south along the trail leading to Panama (known as the Camino de Cruces). San Lorenzo lay 70 miles behind them, while their objective was now only 24 miles ahead, along a firm road. The canoes were sent back to rejoin the rest of his river flotilla, leaving one canoe as a messenger boat. His small army was then divided into two main divisions, each of 400 men, preceded by an advanced guard of 200 men. This vanguard contained the best of Morgan's marksmen, and it was commanded by the highly experienced Dutch buccaneer Laurens Prins. This deployment was vital given the terrain: a region of hills, passes and woodland which extended for almost 15 miles before the hilly inland plateau gave way to the flatter coastal plain. All went well for several hours until the vanguard reached a defile, where they were suddenly showered by Indian arrows loosed by a hidden enemy. Although their assailants fled and no men were killed, Prins remained cautious, and beyond the pass his scouts located the Indians gathered in a wood. Most fled, but a small group of Indians stood their ground and fought the buccaneers. The defenders broke when their chief was killed by a pistol shot, but the skirmish cost the lives of eight buccaneers, with a further ten wounded. Prins sent 50 scouts ahead of the vanguard, who reported that the Indians were attached to a larger Spanish force. Prins took up a position on high ground beside the trail and called for Morgan and his main force. After a tense delay it was found that the Spaniards had withdrawn back towards Panama, and the march continued. As dusk fell a heavy tropical downpour broke and Morgan's men sought shelter in a small village. There were not enough buildings to shelter more than a fraction of his men, so Morgan ordered that the buildings be reserved for weapons and powder, and the buccaneers including Morgan spent a miserable and hungry night exposed to the elements.
Dawn broke on Monday 26 January to find Morgan already marching south under overcast skies. During the early morning they were shadowed by Spanish scouts, who kept the invaders under observation from a distance, and shortly after 9am the buccaneers reached the crest of Culebra, the last hill of the inland plateau. It presented the buccaneers with a view of 'that desired place, the Southern Sea', or Pacific Ocean. If Morgan felt any foreboding when he saw a treasure galleon sailing south from Panama, he kept his thoughts to himself. Another more welcome sight lay closer at hand. Morgan's scouts found a large herd of cattle, which were promptly rounded up and killed. It is probable that these were some of the animals which the Indian auxiliaries had driven from the plantations along the Chagres River. Fires were started, the cattle were butchered and Morgan's men gorged themselves on the first real food they had tasted since leaving San Lorenzo nine days before. Esquemeling claimed that 'they devoured them with incredible taste and appetite. Such was their hunger that they more resembled cannibals than Europeans at this banquet'. The march was resumed in the afternoon, but this time the buccaneers had as much food as they could carry, and their objective was within reach. Spanish cavalry circled just out of range, yelling insults at the buccaneers, including 'cornudos' (cuckolds) and 'perros Ingleses' (English dogs). The buccaneers ignored them, and by late afternoon they sighted Panama through the trees. The buccaneers made camp behind a slight rise about a mile north of the city, and it was clear to everyone that battle was imminent.
During the evening Spanish artillery on the city walls fired an ineffectual bombardment at the buccaneer camp. A Spanish company also blocked the trail behind the buccaneers, effectively preventing them from retreating without a fight. Both these actions failed to alarm Morgan's men, who lit fires and cooked their evening meal. During the night Morgan's scouts had probed the approaches to the city, and revealed that a frontal attack was too dangerous. An approach along the axis of Camino las Cruces would be subject to fire from artillery placed on the walls and by flanking fire from outlying earthworks. A newly-built redoubt dominated the approach, containing even more artillery and a small garrison. Morgan therefore laid plans for an indirect approach march, using the woods to the west of his camp as cover.
The Battle before Panama
On the morning of 27 January Morgan formed up his men 'with drums and trumpets sounding' and began marching towards the city. His intention was evidently to divert the enemy, as he soon moved his men off the road to the right into the woods. The Spanish and the buccaneers lost contact with each other for a short while until Morgan's men reappeared on a small rise a mile or so to the west. The Spanish governor was left with no alternative but to face the buccaneers in the open field, as he was unable to redeploy enough of his artillery to adequately protect the western side of the city. Therefore in the mid morning the two small armies faced each other, separated by two miles of boggy open ground. A slight rise or 'hammock' dominated the open plain to the east of the battlefield, immediately to the front right of the Spanish line.
The Spanish were formed in line with their foot in the centre and their flanks protected by cavalry. The infantry were all militia, formed into four regiments, each of approximately six companies of around 50 men each. The formations were arrayed six deep in the current Spanish style, with the musketeers protected by pikemen (a musket: pike ratio of 2:1 was probable). The 400 militia cavalry were split into two squadrons, one on each wing. The Spaniards also had a trick up their sleeves, as they had rounded up a herd of several hundred cattle, which the governor planned to stampede into the buccaneer ranks at a critical moment. Governor Peréz de Guzmán commanded his troops in person, assisted by the Alcalde (mayor) of Panama, and an un-named Spanish army colonel, a military attaché to the Governor's staff. It is unclear whether he included field artillery in his line of battle. Artillery was readily available, but if used its part in the battle was not commented on by the participants.
Morgan dressed his men, who were organised into the three divisions which had been formed at Las Cruces. The buccaneers then advanced; 'their red and green banners clearly visible to the Spaniards É [who] were posted in a spacious field waiting for their coming'. Prins was on the left wing with his vanguard, Morgan remained in the centre with the main body, while another commander, probably Robert Searle, commanded the rearguard. Each main division contained less than 400 men, while the vanguard was formed from the remains of Prins' 200 picked men. As Esquemeling reports:
As soon as they drew nigh unto them, the Spaniards began to shout, and cry 'Viva el Rey' [Long Live the King], and immediately their horse began to move against the pirates.
This appeared to be an impromptu charge of the cavalry on the Spanish right wing, launched against Prins' division. The boggy ground slowed down the Spanish, and Prins was able to receive them in line with an organised volley from his buccaneers formed into three ranks:
Every one putting a knee to the ground, gave them a full volley of shot, wherewith the battle was instantly kindled very hot.
With half the horsemen killed or wounded, the remainder withdrew, a similar but less determined charge on the buccaneer's right flank was also repulsed. Musketeers detached from the foot units 'endeavoured to second the horse, but were constrained by the pirates to separate from them'. In other words, concentrated volley fire had pinned down the two wings of the Spanish army.
Peréz de Guzmán decided to launch his secret weapon, and called for the cattle to be released. The drovers promptly fled, and the cattle ran aimlessly between or through the two armies, or stampeded from the field. Driven frantic by the gunfire, the animals proved to be more of a hindrance for the Spaniards than for the buccaneers. As Esquemeling observed:
Some few that broke through the English companies did no other harm than to tear the colours into pieces, whereas the buccaneers, shooting them dead, left not one to trouble them thereabouts.
By this time the Spanish militia infantry had seen their cavalry wings dissolve, and their own ranks disrupted by stampeding cattle. As a last resort the Governor ordered them to advance on the buccaneers. They were met by a withering fire, and the advance stalled. They stood their ground for a few minutes and tried to exchange fire within 50 yards of the buccaneer line, but they were no match for the buccaneers
. . . which being perceived by the foot, and that they could not possibly prevail, they discharged the shot they had in their muskets, and throwing them on the ground, betook themselves to flight, every one which way he could run.
The poorly trained Spanish militia armed with matchlock muskets proved no match for Morgan's veterans armed almost exclusively with flintlocks. Peréz de Guzmán's attempts to rally his men were fruitless, and he fled towards the city, where a boat waited to take him to safety.
Many of the rest of the Spanish soldiers were not so lucky. The buccaneers offered them no quarter, and even a group of clergymen who came out to beg Morgan to spare the city were cut down, at least according to Esquemeling. It still might have been possible to stop the buccaneers entering the city, but the fleeing Spanish troops pouring through the gates prevented their closure. The buccaneers followed on behind, and although some Spanish gunners remained at their posts and fired at the attackers (probably mowing down some of their own routed troops), they were unable to prevent them entering the city. The buccaneers slaughtered anyone who dared to oppose them, and the Spanish inhabitants fled for the eastern gate and for the harbour, where they escaped in anything that would float. The chaos must have been indescribable, but by noon, Morgan had established complete control of the city.
The Aftermath
Panama proved to be a less than lucrative prize. All of the royal treasure had been removed in the galleon spotted by Morgan from the plateau, and most of the city's private wealth had also been removed before the buccaneers arrived. The richest Spanish prize in the Americas proved to contain little for Morgan's men to plunder. The buccaneers remained in the city for several more weeks, searching the hinterland for hidden plunder, torturing any Spaniards they found to reveal the location of secret caches of valuables. By February the buccaneers felt that they had extorted all they could from the region and retraced their steps to San Lorenzo and their ships. The mood of the buccaneers was volatile, as the average haul had come to less than £18 sterling per man (totalling roughly £50,000/$80,000 today), a fraction of the plunder taken at Porto Bello. Many accused Morgan of cheating them, so he quickly ordered his men to disband and sailed for Port Royal in mid-May, 1671. On his arrival he found that while he was away, Spain and England had made peace, which made his actions legally questionable, and any further attacks unacceptable. Before the end of the year he was taken to England to answer charges levelled by the Crown (at the insistence of the Spanish ambassador). Morgan was eventaully acquitted, and, to the chagrin of the Spanish ambassador, he was even appointed as the new Deputy Governor of Jamaica. He died in Jamaica in 1688 at the age of 53, his demise reputedly hastened by excessive drinking. The Panama campaign was Morgan's last raid, and marked the end of the English buccaneering era in the Spanish Main. What remains is the legacy of his achievements. He marched a make-shift army of lawless pirates over 100 miles through the jungles, swamps and infested rivers of Central America to take his private war into the very heart of the Spanish overseas empire. Although renowned as a great pirate chief, his exploits would stand alongside those of other more celebrated military commanders.
Note: Much of the route used by Morgan lies beneath the Panama Canal, which follows the Chagres River for much of its course. Panama was abandoned after Morgan sacked the city, and a new city built eight miles down the coast. The ruins of old Panama and San Lorenzo are now historic attractions.
by Angus Konstam
Suggested reading
Cruickshank, E. A., The Life of Sir Henry Morgan, (Toronto, 1935)
Earle, Peter, The Sack of Panama: Henry Morgan's Adventures on the Spanish Main, (New York, 1981)
Esquemeling, John, The Buccaneers of America, (London, 1685)
Marley, David H., Pirates: Adventurers on the High Seas, (London, 1995)
Parry, J. H., The Spanish Seaborne Empire, (London, 1966)
Pope, Dudley, Harry Morgan's Way: The Biography of Sir Henry Morgan 1635-1684, (London, 1977)
About The Author
Angus Konstam has written a number of books for Osprey, mainly on 18th century subjects. His recent work include Campaign 44: Pavia 1525 and Elite 67: Pirates 1670-1730. Angus previously worked as a curator of weapons at the Royal Armouries, London, and Chief Curator of the Mel Fisher Maritime Museum, Florida. His most recent work is Elite 69: Buccaneers 1600-1700, due for publication in June 2000.