Five days after his very creditable performance at the siege of Toulon (see the Osprey Military Journal Issue 2.5), culminating in the town's surrender on 17 December 1793, Napoleon was promoted Brigadier-General. He was also named 'Inspector of the Coast', residing at Nice in the south of France. He was now responsible for all matters relating to the artillery of the French forces in that area. Things were certainly looking up for the young general — he was only 25 years old. His family was still impoverished but he soon used his new influence as a general officer to find employment for some of his brothers. This was not unusual in any country at that time — even in the land of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' — and elder brother Joseph became assistant-commissary, Lucien army storekeeper, while sixteen-year-old Louis was made one of his aides-de-camp.
This good fortune only lasted a few months. At that time it could be quite hazardous to be an official in France — these were the days of 'The Terror' presided over by Robespierre and his Committee of Public Safety, one of the darkest periods in the history of France. Dozens of nobles and suspected royalists, all condemned as 'traitors' by the new republican order, were guillotined daily in front of crazed bloodthirsty crowds. Increasingly, political scores were settled by beheadings, with opponents who were themselves republicans finding themselves condemned as traitors and executed. Like many in France, Napoleon was appalled at all this. When Robespierre's young brother, Augustin, a high republican official in southern France, recommended that Bonaparte should be sent to Paris to become commander of the Paris garrison, the young general flatly refused. It would have been a considerable promotion but Napoleon did not want to have anything to do with Robespierre. Many biographers have concluded that Napoleon was driven by blind ambition but his refusal of this promotion refutes charges that he had an insatiable craving for higher rank, this was a superb opportunity, yet he turned it down. Nevertheless, the government entrusted him with a secret mission to Genoa to assess its military potential and the 'civic and political conduct' of the French ambassador, Citizen Tilly, and his agents.
So off went Napoleon secretly to Genoa but, back in Nice, he found new political masters, Albitte and Salcetti, now in charge. Their predecessor, Ricord, had fled to Switzerland. In Paris, Robespierre secret trip was treasonable and, on 10 August 1794, Brigadier-General Bonaparte was arrested in Nice. From there he was brought under guard to nearby Antibes and imprisoned in the town's citadel, the Fort Carré. Whatever had been gained in the last few months now seemed lost but Napoleon was not to be discouraged. He spurned an escape planned by his ADCs, Junot, Marmont and Sebastiani, pleaded his innocence vigorously to the two commissioners and was released after 13 days for lack of incriminating evidence. These were risky times and less than a year later, it was Commissioner Salcetti who was being pursued by the gendarmes for political crimes. Bonaparte meanwhile was back on duty as artillery commandant in the army deployed on the Italian border. But this duty came to an end as a projected advance was cancelled. Thus General Bonaparte, now unemployed in Marseilles, left for Paris in May 1795 in search of new opportunities.
Once in Paris, Napoleon went to see Minister of War Aubry, previously a captain who had promoted himself general but had never been in action. The interview was stormy, Aubry deciding that the young general should serve in Vendée commanding an infantry brigade 'to age'. Napoleon angrily retorted that one 'grows old fast on battlefields' and refused to part with the artillery, his chosen arm of service. The incident is interesting in that it shows the deep attachment some officers had for their arm of service. It also shows again that Napoleon was not willing to take any command for the sake of ambition — Vendée could have been a good opportunity, but not for an artilleryman. The short-term result of his refusal was leave without pay and there followed a pretty lean period of time in Paris. He sold some of his belongings, courted other opportunities with politicians, even the possibility of going to Turkey as artillery general, and finally got a position at the topographical office.
But things were at last looking up. The very able Lazare Carnot had replaced Aubry and Napoleon had befriended Paul Barras, the most powerful politician in the Directory, the ruling faction in the post-Robespierre National Convention. In those turbulent days, a powerful faction of discontented republicans supported by royalists was openly rumoured to be plotting a coup to take over the assembly. Riots broke out and General Menou, commanding the troops in Paris, could not disperse the rioters and soon there were rumours that some of the army was siding with them. The politicians started to panic. At one in the morning of 13 Vendémaire (5 October 1795), Barras asked Napoleon to take over the command of the Paris troops giving him three minutes to answer. 'I accept,' answered Napoleon, 'but I warn you that once my sword is draw, it will not be sheathed until order is restored.'
Amidst the nervous politicians stood a calm and resolute General Bonaparte. He immediately issued a series of orders to prepare his forces, profiting from the inactivity of the insurgents. There were not many cannons in Paris and Major Joachin Murat, a young cavalry officer, was ordered to get the forty field pieces at Sablons into Paris in all haste. By morning, more troops were marching in and the guns were arriving at the Tuileries palace where the Convention sat. Troops were disposed to guard it and Napoleon went off with his guns to meet the insurgents, who were marching in two columns towards the Tuileries. The first and most powerful insurgent column was met at the St. Roch church; Napoleon's artillery was skilfully aimed towards the church steps and Rue St. Honoré and he opened fire with grapeshot. It swept the steps and the street and, within minutes, the insurgents were fleeing. The other column was also greeted with grape shot near the Palais Royal and they too fled. Mopping-up operations by infantry and cavalry followed and, by ten in the evening, Paris was calm and Barras could announce to the Convention that the rebellion was over. Brigadier-General Bonaparte had quickly and expertly crushed the insurrection. The next day, Napoleon's troops occupied the insurgents' bases. Later in the day, he was promoted General de Division (Major-General) and four days later, Napoleon was appointed second-in-command of the Army of the Interior. His name had been praised by deputies at the Convention and was in all the newspapers. Barely twenty-six years old, had become a popular general.
He was also in love. Shortly before, he had met a fascinating woman from Martinique: Josephine de Beauharnais, the widow of the former president of the Convention. She already had two children, Eugene and Hortense, was six years older than Napoleon and something of a 'courtisane' amongst powerful politicians; but he was smitten and proposed. She was no doubt attracted but most biographers felt it was more of a relationship of convenience for 'la belle créole' while Napoleon was wildly infatuated.
To have such a potentially powerful and popular general in Paris could eventually be awkward for politicians. Barras knew this and, as Napoleon seemed to show little interest in politics and much in his military profession, a distant but prestigious post needed to be found for him. As he showed much interest in southern France and the Italian border area, he was given command of the Army of Italy on 2 March 1796. It was a splendid appointment for Napoleon, who had already drawn up a plan to attack Austria via northern Italy. Now the government approved it and asked him to carry it out.
On 9 March, he married Josephine in a private ceremony. On 11 March, he left Paris to join his army. There was no time to lose as there were reports of Austrian and Piedmontese troops gathering on the border.
The Army of Italy
When Napoleon joined his Army in Nice on 26 March, he was greeted coolly by its senior officers. Men such Masséna, Angereau, Joubert, Berthier, Sérurier and Dommartin — many of whose names were to become famous — were experienced soldiers and felt young Napoleon to be yet another of those political creations from Paris they had endured many times before. They called him a 'street general' in allusion to his cannonade on St. Roch church. For his part, Napoleon found his army to be well armed but largely in rags, lacking various supplies and owed months of back pay. It was supposed to be 60,000 strong but numbered 45,000 and was indisciplined. Half of the cavalry's 4,000 horses were unfit for duty and the artillery only had 24 mountain cannons.
This was typical of the various French armies of this time. The great mass levies of 1793 and 1794 had indeed mobilised hundreds of thousand of men. The new battalions had been combined with those of the old royal army and the white-coated veterans had showed the tricks of the trade to the raw recruits in the new blue 'national uniform', which all would ultimately wear. Thousands of very professional, but royalist, officers had fled France to form royalist units to fight against the Republic (see Men-at-Arms 328: Émigré and Foreign Troops in British Service 1793—1802). So many company officers had come up from the ranks. While they had excellent practical experience; they had no formal training nor, more often than not, did their field officers and generals. Still, against all expectations, the French republican armies had first ousted the Prussian, Austrian, Spanish and Piedmontese invaders from France, then invaded northern Spain, Belgium, Holland and the Italian border area, securing Nice (the Var River was then the border). By 1795—96, French armies stood poised to 'liberate' the rest of Europe in the name of the 'Rights of Man'. However, practical considerations had now caught up with the armies. The government had run out of money and its erratic administration was a source of continuing confusion and inefficiency. The armies were in a state of destitution: lack of pay, lack of food, lack of clothes and lack of discipline bordering on near-mutiny. Napoleon's Army of Italy was no better. Indeed, because it was the furthest away from Paris, it was probably the worst provided for.
Many a general would have despaired at such an army but not Napoleon, who quickly issued a series of orders to restore discipline. Looters, for instance, faced the death penalty if caught; drill was almost constant and there were frequent parades. According to Angereau, later to become a Marshal of France, the senior officers were soon 'crushed' by his powerful personality. 'I will maintain order or will cease to command these brigands,' he wrote to the government in Paris. He immediately recognised the best talents of his officers — one of Napoleon's outstanding qualities — and made sure each served in his best capacity. Everybody was kept busy; but Napoleon's unique leadership qualities were best expressed in his extraordinary first proclamations to his troops. He went right to the point:
'Soldiers! You are naked, badly fed; the government owes you much but can give you nothing. Your patience, the courage that you show amidst these rocks are admirable; but bring you no glory … I will lead you to the world's most fertile plains, to rich provinces; great cities will be in your power; you will find there glory, honour and riches. Soldiers of Italy! You lack neither courage nor determination … You have no shoes, no coats, no shirts, almost no bread and your stores are empty; those of the enemy overflow with everything; it is up to you to conquer them. If you wish it, you can do it, let's go!'
He was in a hurry to fight: victory was the only way to keep the momentum up. The brilliant tactician of Toulon had lost none of his talents. Typically, while the French Convention uttered grand statements about invading Italy to liberate its populations from their evil lords and kings, there was no master strategy as to how this would be done. Indeed, the only thing that could be called a plan was the one worked out by Napoleon during his short tenure at the topographical office the previous year. He called in all the troops in southern France he could so that, by early April, he had about 61,000 men under his command.
His army already had a toehold in Italy and occupied the coastal area from Nice to just east of Genoa. Napoleon immediately moved his HQ from Nice to Albenga, just east of Savona, to be right at the centre of the area where most of his army was deployed. Another portion of the French army, some 20,000 men under General Kellerman, was spread along the Alps north of Nice. Holding the interior of Piedmont were various bodies of Piedmontese with some Austrian troops numbering about 40,000 men. Of these, the most powerful force was the 25,000 men north of Savona under General Colli, an Austrian officer detached to serve with the Piedmontese. Further away to the northeast in the area of Milan was a powerful Austrian army of 30,000 men with 148 guns under General Baulieu. This force was marching towards Genoa.
Thus, Napoleon faced about 70,000 men who were better paid and equipped. But the morale of the Piedmontese, considered the best troops by the French, was poor. Many Piedmontese, indeed many northern Italians, felt that they were caught in a struggle against the French that could only profit Austria. They had suffered many local defeats and had no love for the Austrians. The Austrians also wondered about their allies, as relations with the Piedmontese were tense, but they hoped to avenge the loss of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) by crushing the French in Italy.
Napoleon's men were certainly ragged but their morale was excellent and they were better led than the Piedmontese or Austrian soldiers. To prevail, however, the Army of Italy must immediately attack General Colli's Piedmontese force before it could unite with General Beaulieu's Austrians. Mustering some 40,000 men, the French moved north against Colli and formed a wedge between the Piedmontese and the approaching Austrians. Seeing this, the Piedmontese General Argenteau moved down with a mixed force of about 3,000 men to close the top of the wedge. It was a dangerous situation for Napoleon. If he did not move fast, his army would be caught between three opponents. But move fast he did. After a series of initial engagements, his men defeated Colli's and Argenteau's force at Montenotte on 12 April and other Piedmontese and Austrian troops at Dego two days later.
General Beaulieu arrived at Acqui on 13 April with the vanguard of his Austrian army and beat back a French advanced column at nearby Volpi. This initial success made him think he would easily overcome the rest of the French once he had joined up with Colli's troops by following the Spigno River valley. But Colli's force was already partly dispersed and retreating towards Torino while the remnants of Argenteau's men were also fleeing north with French columns hot on their heels. Thus far, the first part of General Bonaparte's daring plan had been successful, but there remained Beaulieu's 30,000 Austrians at Acqui. By now he knew that Bonaparte 's stronger force was bearing down on him in several columns and he cautiously moved back his army towards Milan to regroup leaving the French in control of much of southern Piedmont.
The Piedmontese, feeling powerless against the French, were eager for an armistice and Bonaparte obliged on 28 April. The Paris Convention had forbidden him to negotiate diplomatic terms but he was in a hurry and did not hesitate to dictate terms in order to knock Piedmont out of the war: an extraordinary achievement in less than three weeks of campaigning. In so doing, he had revealed himself to be a most skilful politician, cleverly combining force and ruse with decisive action and soothing words. To the Italians, he proclaimed that the French army had broken their chains, that the only enemies were the ruling tyrants.
Meanwhile, General Beaulieu was faced with increasingly unsavoury relations with the Piedmontese troops and civilians. Wherever his troops ran into them, they were accused of violating the armistice and were often openly favourable to the advancing French. Beaulieu, who initially favoured a stand at Alessandria, decided to retreat further east. General Bonaparte was keeping a close watch on his Austrian adversary and determined that his next step was to occupy Lombardy. Spurring his men on, he told them greater victories were ahead. Beaulieu had about 30,000 men while Bonaparte now enjoyed superiority in numbers with about 40,000 troops. On 9 May, led by Napoleon, the French crossed the Adda River at Lodi, southeast of Milan, and outmanoeuvred the Austrians in a series of engagements. Beaulieu could only retreat further east, out of Lombardy, to save the remnants of his army. General Bonaparte had beaten both armies.
Now came a short pause in the campaign. For all the great proclamations about liberty, equality and fraternity, the French ransacked the gold reserves and supplies of their new conquests and the behaviour of some of the 'liberators' was not always up to the lofty tone of their proclamations to the Italians. The city of Pavia broke into open revolt against the French. Bonaparte could not afford such dissension and fiercely crushed it, allowing his soldiers to sack the city. For their part, the Austrians were stunned at their defeat but were not about to give up. Indeed, General Bonaparte's army had to be stopped and chased back to Provence otherwise northeastern Italy and Venice would be threatened and after that the Austrian border itself.
Not surprisingly, the Austrians sent in more men and were joined by some Neapolitan troops — the Bourbon kings of Naples were anxious to oust the French, as were most of the governments of the states that then made up Italy. The largest corps bearing down on Bonaparte's army, now down to about 45,000 men, was an Austrian army of 33,000 led by the 70-year-old Marshal Würmser entering northern Italy from the Tyrol in mid-June. He was to join Beaulieu's retreating 18,000 men. However, Würmser had divided his army into three columns and Napoleon seized the opportunity to beat him in successive actions before they could regroup. On 31 July, the Austrians west of Lake Garda were stopped and beaten back at Salo. After an engagement at Lonato on 3 August came the battle of Castiglione two days later where Würmser's 24,000 men had to retreat before Bonaparte's 30,000. The third Austrian column of 5,000 men was further southeast in the Mantua area, a city that the French besieged.
In spite of these victories, the French army of Italy was getting weaker as reinforcements had not arrived, nor had promised supplies. It also had a large area to secure with about 38,000 effective men left to do the job. The Austrians had retreated north except for the 15,000-man garrison of Mantua, which held out and received reinforcements. By the end of August, General Würmser had about 55,000 men north and northeast of Lake Garda including 20,000 under General Davidovich. The Austrian wanted to raise the siege of Mantua and, combining all forces, at last crush the French south of Lake Garda. Once again, the Austrian army was divided, a fatal mistake, so that Davidovich's corps was held north of Lake Garda while Napoleon sent Masséna and Angereau to attack Würmser's left flank moving towards Verona. They struck at Bassano on 8 September and split Würmser's force, some retreating east to Trieste and Würmser himself seeking refuge in Mantua, whose siege was again taken up by the French army. It was yet another masterstroke by General Bonaparte, whose rapid moves confounded the Austrians. Such results were only possible with seasoned troops who had outstanding confidence in their general and his senior officers. Paris was overjoyed and Bonaparte was compared to Hannibal in fashionable circles.
General Bonaparte was not distracted. He knew victory would not be complete until the Austrians had been chased out of eastern Italy, a feat no French army had ever achieved. The Austrians too had a plan for attacking the French east of Lake Garda, raising the siege of Mantua and chasing the defeated French back to their border. General Alvinzi, an old and experienced officer, led some 60,000 men against Bonaparte's 36,000 in early November. Outnumbered, Bonaparte was nevertheless a genius at manoeuvre and caught the Austrians on their rear at Arcole on 17 November. It was a closely fought engagement but Alvinzi had to retreat. More troops came from Austria and Alvinzi tried again in early January. On 14 January 1797, he was defeated by the French army on the plateau of Rivoli — a decisive victory for General Bonaparte. Running out of ammunition and food at Mantua, much of the garrison was sick and now with no hope of relief. Würmser surrendered with his 13,000 men on 2 February. The gallant old soldier was granted all the honours of war in defeat.
With the Austrians badly shaken, General Bonaparte turned his attention to Pope Pius VI, who had foolishly sided with the crowned heads of Europe against the French Republic. Bonaparte marched south into the Papal States meeting hardly any resistance. The whole affair turned into a 'military promenade' ending on 19 February with the Pope's signature on a peace treaty at Tolentino. Meanwhile, about 20,000 men under Generals Delmas and Bernadotte were at last reinforcing the Army of Italy, which stood at some 56,000 men by early March 1797. It was in the nick of time as the regrouped Austrians, now led by Archduke Charles, tried again, but to no avail. Bonaparte's tactical genius and the talents of his generals soon had them in retreat and, by 28 March, the French had penetrated the Tyrol and were at Innsbruck. They seemed unstoppable and, on 7 April, Bonaparte was at Loeben, only 30 leagues (115 km) from Vienna. The Emperor Francis II called a truce and, on 18 April, hostilities ceased. The Austrians then stalled on signing a definitive peace treaty for several months while the French army retired back into Italy. During the summer, the French set up the Cisalpine Republic. Fed up with the Austrians' diplomatic delays, General Bonaparte gave them 24 hours to comply with his demands or he would resume hostilities. The next day, 17 October 1797, the treaty of Campo-Formio was signed. On 5 December, Bonaparte made a triumphant return to Paris and was greeted with full honours by the Directoire a few days later.
Barely a year and a half before, Bonaparte — a 'politician's' general who had never commanded an army in the field — had taken over the rag-tag army. The Italian campaign had revealed his extraordinary strategic intuition and his tactical genius. Also revealed was his charismatic ability as a leader of men. He was only 28 and already one of the most powerful generals in France and certainly the most talented. This worried many a Paris politician.
by René Chartrand
About the Author
René Chartrand was born in Montreal and educated in Canada, the United States and the Bahamas. A senior curator with Canada's National Historic Sites for nearly three decades, he is now a freelance writer and historical consultant. He has written numerous articles and books including over 30 Osprey titles. He lives in Gatineau, Quebec, with his wife and two sons.
Further Reading
Haythornthwaite, Philip, Men-at-Arms 257: Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy (Osprey, Oxford, 1993)
Hugo, A., France militaire. Histoire des armées françaises de terre et de mer de 1792 à 1833 (Paris, 1833), Vol. 1.
Norvins, M. de, Histoire de Napoléon (Paris, 1868)
Montorgueil, G., Bonaparte (Paris, 1910)
Sloane, William M., ‘Life of Napoleon Bonaparte’, The Century Magazine (February, 1895)