Quebec is a place gifted with great beauty, situated where the mighty St. Lawrence River passes between the heights of Levy to the south and the magnificent Cape Diamond on the north shore. There, the river widens greatly, flowing around the large and lovely Ile d'Orléans, continuing east, past Ile-aux-Coudres, Tadoussac, Anticosti Island and the Gaspé peninsula, and into the North Atlantic.
In the 16th century, Europeans sailing west seeking new lands and routes to China encountered the mouth of the great river. In 1534, French explorer Jacques Cartier took possession of the country in the name of the King of France at Gaspé and the following year sailed upriver to where it narrows beneath the heights of Cape Diamond. There they found the Indian town of Stadacone, the site of present-day Quebec City. They soon landed and built their own small fort but this first settlement and the others that followed all failed, the last one being abandoned in 1543.
The increasing importance of the market for furs in Europe brought new interest in the northern part of America in the early 1600s. In 1608 Samuel de Champlain arrived with a party of traders and built the first habitation on the site. This time the small post flourished and the settlement grew. In 1624 a larger habitation with stone turrets was built. In 1626 work started on Fort St. Louis on top of Cape Diamond which, in time, became the Chateau St. Louis, the residence of the governors of New France and their British successors.
The post of Quebec was surrendered without resistance on 19 July 1629 to the English privateers Lewis and Thomas Kirke who arrived armed with letters-of-marque from King Charles I. (At that time Charles was assisting the Huguenots of La Rochelle against the besieging forces of Cardinal Richelieu; the Kirkes' crews included many resentful Huguenots). Champlain knew he could not resist the far stronger force of the Kirke brothers, especially as another five vessels were upriver at Tadoussac with their brother David who led the expedition. Champlain surrendered Quebec, and sailed to England with the Kirkes as their prisoner. However, by the peace treaty signed between England and France, New France was returned to France, and in 1632 Quebec was again under the French flag.
During the next decades, the post grew into a town. Its harbour was increasingly important as Quebec was the place where ships came and went carrying furs, European goods, men and news. Smaller vessels might make it to Trois-Rivières (founded in 1634) and Montreal (founded in 1642) but larger ships seldom ventured past Quebec. As French explorers travelled farther into the interior of North America, Quebec's role as the gateway to a vast inland empire increased. The French had explored the Great Lakes and by the 1670s they had gone down the Mississippi River; in 1682 the Gulf of Mexico was reached. Thus, New France was becoming an enormous territory whose boundaries on the east were the small settlements in Acadia (present-day Nova Scotia) and Placentia on the south coast of Newfoundland; going west along the St. Lawrence River valley, past Quebec, Trois-Rivières and Montreal, into the Great Lakes; and then south down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico. It formed an enormous arc right across North America.
But as impressive as it may have looked on a map, New France remained a weak colony in terms of population. It had only about 500 French inhabitants in 1641 and about 14,000 in 1689.
War with New England
South of New France, along the Atlantic seaboard, English, Dutch and Swedish colonies flourished. The Swedes were the first to be taken over by the Dutch, then the English took the Dutch colony in 1664 and renamed it New York. It was one of several colonies established by British settlers since the beginning of the 17th century in what was increasingly known as New England. The population growth of these colonies was spectacular. Some 40,000 settlers were already established on the seaboard colonies in 1641 and this had grown to a quarter of a million by 1689. Of the English colonies the most important were Massachusetts and Virginia. As time passed, the English colonists were increasingly aware that the French were carving out a vast empire in North America and would secure the fur trade for themselves. They were also convinced that the evil Papist Catholic missionaries and French officers were encouraging Indians to fight the Puritan and Protestant settlers of New England. As time passed, resentment grew among New Englanders. During the 1680s, relations between the Iroquois, supported by the New Englanders, and the French in Canada went from bad to worse until finally, in 1689, war broke out between England and France, and the governor of New York encouraged the Iroquois to stage a raid on Montreal.
On 4 and 5 August, a large Iroquois war party struck at the village of Lachine, just west of Montreal. The wanton cruelty during the raid both terrorized and revolted the Canadians. They wanted revenge, not so much on the Iroquois as on the New Englanders whom they judged to be the true culprits of this tragedy.
At this very time Louis de Buade, Count Frontenac, arrived in the colony for his second term as governor general. He was a crusty old soldier from ancient nobility, proud and temperamental, an experienced officer and shrewd man of action. Outraged at the news of Lachine, he accepted the advice of his Canadian officers who favoured a new sort of warfare —inspired by the Indians but carried out with European discipline by the toughest and most enduring men. With Frontenac, the officers of the French general staff at Quebec approved the views of Hertel de la Fresnière and other Canadian officers on the tactics that should be adopted: Attack the English colonies by land, in winter and through the woods, in the "Canadian fashion". Frontenac ordered that an attack be mounted simultaneously and as quickly as possible from Montreal, Trois-Rivières and Quebec.
Three mixed expeditionary corps composed of Canadian officers, French colonial soldiers and volunteer militiamen and Indian allies marched into the wilderness. The Montreal group, commanded by Jacques Le Moyne de Sainte-Hélène and Nicolas d'Ailleboust, approached the village of Schenectady on the Mohawk River north of Albany, New York, in late January 1690. It was the westernmost outpost of the colony of New York. They awaited nightfall before approaching the fortifications. One of the gates was ajar, blocked by the snow. No guards were on duty. The Montrealers entered silently and soon surrounded every house in the village. At a war-cry signal, the attackers knocked down the doors. The surprise was total and only a few inhabitants succeeded in escaping; sixty were slain. Schenectady was razed, although the survivors were spared; twenty-seven were carried off.
Two months later, on the night of March 27, the expedition that had left Trois-Rivières commanded by Hertel de la Fresnière himself, attacked the fort and village of Salmon Falls, near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Two hours later, nothing remained standing. The local militia arrived and set off in pursuit of the attackers; Hertel took advantage of this to set a trap. He and his men waited for the Massachusetts militiamen to make their way onto a narrow bridge across the Wooster River, then they fired, killing twenty and sending the rest fleeing. The expedition then set off to join the third attack force, that of commander Portneuf, which was headed for Casco within the limits of present-day Portland, Maine, which was taken and razed in May.
New England attacks Quebec
Outraged in their turn at Frontenac's response, the colonists of Massachusetts (which in 1690 included present-day New Hampshire and Maine) decided to go to the root of the trouble and take Quebec. Such an expedition would have to be carried out by sea. It was totally sponsored and underwritten by the colony itself. The way it was financed was perhaps an early example of "junk bond" trading: money to pay for the venture was raised by paper bonds, and they were to be redeemed on the value of the booty taken at Quebec. Sir William Phips, the most famous native son of Massachusetts — a sometime corsair who had made a huge fortune by salvaging gold and silver from sunken Spanish galleons in the Bahamas — was appointed to command. He had just captured the French outposts in Acadia without a fight and was the obvious choice.
The land forces were volunteer or drafted militiamen from New England. There were no British royal troops participating. (A delegation had travelled to England, requesting military aid, but King William was preoccupied that summer with the threat of James II in Ireland). The colonial troops consisted of about 2,300 men divided into seven battalions. Each battalion bore the name of its major commanding: Quincy, Phillips, Hutchinson, Henchman, Appleton, Gedney and Saltonstall. Most were from Massachusetts but a few companies came from the colonies of New York and Plymouth Plantation (then a separate colony from Massachusetts, just south of Boston). The battalions also appear to have included gunners from the Ancient and Honourable Artillery of Boston with half a dozen brass field guns. These men were probably gathered into an unofficial "Train of Artillery" during the campaign. Finally, perhaps as an afterthought to the perils of the new bush warfare recently practiced by the French, there was a band of about sixty Indians to act as scouts under Lt. Thomas Swift. Command of the troops was given to Massachusetts Lt.Gen. John Walley. In general, New Englanders came from companies of "Trained Bands" who drilled in emulation of European troops. Their tactical approach was thus totally different that of the Canadians.
Although quite late in the season for sailing to Quebec due to the weather worsening in September, the expedition was still launched and the 34 ships (by most accounts) of the fleet left Boston on 19 August. The largest ship was the Six Friends of 44 guns with 200 sailors; it was Phips' flagship. There were also at least three frigates of 26, 24 and 20 guns and probably several more; details on ships are largely unknown. Brigs and sloops usually armed with several cannons and swivel guns made up the rest of the fleet. The number of sailors, many with some experience in gunnery, must have been about a thousand men. The New England force therefore mustered a total of about 3,400 men. It was the largest military expedition in colonial America until the 1750s.
Phips had no reliable charts to guide him up the St. Lawrence River, so it was slow going. The trip took almost two months. On 16 October the New England fleet finally reached Quebec.
"Through the mouth of my cannons"
Phips and his New Englanders were quite confident that the French would be terrified by their arrival before Quebec. The cowardly and effete French would be no match for their hardy men and the place was expected to surrender immediately. As soon as he had dropped anchor not far from the city, Phips wrote up a fairly curt summons to surrender, with instruction to the French commander that he had an hour to comply. An officer with a trumpeter was at once sent to the city to present the summons. Reaching shore, the New England officer was blindfolded and escorted by two sergeants and an officer, amidst much hustle and bustle and catcalls, through the streets to the Chateau St. Louis. There the fiery Governor General Frontenac listened to the summons. After he had read it aloud, the New Englander pulled out his watch.
That was too much for Count Frontenac. He was so enraged at the tone of Phips' summons that he wanted to have the messenger hanged at once in full view of the Massachusetts fleet! He was restrained by the bishop and the intendant but not without some difficulty. One simply did not summon in such a way "un homme comme moi" (a man like me), fiercely proud, who considered himself to be the very shadow in the New World of his royal master, King Louis XIV, the "Sun King". Deeply insulted by Phips' impudence and viewing the whole lot of New Englanders to be a bunch of pirates, he answered the summons with a line which has since become famous in the history of New France and of Canada: "Tell your master I will answer him par la bouche de mes canons (through the mouth of my cannons)!"
Taken aback by Frontenac's defiant answer, Phips tarried for a couple of days, examining the city while his big ships fired their guns at it without much effect. Obviously, the French were planning to give him a fight. His envoy had seen a room full of determined officers and the city was full of warlike sounds and calls. Perhaps it was then that the full challenge oftaking a position as strong as Quebec dawned on Phips and his officers and men. This was a place where nature had almost built a fortress on its own. The addition of a few walls and batteries in well-placed positions made it near impossible to storm. Garrisoned by hardy troops, it was almost impregnable.
To man these defences Frontenac had gathered at Quebec about 900 soldiers of the colonial troops, the Compagnies franches de la Marine, out of the 1,400 in New France. These troops were regulars who had been sent to garrison the colony in increasing numbers since 1683. In 1690 there were 28 of these "Independent Companies of the Navy", each having an establishment of 50 men. They were not grouped into regiments and came under the authority of the Navy since that department was responsible for the administration and defence of France's colonies in America. These troops were more suited to a classic European-style siege than bush warfare, but Frontenac had also organized them into several temporary battalions to bring them into a field action if need be. While there was no distinct artillery unit, some of the soldiers were trained to man guns by the "King's Gunner" the artillery official who was part of the permanent staff at Quebec. Besides the Compagnies franches there was also a 25-man castle guard and the 20-man personal bodyguard of Governor-General Count Frontenac.
The other strong contingent was from the militia. Organized since 1669 on the basis of compulsory service by every man able to bear arms from ages 16 to 60, the Canadian militia was rapidly evolving into a formidable fighting force. This was due to its extraordinary adaptation to Indian-style bush warfare. Indeed, unlike New Englanders, Canadian militiamen hardly ever drilled at their militia musters; instead, they would usually practice shooting skills and deployment under cover. Some 1,100 militiamen were assembled at Quebec, including 300 from Montreal. There were also some Indians but their number appears to have been moderate, perhaps a hundred or so. The French defending force was thus about 2,100 men.
Attack
Phips now knew that the place would be very difficult to take, but he had to come up with a plan to storm it. The fortifications themselves were not all that formidable but he could plainly see that the site made almost any defensive works quite daunting to an attacker. A frontal assault seemed next to impossible; his troops were no doubt brave militiamen, but not professional soldiers, and certainly not material to send in a near-suicidal "forlorn hope" attempt. Possibly the weakest part of the French defenses was the northeast side, but even there the New Englanders would have to first cross the Beauport River before getting to the earthworks. However, this avenue seemed to Phips and his senior officers as the only possibility to crack French defences. They finally resolved to land troops at La Canardière on the Beauport shore, on the east side of the St. Charles River, while the fleet would bombard the city heavily. Accordingly, on 18 October, about 1,200 New Englanders landed under the leadership of John Walley. They were unopposed at the beach but, as they were to find out, the French had already chosen their own ground on which to repulse the New Englanders.
Frontenac, experienced old soldier that he was, expected the New Englander's land attack to come from that area. The banks of the St. Charles River had been built up with field fortifications on the southwest side. He was ready to reinforce the area with three battalions of colonial soldiers. Furthermore, he had already sent in strong detachments of Canadian militiamen with some Indians skilled in bush warfare in the wooded areas east of the river. Thus, on 18 October, led by regular officers, Canadian militiamen and Indians were soon taking aimed shots at the New England soldiers as they ventured near the woods shortly after their landing. The Canadians were almost invisible, hiding behind trees and fighting in Indian style, and they were usually very good marksmen. Losses were heavy for the New Englanders, who settled on holding their position in the open for the moment. In effect, the New Englanders could hardly move without being detected and shot at. They were, for their part, incapable of returning anything like adequate fire against the numerous skirmishers. This went on for a couple of days, the French forces constantly taking potshots from under cover.
Meanwhile, Phips' bigger ships had moved closer to bombard the city. Perhaps a diversion and even a panic was hoped for. But nothing of the kind occurred. Instead, the shore batteries proved more than a match, and four of the larger ships were pounded by French gunners drawn from the colonial troops. Riggings and hulls were much damaged, and finally the battered New England ships had to withdraw. In the artillery duel, the ensign of the New England flagship was cut down by an 18-pounder cannonball and fell into the St. Lawrence. Some hardy Canadians jumped in a canoe and went for it under a hail of musket shots. Their daring paid off and they triumphantly brought the prize back into the city, unscathed.
On the 20th the New Englanders on shore at La Canardière decided to force a crossing of the St. Charles River. They hoped to cross the river, carry the positions on the southwest shore, and then attack the city's earthworks. It was a difficult task, but Walley's men courageously formed ranks in the best European tradition and, drums beating and colours unfurled, tried again to get to the St. Charles River. However, just at the fringes of the woods, Canadian militiamen were waiting for them under cover and poured a heavy fire on the New Englanders. Wilting in the face of the Canadians' fire Walley's militiamen again fell back. Their brass field guns had been brought up at last but were badly manned. Finally, unable to advance further, the New Englanders retreated back to camp. The Canadians and Indians maintained the pressure thereafter by skirmishing closer and closer to the New Englanders' camp during the next day. By the night of 21-22 October the New Englanders were worn out and totally dispirited, seeing no alternative but a hasty withdrawal. They made a spontaneous general retreat to their ships, abandoning five of their field guns on the shore.
Triumph & Retreat
While the French and Canadians were now triumphant, the New Englanders had completely lost faith in the expedition. Every attempt had failed and they had suffered losses in men and materiel. About 150 men had been killed or wounded in action and many more would die of exposure and sickness. The French and Canadians had, at most, nine killed and 52 wounded (but only eight known wounded for certain). On top of this, bad weather was setting in. Soon the frost would appear. Everyone saw there was no hope of cracking the city's defenses. On the 23rd Phips and his fleet left Quebec and sailed back to New England. Such a late return trip proved very perilous for the fleet. At least four ships were lost. One was later encountered in the gulf drifting lifelessly, its crew all frozen to death.
Once back in New England, the problems associated with Phips' expedition were not over. The sailors and soldiers wanted to be paid some real money rather than worthless bonds and darkly murmured that they might take harsh measures to obtain satisfaction. They had not taken Quebec but might take Boston instead! The nearly empty colonial treasury now faced bills of some 50,000 pounds, with Massachusetts nearly bankrupted; Phips had lost a good part of his fortune in the venture. The colony's leaders were most alarmed and made some compensation. Finally, the militiamen and sailors were paid in paper certificates — the first paper money issued by the Massachusetts government — which quickly lost their token value.
Thus ended the first siege of Quebec. It was certainly no less glorious, if lesser known, than the famous later sieges of 1759 and 1775. The 1690 military defeat at the hand of Count Frontenac's New France, compounded by large-scale fiscal humiliations, would burden New England for years. Certainly one considerable lesson was learned by New England: Clearly, Quebec could not be taken by armies of colonials alone. To achieve such an objective, the resources of Old England would have to be brought to bear.
by René Chartrand
Suggested reading
Charbonneau, André, Desloges, Yvon and Lafrance, Marc, Quebec: the Fortified City, Pelican & Parcs, 1982
Filteau, Gérard, Par la bouche de mes canons: la ville de Québec face à l'ennemi, Septentrion, 1990
Myrand, Ernest, Sir William Phips devant Québec, Quebec, 1893
Parkman, Francis, Count Frontenac and New France Under Louis XIV, Little Brown, 1877
About the Author
René Chartrand, a native and resident of the province of Quebec, has written many books, including numerous Osprey titles, most recently Order of Battle 3: Quebec 1759 and Men-At-Arms volumes on the Spanish Armies of the Napoleonic Wars.