Bannockburn is one of the most famous battles in British history. Yet its location, the size of the armies involved —and what actually happened that midsummer's day—remain controversial. Historian Peter Traquair's book, Freedom's Sword, analyses the Anglo-Scottish wars from Wallace's rising to the Treaty of Berwick in 1354. He disentangles the true story from centuries of myth-making and modern nationalist propaganda. Bannockburn took place less than halfway through a 60 year period of Anglo-Scottish warfare, yet is often portrayed as the end of the business.
In 1313 Robert Bruce's brother Edward made an agreement with the governor of Stirling Castle, which was besieged by the Scots. Unless the fortress was relieved by an English army by 24 June 1314 it would surrender. Both sides bought themselves time, but, with the Scots unwilling to abandon the siege, it committed Robert Bruce's hitherto successful guerrilla army to pitched battle with the English.
Edward II marched north, confident not just of relieving Stirling but of bringing the Wars of Independence to a close. Conscious that no English king had been defeated in Scotland for more than 600 years, Edward was 'light of heart' as if on a pilgrimage, according to the Monk of Malmesbury, writer of the Vita Edwardi Secundi. His army straddled miles of countryside. From a distance, the land glittered as the sun reflected off polished armour and banners fluttered in the breeze.
It was a spectacle which stirred Robert Keith and William Douglas who had been sent to reconnoitre. They returned to the Scottish camp to inform Bruce that he faced 'the stoutest men in Christendom'. Bruce was shrewd enough to suppress the news, telling his men that the English approached in disarray. He well understood that battles could be won and lost in the combatants' minds before a single blow was struck.
For all its glittering armour, the English army had been late to assemble. With the midsummer deadline for Stirling's relief only a week away, the army had to make a gruelling forced march to reach the castle. The host moved along the Tweed valley and then up Lauderdale, arriving at Edinburgh on 19 June and a rendezvous with ships carrying fresh provisions at Leith. It rested two days, waiting for the arrival of the rear of the army and for contingents that had arrived too late for the muster. The army set out again early on the morning of 22 June, compelled to make a hot, dusty, forced march, covering 20 miles to reach Falkirk – still 14 miles short of Stirling. On the following day they pushed on. A tired
host arrived three miles from Stirling a day early. By the terms of the covenant agreed between the governor of Stirling and Edward Bruce, the castle had been relieved.
The following two days have been the subject of intense scrutiny from historians ever since. Speculation has often succeeded in confusing an already complex story. The very size of the armies remains contentious (see p.16). The most that can be said of the opposing forces is that the English army was larger, and that its superiority was greatest in cavalry.
Bruce prepares
The first seal of Robert Bruce, in use 1313-16. It follows the basic pattern of English seals. In 1316 Robert had another seal made, inspired by that of King Louis X of France. (Author's collection)
Bruce led his army from their mustering point at Torwood to New Park, two miles from the castle. He had chosen his ground well. The road to Stirling castle passed through this area of heavy woodland, where it would be difficult for the English cavalry to deploy. The only open ground for cavalry lay before the edge of the wood, between the Bannock Burn and 'the Entry'. To guard against action here Bruce ordered shallow pits dug either side of the road. These were disguised with a light covering which would give under the weight of a horse. Caltrops, vicious iron spikes designed to injure or disrupt cavalry, were scattered too. To the east of the wooded plateau the land drops steeply towards the Forth into a boggy area known as the Carse. The incline would have prevented either infantry or cavalry from remaining in formation.
The Scottish vanguard, under Moray, was placed nearest Stirling by St Ninian's Kirk, from where he could look out across the Carse and intercept any flanking movement; Bruce himself led the rear schiltron, towards the English, guarding the entrance to the wood at 'the Entry'. The schiltron was the standard formation of the Scottish infantry. A tight 'box' formation protected by three rows of twelve-foot spears pointing outwards. If these units kept their cohesion they were practically invulnerable to cavalry.
On the eve of the battle he had deployed his men for retreat. The English had arrived late on the afternoon of 23 June. They were met by Sir Philip Moubray who warned Edward that the Scots had blocked the narrow road in the forest. He told him that the conditions of the pact made with Edward Bruce a year earlier had been met —a pitched battle was not necessary.
Bruce vs Bohun
As the bulk of the English army came together about a mile from the Bannock Burn, Edward ordered a halt. In the van the earls of Hereford and Gloucester could see activity across the burn. Whether the order to stop never reached them, or whether they ignored will never be known. The van advanced across the burn along the Roman road. Robert Bruce could be identified by the gold crown that he wore over a leather helmet. The sight of this old enemy so close was too much for the Earl of Hereford's nephew, Sir Henry Bohun, who was leading a troop of Welsh infantry. He charged Bruce, who took up the challenge. Riding a more nimble horse, Bruce side-stepped Bohun's lance, rose in his stirrups and swung his axe through Bohun's helmet. The blow was so heavy it broke the axe into two pieces, leaving the head impaled in its victim's skull. Bruce's men moved forward to drive back the English, who had the worst of the following melee and Gloucester was unhorsed. It said much for the discipline of the Scots that they heeded Bruce's call to retire rather than follow up their victory in the chase.
Edward determined to carry out a flanking movement. He sent Robert Clifford and Henry Beaumont across the Carse with 300 mounted men-at-arms, intending to reach the castle. A strengthened garrison would have been useful for Edward. Located behind the Scottish army, it could have obstructed the Scots' retreat if they lost the battle. Clifford crossed the Bannock and moved parallel to the escarpment, but well away from the trees. They ran into Moray's 'battle', one of the sections into which the army was divided, which seems to have moved down the embankment and reformed—a dangerous and exposed manoeuvre. Henry Beaumont was heard to call out 'Let them come on, give them some ground' so that he could have space for the cavalry to operate. Thomas Grey questioned the sense of charging the schiltron; after all, Moray's men were on foot, so it would have been easy for Beaumont to evade them and reach the castle. Instead Beaumont challenged Grey's courage, a charge to which hot-headed knights had one response. Grey spurred his horse between Beaumont and Sir William Deyncourt and charged into the thick of the schiltron taking Deyncourt in his wake. Grey's horse was killed beneath him and the schiltron opened up to take him prisoner. Deyncourt was killed.
It was a small, but desperate engagement. In the heat of the late afternoon the combatants became soaked in sweat. As the knights circled the schiltron, trying to break into its wall of spears, a cloud of dust veiled the scene. The knights resorted to flinging spears, darts, knives, swords and maces at the infantry. As the other 'battles' looked on, James Douglas pressed Bruce to allow him to relieve Moray. Bruce eventually agreed and Douglas led his men down the escarpment. When the English saw them they drew off. Moray counter-attacked, dividing Clifford's force so that some headed back to the host, others in the direction of Stirling castle.
The English called a halt to any further attacks that evening, deciding to move the bulk of the army across the Bannock Burn. The army then settled down for a restless night. Fearing a night attack—the Scottish army was only a mile or so away—the camp was well guarded, the soldiers keeping themselves awake with drinking and revelry while the last elements did not cross until shortly before dawn. Some of the infantry may have remained on the other bank with the baggage train.
The Second Day
Edward was determined to force a battle. With the English across the burn it would be difficult for the Scots to break camp. Bruce's clash with the English van had shown that the road was not passable, and had no room for cavalry action. In any case, why should Edward fall into the trap Bruce had so carefully prepared for him? Clifford and Moray's engagement had shown that there was firm ground between the Carse and the wood where cavalry could be deployed. This final site was not a battlefield of Edward's choosing, but he, together with the rest of the leadership, did not believe the Scots posed a threat to the whole English army.
The English were tired, the forced marches in the hot sun over the past week meant that there had been little time to rest or feed men or horses. They had lost confidence after the day's skirmishes. Worst still, Bruce knew it. Alexander Seton had entered into a solemn bond at Cambuskenneth abbey with Gilbert
Hay and Neil Campbell 'that they fought to defend the freedom of the kingdom and Robert lately crowned king, against all mortals, French, English and Scots, to their last breath.' Hay and Campbell became two of Bruce's most constant companions, but Seton had returned to his Lothian estates and remained in Edward II's peace. He now made a critical intervention. The night before the battle, Seton deserted from the English army and revealed to Bruce how disorganized and dispirited parts of it were. Indeed, Seton pledged his head that the Scots would win an easy victory if they fought the next day.
Bruce had been on the point of pulling back to Lennox. He passed up the opportunity to attack the English before they crossed the burn —as Wallace had at Falkirk. He now put the decision to the army, whose leaders unanimously called on him to fight. It is difficult to believe Bruce put the question without being sure of hearing the answer he wanted. A pitched battle risked everything. Defeat would mean the final loss of his cause despite all the ground he had won so expensively in the preceding years.
There was treachery in the Scottish camp too. During the night, the Earl of Atholl killed Sir William Airth and many others who were in charge of the Scottish supply depot. His motives are uncertain, but he may have been after Edward Bruce, who had seduced then abandoned Atholl's sister. Whatever the reason, Atholl's treachery was a powerful reminder—if any were needed— that Robert was still unsure of his friends, and that his enemies were still a force to be reckoned with.
The Scots emerged from the woods as dawn broke. Bruce had boldly decided to provoke the English cavalry into battle. As they reached the Carse the Scots formed into schiltrons. The only way infantry could withstand a cavalry charge was to stand its ground and attempt to absorb the force of the impact. The idea that the Scots attacked the English can be dismissed, the schiltron was still a defensive formation. Bruce took the Scottish divisions as close as possible to the English line. Then the Scots stopped, and braced themselves for the first cavalry charge. It was only after the first wave failed that the Scots assumed the offensive.
The English had remained under arms all night, but they were not arrayed in formation. Only Gloucester's battle was prepared, and even he did not have time to put on his surcoat, with its vivid De Clare coat of arms that would have highlighted him as worthy of ransom. The rest of the camp frantically prepared for the fight. Meanwhile, the Scots knelt in prayer. Barbour (whose source must have had remarkable hearing) has Edward II commenting to Sir Ingram de Umfraville:
"Those men kneel to ask for mercy',
'You are right,' Umfraville replied, 'they ask for mercy, but not from you.
They ask it from God for their sins.'
The 23-year old Earl of Gloucester counselled delay, voicing the concerns of older veterans who considered that the troops were in desperate need of a rest. In a fit of pique, Edward denounced him as a traitor—a typically absurd accusation.
The Lanercost chronicle has the fight beginning with an archery duel, in which the English and Welsh had some success against the few Scottish archers from Ettrick forest. It did not last long as Gloucester's charge interrupted the archers' line of fire. Tempers had flared between Hereford and Gloucester over who should lead the van. The honour would normally have fallen to Hereford, as hereditary constable of England, but Edward had offered Gloucester joint command as a favour. The dispute only ended when Gloucester spurred his mount and headed for Edward Bruce's schiltron. The result of his suicidal charge was as swift as it was predictable. He called for help from Berkeley, but if help came it came too late. Moray soon reached the rest of the English cavalry and desperate fighting took place along the front. The Lanercost Chronicle relates:
'The great horses of the English charged the pikes of the Scots, as it were a dense forest, there arose a great and terrible crash of spears broken and of destriers wounded to death'
When they failed to ride down the schiltrons with their first charge, the knights had no room to retire, reform and charge again. The horses suffered heavy losses and the men-at-arms were thrown to the ground. Many were trampled underfoot or suffered the final coup de grace from an axe-wielding Scot sallying from the schiltron. Others stood by helplessly since the front rank refused to retire and allow fresh troops to come up. The English infantry were stuck behind the cavalry and could only watch as the knights fell in front of them.
Edward finally managed to deploy some archers against the Scottish left. The forward march of the schiltrons had left their flanks exposed. But the archers were overrun by Robert Keith's light cavalry. Why Edward waited so long to bring the longbowmen into the action is one of the most puzzling aspects of the battle. It is unclear how many archers he had, but earlier writs for the year, later cancelled, summoned 5,000, with more from Wales. It is unlikely that Edward was short of archers at Bannockburn, and astonishing that they did not play a more prominent role. The longbow was the single most effective weapon against the schiltron.
Defeat
Even then the battle was still undecided. Bruce brought his own schiltron into the fray. Now all three Scottish divisions were fighting together. The English host began moving backward and the cry went up from the Scottish line, 'On them, on them, on them! they fail'. Then the 'little men', the undisciplined rabble, what Barbour calls the 'yeoman, swains and poveraille' (yeomen, servants and labourers), streamed from the Park, screaming 'slay, slay'. To the English, whose cause already looked lost, it seemed that a fresh Scottish army had reached the field. At the rear the army began to break up.
The Earl of Pembroke seized Edward's reins and with Sir Giles d'Argentine led an unwilling king from the field. Argentine and Pembroke escorted him towards Stirling. It was a prudent move, had Edward been captured his ransom would have sorely tested English taxation. As it was his path was barely clear, with the royal escort having to fight its way through. The Scots 'laid hold of the housing of the king's charger in order to stop him, he struck out so vigorously behind him with a mace that there was none whom he touched that he did not fall to the ground' (Scalacronica). Edward's horse was killed beneath him. Sir Roger Northburgh, bearer of the king's shield, was captured, as was the privy seal. The king did not gain entry to Stirling, perhaps reminded by Moubray that the loss of the battle would see the castle surrendered to the Scots. Instead, with a force of some 500 mounted men including Hugh Despenser and Henry Beaumont, Edward fled past the rear of the Scottish army and then took the road to Linlithgow and finally reached safety in Earl Patrick's castle at Dunbar. From there he took an open boat to Berwick.
Behind him the rout began. It was at this instant that the greatest loss of life occurred in medieval battles—a running man on foot stood little chance against a mounted knight. But Robert Bruce did not have many cavalry to follow up the victory. The 'small-folk' could have created more problems for the English, had they not discovered and plundered the wagon train. Many Scots left the field rich from the gold, plate, armour and cloth found in the wagon train. The English scattered, some following Edward towards Stirling. Bruce feared to leave the field in case they regrouped.
Disaster struck as sections of the army tried to cross the Bannock Burn. The Scalacronica describes how 'The troops in the English rear fell back upon the ditch Bannock Burn, tumbling one over the other', the 'Forth absorbed many well-equipped with horses and arms, and Bannock mud many whose very names we know not.' Another group of fugitives, including the earls of Hereford and Angus, his brother, Ingram de Umfraville, Segrave and Anthony de Lucy, made it as far as the English-held Bothwell Castle. But the Scottish warden, Walter Gilbertson, knew where his interests lay after Bannockburn. Struck by a convenient fit of patriotism, he took the barons under his protection, and then imprisoned them until they could be handed over to Bruce for ransom. Those left outside were slain.
The chronicles record the names of 37 men of worth among the English dead, a total never to be repeated in the Anglo-Scottish wars. The Scots lost two knights, William Vipont and Walter Ross. Gloucester's body was found by a Franciscan friar. It was taken to a nearby church where Bruce, Gloucester's brother-in-law, spent the night in vigil.
by Peter Traquair
About the author
Peter Traquair is the author of Freedom's Sword: The Scottish Wars of Independence (published by Harper Collins in 1998, paperback edition available in March 2000).
Suggested reading
Barbour J., The Bruce, ed. W. Skeat (Oxford University Press, 1968)
The Lanercost Chronicle. ed. J. Stevenson. (1839)
Traquair, P., Freedom's Sword: The Scottish Wars of Independence, (Harper Collins, 1998)
Armstrong, P., The Battle of Bannockburn June 1314: Heraldry, Armour and Knights, (Lynda Armstrong Designs, 1998)
Rothero, C., The Scottish and Welsh Wars 1250-1400, Men-at-Arms 151, (Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1989)