Tales of buried treasure on what the villagers believed was the site of the Battle of Toothole led to so much unauthorised digging on Cuttle Mill Bank in the 1930s that, according to Leon Goff, Fred Franklin of Plum Park Farm planted the area with trees and fenced it off. A tale like that calls for investigation. Cuttle Mill is on Watling Street, about three kilometres (two miles) south-east of Towcester. It is in the parish of Paulerspury, east of the hamlet of Pury End, where Leon Goff lived as a boy, and north of Plum Park. No Battle of Tootall, Toothill or Toothole is recorded as having taken place here, although there was a Wars of the Roses battle in Wales called Twt Hill. The Northamptonshire site appears to have a minutely local name, used in just one village, and was being claimed as the site of the final battle of Boudica's rebellion of AD 60 well over a century ago. No evidence was offered and since then other sites have been put forward, notably Mancetter, north of Nuneaton. It seems very likely that, wherever the fight took place, it was somewhere along the line of the road to Chester and north Wales that is known today as Watling Street. For convenience I use the modern place-names with a reference to the Roman name provided the locations are not too far apart.
The rebellion
The causes of the uprising of the Iceni and Trinovantes of East Anglia lie beyond the scope of this article. The events of the rebellion itself were, briefly, as follows. While the governor of Britain, Caius Suetonius Paullinus, was on active service with Legio XIV Germania and part of Legio XX Valeria against the Druids in Anglesey, Boudica, the widow of the late ruler of the Iceni, was flogged, her daughters raped and the kingdom plundered by the Romans. The British rose in fury and laid waste to Colchester (Camulodunum), slaughtering the pensioned-off Roman soldiers there, together with all other inhabitants, before their messages calling for assistance could be acted upon. On learning of the trouble Suetonius ordered part of Legio IX Hispania to move from Longthorpe, near Peterborough, to put down the rising and called for Legio II Augusta to come up from Exeter. The IXth, under Petillius Cerealis, was ambushed, possibly somewhere north of Braintree, and only the commander and his cavalry escaped. Meanwhile Suetonius made haste from north Wales to London, followed by his legions on foot. He found London impossible to defend and ordered the small trading settlement to be abandoned. He then moved north-west once more, along Watling Street, to a rendezvous with the XIVth, XXth and, as he hoped, the IInd Legions. The latter failed to show.
The causes of the uprising of the Iceni and Trinovantes of East Anglia lie beyond the scope of this article. The events of the rebellion itself were, briefly, as follows. While the governor of Britain, Caius Suetonius Paullinus, was on active service with Legio XIV Germania and part of Legio XX Valeria against the Druids in Anglesey, Boudica, the widow of the late ruler of the Iceni, was flogged, her daughters raped and the kingdom plundered by the Romans. The British rose in fury and laid waste to Colchester (Camulodunum), slaughtering the pensioned-off Roman soldiers there, together with all other inhabitants, before their messages calling for assistance could be acted upon. On learning of the trouble Suetonius ordered part of Legio IX Hispania to move from Longthorpe, near Peterborough, to put down the rising and called for Legio II Augusta to come up from Exeter. The IXth, under Petillius Cerealis, was ambushed, possibly somewhere north of Braintree, and only the commander and his cavalry escaped. Meanwhile Suetonius made haste from north Wales to London, followed by his legions on foot. He found London impossible to defend and ordered the small trading settlement to be abandoned. He then moved north-west once more, along Watling Street, to a rendezvous with the XIVth, XXth and, as he hoped, the IInd Legions. The latter failed to show.
The British destroyed London utterly and put everyone there to death in a variety of cruel ways. They then moved along Watling Street to Verulamium (next to the modern St Albans), which was inhabited by the Roman client tribe, the Catuvellauni, who had had the good sense to vacate the place. This town was also burnt to the ground after being comprehensively plundered. This destruction has been verified by archaeological evidence. The massive British force, encumbered with carts full of the warriors' families, resumed its march to the north, seeking to destroy the Romans. In order to level the odds, Suetonius placed his 10,000-odd men in a defile with woods to his rear and open country without cover in front. When the British attacked they were met by a shower of javelins before the Romans, in close order, pushed forward, beating them down with their shields and killing them with the sword. The British were driven back and their attempts to flee the enclosing wings of cavalry were hampered by the ring of wagons drawn up for their families to see the victory they so confidently expected. Tacitus gives the doubtful figures of 80,000 Britons slain for a cost of 400 Roman dead.
The historians
It is unusual to have contemporary reports of events of this antiquity, but in the case of the rebellion of AD 60 the account in the Annals of Tacitus comes fairly close. His father-in-law, Gnaeus Iulius Agricola, was a tribune of the XXth, and was in Britain at the time. It is not known if he actually fought in this battle, but his reminiscences could have supplied material for the account in the Annals. The later historian Cassius Dio adds nothing of value and, indeed, probably obscures understanding of the military operations.
In modern times the principal authority on the subject of Boudica's rising is the late Graham Webster, OBE, an archaeologist of great distinction. In his account of these events he draws on the work of Adrian Oswald and of Keith Scott as reported in The Transactions of the Birmingham and Warwickshire Archaeological Society in 1964 and 1973 in relation to the Mancetter site, but consideration of that site itself depends on assessments of the dispositions and capabilities of the troops at Suetonius' command. As Webster remarks: 'The site of the great battle which decided the fate of Roman Britain will never be known for certain, unless some quite remarkable finds are made, such as a mass burial with closely identifiable weapons in association.' Such a find seems extremely unlikely as the weapons, most certainly, would have been plundered by the victors. All it is possible to do, therefore, is juggle uncertainties - a fascinating and enjoyable pastime!
The provisional plan
The immediate problem is that the British are making a mess of the purpose of the province - the extraction of wealth. Some writers suggest that it was in Suetonius' interest to draw the British as far north-west as possible, but this could only be achieved at the sacrifice of the tax-generating south-east, a cost a Roman governor would be unwilling to incur. Further, it would take time to get the IInd up from Exeter. The message to move would take six or seven days to reach Poenius Postumus, its commander, and even if he got on the move at once it was about five days to Cirencester and another five days to any possible point for a meeting on Watling Street.
There is no evidence at all for the suggestion that follows, but equally there is no evidence of any plan whatsoever; the ancient chroniclers are silent. To order the XIVth and that part of the XXth that were with Suetonius in north Wales to follow him down Watling Street at a brisk but sustainable pace is an obvious thing to do. Either they meet their commander in London or he meets them at some point as he returns. It is a secure and sensible arrangement. The difficulty is what to tell the IInd to do. The solution is to order them to a holding point from which they can then be moved to the final meeting place, to put them somewhere west of Watling Street in a place from which they can be sent in a number of different directions, at pace, as needed. The answer is Bicester or, more accurately, Alchester. From Cirencester Akeman Street will bring them there in four days, either to be sent for from St Albans or London, or to be sent north to join the Foss Way to High Cross, or to be ordered north-east to Towcester. If, as some writers suggest, the IInd was at Gloucester, Alchester remains a suitable destination. Whatever the reconnaissance reveals, Suetonius will have his legions at the ready, as close to the enemy as is prudent and saving as much as possible of the productive part of the province.
The actuality?
Off goes Suetonius to arrive in London eight or nine days later. The town cannot be defended, so he orders everyone to leave. Those who disobey die horribly in due course, but the sensible make for Silchester or Chichester, even for Gaul. Suetonius turns north, warning the last hangers-on to clear out of Verulamium. British progress is slow as they spend too much time looting and burning; indeed, they had not even reached London before Suetonius. Further, they have a great train of followers, for the warriors have brought their families with them and the great, creaking, lumbering mass moves at best at a third of the pace of their adversaries.
As he journeys up Watling Street once more Suetonius decides that, with two and a half legions, a force he cannot increase in any case, he can and must bring the British to battle and defeat them. At St Albans he detaches a messenger to ride up Akeman Street to Bicester and bring the IInd to meet him at Towcester. That Poenius Postumus, perhaps beset with rebellious British at Exeter, has not even set out is not known to him.
Twelve days' march has brought the XIVth and XXth to Towcester just as their commander arrives from the south. The IInd can be expected the next day, but instead the messenger arrives to report their absence from the rendezvous. The 10,000 men at Towcester are it. Should they fall back to seek a better position? It would be possible to make a stand at Weedon Bec, about halfway to the next fort to the north, Bannaventa (Whilton Lodge), but the place is without facilities. Beyond that the land flattens and broadens, offering greater scope for the chariots of the Britons. If a place can be found in which they can have the advantage of terrain, the Romans will fight nearby.
Cuttle Mill
Towcester was neither very large nor well positioned for battle other than siege defence. It was a victualling place, sitting between the little streams of the Tove to the north and Silverstone Brook to the south. The name, Lactodorum or Lactodurum, is made up of the Celtic word for a fort on low ground, 'duro', and an obvious reference to milk. A secure place in a land of plenty, this had already been a fort and market town for at least a hundred years and so it was to continue for many years to come; no evidence of burning or sacking in Roman times has been found. If they had moved further north up Watling Street the British would have been curiously forbearing to spare the place. The broad, flat water-meadows stretch away 11 km (7 miles) south to the yet broader, equally flat valley of the Great Ouse. The marshy fields of winter would, by now, early summer, be firm and covered with rich grazing. On the higher land bounding the western side of the open country Watling Street runs along the ridge, the boundary between the Whittlewood Forest and the open country. Three kilometres (2 miles) south-east of Lactodorum a stream cuts back into the ridge, forming a narrow, flat-bottomed valley facing the open grazing lands. Into this valley the road dips, crossing at what is now called Cuttle Mill.
Here Suetonius could position his troops, backed, like a hermit crab in its shell, into the shelter of the wood-topped hillside. Just as Tacitus described.
Suetonius had the XIVth and part of the XXth legion and some auxiliaries and cavalry. Estimates of the number of men vary from 10,000 to 13,000, but assuming that there had been some falling-out on the long march from Wales, a reasonable guess might be that his hard-fighting infantry, the legionaries, numbered some 6,000. A full one and a half legions would have given him about 7,200 men. These are the men that count when considering deployment in a defile because they fight best on flat country; the auxiliaries can occupy the flanking slopes and the cavalry can be placed outside them in turn, but if the infantry are to withstand a British charge, a slight slope away from them is ideal.
Experiments carried out by the Roman Military Research Society suggest that men in the front line about to throw javelins need to be at 1.8 m (6 ft) intervals. They can then close up a little. However, they must leave enough room to change places with men to the rear because the combined efforts of pushing with the shield and striking with the sword can be sustained for only about six minutes. Assuming no casualties and taking a single front-line cohort eight ranks deep, a man might have up to 45 minutes rest between bouts of fighting. Obviously that figure is open to innumerable doubts and variations, but the principle is clear. It is the expectation of casualties and the need for tactical flexibility that leads to a formation of four cohorts in the front line with three in each of the two supporting lines. A fully manned front line of limited width could be sustained in this way for some hours. With one and a half legions and thus six front-line cohorts, each with a front line of 60 men, the total infantry front is about 750 m (2,460 ft). On their flanks the auxiliaries provide a flexible support on the slopes, ready to descend to the plain as the main body advances. Outside them the cavalry are ready to enfold the enemy flanks and pursue the fleeing. Suetonius' position must satisfy these criteria.
The Roman road still runs past Cuttle Mill. Driving north on the A5 from Milton Keynes you are actually travelling Thomas Telford's Great Holyhead Road. It follows the line of Roman Watling Street closely, but where the Romans were prepared to march straight up a hill, the stagecoach hurrying Mr Pickwick to his dinner at the Saracen's Head (then the Pomfret Arms) in Towcester could not manage the incline. The road was therefore modified to veer east of the public house that once stood opposite the water mill and curl back west to ease the slope before rejoining the line of the old road. Indeed, visitors today can see that the remains of an earlier modification give access to houses east of the road. The old pub has, since the 1930s, collapsed, maybe because of the vibrations of heavy traffic, and the site is now part of the much changed range of buildings west of the road. A length of the agger, the embankment which carried the Roman road, is still to be seen, in line with the road on the far horizon, when looking south from the public footpath that strikes west halfway up the hill. To the north, on the top of the ridge, a road heads north-east from the A5 towards Shutlanger and Stoke Bruerne through the tiny hamlet of Heathencote, from which a public footpath runs east, descending on to the plain before climbing again to Alderton. Alderton stands on the southern ridge along which a north-east to south-west road goes to connect it to Paulerspury. From Alderton the public footpath to Heathencote joins another path that follows the stream coming from Cuttle Mill back to the A5 on the bridge and embankment above the water. The whole area can thus be explored on public footpaths.
The 90 m (300 ft) contour almost touches the A5 at Cuttle Mill and following that contour north and south of the valley takes you to a point where it turns sharply to left and right. The distance between these corners is 750 m (2,500 ft), and the line between the corners is parallel to, and 500 m (1,700 ft) from, the road. In front the land falls away gently towards the river Tove, 1,500 m (5,000 ft) distant, where the spot height is 78 m (300 ft). The position satisfies the criteria set out above. From the field gate on the road just west of Pury Farm on the road to Alderton the whole position can be seen in winter. I have not visited that viewpoint in summer, but it may be visible then as well. From Suetonius' point of view it is perfect. The rear of his force is in contact with the road to Towcester and possible reinforcements from Bicester (Alchester) coming along Akeman Street. To the south Watling Street passes through the Whittlewood Forest, which occupies all the higher ground west of the Tove valley, and so the cavalry can prevent any attempt to outflank him there. The northern flank is protected by the Heathencote spur, which today furnishes visitors to Towcester races with such a fine view of the course. The spot height on the summit over which Watling Street passes near here is 121 m (397 ft) and the spot height at the crossroads with the Alderton-Paulerspury road is 114 m (374 ft).
Selecting a position in a defile closed in behind by a wood, and having made sure that there was no enemy but in front, where there was an open flat ground unsuited for ambuscades, he drew up his legions in close order, with the light-armed troops on the flanks, while the cavalry was massed at the extremities of the wings.
Tacitus: Annals, trans. G. G. Ramsay.
The alternatives
Although there seems to be a good argument in favour of the Cuttle Mill site, it has not, as far as I know, previously been advocated in anything other than folklore. Also suggested locally is a site north of Stowe Nine Churches, near Weedon Bec. Here Watling Street climbs over the ridge on which Stowe sits and descends on to the flat valley bottom to cross the River Nene at Weedon Bec. From the village a ridge climbs away to the south-west along the northern side of the valley and the road along it goes, after turning east at a crossroads, back to Stowe and the A5. At the apex of the valley is a pre-Roman fortified site known locally as Castle Dykes. A number of features lead me to reject this as the battle site. First, it is not close to any known Roman camp or facility; indeed it is about halfway between Lactodorum and the next camp at Whilton Lodge (Bannaventa). It is thus unsuitable as a place to wait for the British for, perhaps, several days and it lacks a Roman road for possible reinforcement from the south-west. Second, it has the road forward of the Roman positions and far from placing Suetonius in a superior position, it puts him between steep hillsides with their summits 50 m (164 ft) above the valley floor. Third, the flat area in front of what would have been the Roman line, approximately along the modern railway embankment, would probably have been much more marshy than the site further south at Cuttle Mill as it is fed by two larger streams. Finally, the evidence of the area being wooded at the time is missing. All that being said, the terrain makes this the second best option in my view.
Webster favours Mancetter. He is, as we all must be, suitably tentative. He proposes that Suetonius followed a different strategy and intended his forces to gather either at Wroxeter or at Wall while he made the dash to London. The Foss Way from Cirencester is not mentioned. Two objections to this conjecture arise at once. The IInd was, according to Webster, at Exeter, which is as far from Wall as it is from London. Why he should want them to make a forced march to a point so far from the enemy it is hard to understand. Additionally, it was impossible to be certain which way the British would go and to concentrate all one's forces in nine days' march from London seems unwise. Second, why the XIVth and XXth legions, coming down from Wales, should be halted so soon, well beyond the southern edge of the military zone, is also difficult to understand. In any case, developing from the idea of this rendezvous, it is suggested that the commander dashes back from London and then leads a cautious advance along the road over the bald and unpromising terrain towards High Cross (Venonis), the junction with the Foss Way, which is an alternative route for the IInd. Between Wall and High Cross, on the south-eastern edge of Atherstone, is Mancetter, Manduvessedum.
Not much is left of old Mancetter. The B4111, a minor road to Nuneaton, leaves the A5 at a large roundabout, heading south-west initially, then curling round to the south-east. Shortly after the church a road to the left, Mill Lane, leads towards the River Anker which Watling Street bridges near the roundabout and which flows its meandering course between the A5 and the railway embankment. The Coventry canal also makes use of the easy east/west route. There is no Roman road to the south-west less than half-a-day's march away, but there is one to the north-east, to Leicester (Ratae). As a sign in Mill Lane explains, the Romans built a fort here, probably an earlier, fortified marching camp.
The intrusion of modern transport facilities adds to the difficulty of interpreting the site. The defile said to be the one of which Tacitus wrote is south of the railway and cannot be seen from the river or the B4111 road. Above the line of railway and canal the hills rise up from 90 m (300 ft) at their base to over 160 m (530 ft) and into the face of the slope is set a rectangular bite about 2,000 m (6,600 ft) long and 1,000 m (3,200 ft) deep in which the ground rises in irregular knobs through 70 m (240 ft). This is proposed as the defile. In front of this the Anker runs through its valley on about the 72 m (240 ft) contour beyond which the land rises in a step to the level of the A5 at about 80 m (270 ft). It is suggested that the left of the line was anchored on the fort and the right on 'the hills to the east'. There are no hills to the east. In fact, there is no obstacle to the Romans being outflanked on left or right, as the fort can easily be by-passed. The obstacle that does exist, the river running clear across the battlefront, is not mentioned by Tacitus. If the battle took place here, the Anker must have interfered with the initial British charge before becoming the site of considerable slaughter. It would have run red with blood, an event no decent journalist could resist.
The supposed battlefield is bounded by the A5 to the north-east, the B4111 to the west and south-west by the Coventry canal (the other side of the railway embankment) while the road running north-east from the railway bridge back to the A5 is approximately the axis of the right wing auxiliaries, the legions to their left and the cavalry to their right. On this road, Woodford Lane, a parking place for one or two cars is found, north of the river, where a well-marked footpath starts to the north-west. A walk along this path gives a view of the river to the left and leads to a cart track, which continues to another public footpath to Mancetter and Mill Lane across an area said to have been a Roman settlement. Walking along the B4111 is possible, but not pleasant. There is no footway and quite a lot of traffic. The towpath of the canal can also be walked.
My guess
In the light of the evidence, the solid evidence, we can conclude nothing, for it is so slender; just Tacitus. What we do know is that Suetonius began the campaign against Boudica knowing little or nothing of what she was doing or what she intended. He must, therefore, have adopted the most flexible strategy possible. We also know that the Romans knew the ground all up and down Watling Street. They had marched back and forth over it, and even if he had done so with his eyes shut going to Wales, Suetonius would have carried out a continuous assessment of the terrain as he dashed south to London. That he should deliberately choose the open country, perfect tank or chariot country, north of Nuneaton rather than the ridge and re-entrant of Northamptonshire seems to me unlikely in the extreme. But then, Northamptonshire is where I live, and who would not wish to have a site of such crucial importance close to home?
by Martin Marix Evans
Further reading
Allen, Stephen, Warrior 30: Celtic Warrior: 300 BC-AD 100, Osprey, 2001
Campbell, Duncan B., New Vanguard 89: Greek and Roman Artillery 399 BC-AD 363, Osprey, 2003
Cowan, Ross, Warrior 71: Roman Legionary 58 BC-AD 69, Osprey, 2003
Gilliver, C. M., The Roman Art of War, Stroud, 1999
Johnston, David E., Roman Roads in Britain, Bourne End, 1979
Ordnance Survey map, Roman Britain, Southampton, 1991
Ordnance Survey map, Northampton & Milton Keynes, Landranger 152, Southampton, 1995
Ordnance Survey map, Towcester & Silverstone, Pathfinder 1023 (SP 64/74), Southampton, 1989
Ordnance Survey map, Tamworth, Nuneaton & Hinckley, Explorer 232, Southampton, 1999
RCHME, An Inventory of the Historical Monuments in the County of Northampton, Vol IV, London, 1982
Simkins, Michael, Men-at-Arms 46: The Roman Army from Caesar to Trajan, Osprey, 1984
Sumner, Graham, Men-at-Arms 374: Roman Military Clothing (1) 100 BC-AD 200, Osprey, 2002
Webster, Graham, Boudica, revised edition, London, 1993
Wilcox, Peter, Men-at-Arms 158: Rome's Enemies (2): Gallic and British Celts, Osprey, 1985
Wood, Michael, In Search of the Dark Ages, London, 1981
Woodfield, Charmian, 'Prehistoric and Roman Towcester' in Towcester, The Story of an English Country Town, Towcester, 1995
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the following for their assistance in the research carried out for this article: Glenn Foard, Leon Goff, Geoffrey Holbrooke, Len Morgan, Tony Spicer, Chris and Rachel Weissang and Charmian Woodfield and also to The Battlefields Trust and to the Roman Military Research Society. It is a source of sorrow that the opportunity to discuss the content of this article with Graham Webster has been denied.