In my studies of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and the Marine Brigade in WWI, I came across a few mentions of the battle at Blanc Mont. I was intrigued by one quote of Marshal Pétain's that this battle was the ' . . . greatest single achievement of the 1918 campaign.' I had barely heard of the battle and it was common for historians of the AEF to gloss over it or overlook it altogether. What I discovered about Blanc Mont was that it was among the most successful actions of the AEF and was perhaps the least known. My interest piqued, I set out to ascertain why Blanc Mont was such an 'achievement' and perhaps more interestingly, why was it not better known?
The Germans had held the Blanc Mont area of Champagne, France since September 1914. This low, squat ridgeline dominated the region, allowing German heavy artillery to shell Reims. In the fall of 1918, the resurgent Allies were steadily retaking lost ground in eastern France. Blanc Mont's recapture would secure Reims and unhinge a large portion of Germany's Hindenburg line. If artillery could occupy Blanc Mont, the Germans would be forced into a 20-kilometer retreat to the Aisne River. General Gouraud's French Fourth Army had pursued this objective with only limited success. The Germans had used their four years well, digging deeply into the chalky soil of Champagne and had numerous reinforced, cemented positions and bunkers. They knew the attack routes perfectly and held the dominant terrain. Gouraud's tired and bloody divisions could make little impression on their defenses. To break the deadlock, the Commander of French Forces, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, asked the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), General John J. Pershing, for the loan of two or three US divisions.
By European standards, an AEF division was a large formation of almost Corps strength (27-28,000 men), with two infantry brigades, an artillery brigade and a large number of support troops. The US 2nd Division was a standard AEF formation except that one of its infantry brigades was composed entirely of US Marines. A Marine brigade consisted of two regiments of riflemen and a machine-gun battalion. Among the first US troops ashore in France were men of the 5th Marine Regiment. Pershing's hands were full organizing the AEF's 1st Division and he had to do something with these orphaned Marines. He ultimately assigned them, and the soon to arrive 6th Marines and 6th Marine Machine-gun Battalion, to the 2nd Division. Aware of the Marines' high standards and impressed by their bearing, he kept a company as his Headquarters guard at Chaumont. In August 1918, Pershing gave Marine General John A. Lejeune command of the whole 2nd Division, a unit that had proven itself among the top three of the AEF's 29 Divisions. The Marine Brigade in particular made a name for itself at Belleau Wood. The French were war-weary and with their manpower rapidly waning they hungered for fresh AEF reinforcements.
Lejeune accepts the Challenge
It was with great interest that General Gouraud received General Lejeune at his HQ in late September. Gouraud, a Gallipoli veteran, had lost an arm in France's colonial wars and still proudly wore the khaki uniform and anchor device of colonial troops. When he first met General Lejeune he related that he too was a 'Marine'. The French-speaking Lejeune told Gouraud of rumors to the effect that his combined Army/Marine division was to be assigned to the 4th Army. General Gouraud briefed Lejeune on his army's situation and the importance of Blanc Mont. A concerned Lejeune also reported rumors that his American division was to be broken up as reinforcements to the French. Gouraud asked 'Do you think your division could effect Blanc Mont's capture?' Lejeune quickly replied that if his division was left whole, he would guarantee its capture. Gouraud later related this conversation to Marshal Pétain and requested the American 2nd Division be assigned to him. Pétain, who had received the 2nd and two other AEF Divisions from Pershing, quickly agreed.
By 1 October, the 2nd Division had been assigned to the 4th Army and was deployed in a mostly reserve position south of Blanc Mont. On 2 October, Lejeune with his staff and brigade commanders attended a briefing at Gouraud's HQ. Gouraud assured Lejeune that his division would not be broken up, and he formally assigned the Marine general the mission of storming Blanc Mont. Lejeune listened to the French plan for the 2nd Division's assault which was intended for the next day. They were directing a brigade attack at an angle across the front of a neighboring French division, past Blanc Mont. This was to be followed by an oblique attack onto Blanc Mont proper by the following brigade. After a whispered conference with his staff, he expressed concern with coordinating artillery and the complex movement of his troops into the French battle area. The plan would also force the Americans to confront the heavily defended and aptly named 'Viper Woods' position. Lejeune then presented his own plan to send the Marine Brigade headlong at the objective. Leaving a 2,000-yard gap, the 3rd Army Brigade was to make an attack from the right converging on the objective. This plan would bypass the Viper Woods (Bois de la Vipère) strongpoint and bring the full power of the division on line. Lejeune's essentially direct approach banked heavily on his confidence that his Division would overcome what up to now had been Blanc Mont's impregnable defenses. He felt 'no doubt whatever as to the ability of the 2nd Division to overcome that resistance.' Gouraud agreed to this unorthodox plan and promised the required French supporting attacks to protect the 2nd Division's flank.
Lejeune's staff worked in a frenzy to produce the required orders and map overlays for the imminent attack. Timing was close. Brigadier-General Wendell C. Neville's 4th Marine Brigade was to receive its formal orders one hour before the attack was to commence. Fortunately, Neville's Marines were already occupying their designated jump-off positions. The 3rd Brigade of Army troops under Brigadier-General Hanson E. Ely had been in reserve and had to move to their French-held starting position. Unknown to them, the Germans had taken much of this ground the night before. Without the promised French guides, Ely's Brigade was forced by time to move to its jump-off position. In the morning half light, the German 213th Division fired on them. After a sharp fight, the doughboys seized their starting position and continued, apparently unperturbed and only slightly disorganized and behind schedule.
Médéah Farm and the Essen Hook
An intense Franco-American bombardment had begun at 0530 hours but lasted only 5 minutes. This drove the front-line Germans to cover. Later a German noted, 'By direct hits and splinters, [the bombardment] had rendered useless about 50 per cent of our machine-guns, there having been no opportunity to shelter them in the bombproofs'. Artillery fire then rolled slowly deeper behind the German frontlines. Unable to fully man the trenches, the Germans were dependent on machine-guns and strongpoint defenses. Marine and Army riflemen supported by 48 French light tanks followed dangerously close behind, 'leaning into' the barrage. They caught many defenders emerging from their bunkers. In the German main line of trenches 'hardly was the last man at his post when the Americans became visible, urging our men to surrender by waving at them.' The 2nd Division would ultimately be opposed by elements of eight dug-in German 'divisions' during the course of the battle. Most of these units were worn-out and weak. An officer of the German 200th Division said, 'I consider it my duty to call attention to the present condition of the troops. As a result of physical and mental exertions, the troops have grown apathetic and indifferent to such an alarming extent that I can no longer guarantee that, during a surprise attack, they will continue to hold the positions.'
The lead battalion, 1/9th Infantry, of BrigGen Ely's doughboys was soon thrown into confusion by effective German artillery fire but he sent another battalion forward and continued the attack. His objective was the Médéah Farm and the right side of the Blanc Mont ridge. The brigade encountered sporadic but effective machine-gun and rifle fire. Enfilading machine-gun fire from the flank was troublesome. French units on the right were unable to keep up with the doughboys' advance and Ely was forced to deploy some of his brigade facing his exposed flank as well as the bypassed Viper Woods. Ely's men still reached their objective as planned by 0930hrs. By noon, the French were able to linkup with the 9th Infantry at Médéah farm and provide the brigade some relief from threats to its right flank.
Brigadier-general Neville's Marine brigade had much the same experience as the doughboys in their attack. His objective was the main Blanc Mont ridgeline. Germans in the fortified Essen Hook position on the Marines' flank had stopped the attacking French in their tracks. Elements of the Cologne Landsturm (militia) and numerous machine-gun teams manned this post. They now turned their full attention to the advancing Americans. Their enfilading fire on the brigade's exposed left was especially galling to the advancing Marines. Captain Hunt, skipper of the 17th Company (1/5th Marines) at the tail of the brigade maneuvered into the French sector and onto the flank of the Essen Hook. Supported by a machine-gun platoon, regimental 37mm and 2-3 light French tanks, his men overran the Hook in a beautifully executed combined arms attack. Hunt handed over the position to the French and continued on towards Blanc Mont. As the Americans approached their objective, Leutnant Richert of the German 200th Division was on the phone to division HQ updating them on the enemy's steady progress. He then reported hearing American voices within his position. The last word his HQ heard was American Marine voices demanding the Leutnant's surrender. Though Marines and soldiers were now on the objective, they did not fully control it. The wooded Blanc Mont ridge was honeycombed with trenches and deep interconnecting bunkers and would resist pacification until the morning of 5 October.
The morning's attack on Blanc Mont had been no walkover as witnessed by the awarding of three Medals of Honor. Private John J. Kelly was the fourth son of Irish immigrant parents and a Marine in the 78th Company, 2/6th Marines. He was also a discipline problem from the infamous Southside of Chicago. At Belleau Woods and St. Mihiel, he won two Silver Stars and a Croix de Guerre. At Blanc Mont, he would earn the Medal of Honor during the morning's assault by racing through a barrage 'yelling like an Indian' to confront a machine-gun position containing 10 Germans which was holding up the advance. He grenaded the machine-gunner and shot an approaching German in the chest with his .45 automatic pistol. Kelly returned to his astonished company with eight prisoners. He would win another Silver Star later in the battle and yet another one in the Meuse-Argonne offensive of the following month. In 1919 he mustered out of the Corps with his medals, a good conduct discharge and less than a dollar in back pay due to disciplinary fines. Corporal J. H. Pruitt from Arkansas (by way of Arizona) also of the 78th Company destroyed two machine-gun nests and brought in 40 prisoners on the first day's attack to win his medal. Later in the day, he was killed in action by artillery fire, hours short of his 22nd birthday. Army Private Frank T. Bart, a runner in the 9th Regiment also received the Medal of Honor that day. On two occasions he ran forward with a Chauchat automatic rifle and knocked out German machine-gun nests holding up his unit's advance near Médéah farm.
Holding the ridge
At 1500 that afternoon, Brigadier-general Ely (having advanced with his lead regiment) was on hand to organize and direct the supporting 23rd Army Regiment to continue the attack. The 23rd was able to move over the crest of Blanc Mont and consume a mile of German real estate. It soon outran its support and was forced to stop and deploy units to protect its flanks. A battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment advanced past the Médéah Farm to help protect the 23rd's right. The 23rd went over to the defense in captured German support trenches and held its position against counter-attacking elements of the 15th Bavarian Division.
The 5th Marines were ordered to pass through the 6th Marines on Blanc Mont and match the doughboys' exploits. Lejeune and Neville were unaware the Marines were having to defend both to the north facing Blanc Mont and their exposed left. The 5th had been forced to deploy much of its strength to secure the brigade's flank. The French had slowly advanced to protect Ely's right flank but no Poilus were seen on the Marines' left flank. Indeed, the Essen Hook position the Marines had turned over to the French was lost that afternoon to a German counterattack. The officers of the 5th Marines had pulled units to defend the brigade's flank in a haphazard fashion and it would take the remainder of the day to reorganize their scattered units. The regiment was unable to conduct any advance until the next morning. Darkness on 3 October found the 2nd Division holding a 'stairstep' penetration into the German lines. The 9th Infantry and 6th Marines had led the day's attacks and would spend 4 October trying to eliminate German strongpoints on and in front of Blanc Mont ridge. With the 23rd Infantry standing fast in its forward position, Lejeune ordered a morning attack by the relatively fresh 5th Marines to linkup with the 23rd. This attack would have to deal with the Lüdwigs Rücken (Lüdwig's Back) hill position near St. Étienne. The Marines 6 June attack on Belleau Woods had been the bloodiest day of the Corps' history. The October 4th attack by the 5th Marines would unfortunately almost equal that day's casualties.
' . . . Situation is critical.'
The attack of the 5th Marines went in at 0600 hours without artillery preparation. The 3rd Battalion under Major Henry L. Larsen led with the 1st and 2nd Battalions trailing. Passing through the 6th Marines' lines, they immediately came under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. Again, enfilading fire from the left raked Larsen's battle line as it continued forward. Overcoming all opposition, the battered 3rd Battalion ground to a halt after a one-mile advance. They had come abreast of the 23rd Infantry's forward position on the right, achieving the minimum objective of the attack.
The following 1st and 2nd Battalions also faced heavy artillery and flanking fire as they advanced in support of the lead battalion. The 2nd Battalion came abreast of the 3rd's position and also went to ground in what cover was available. Major George W. Hamilton's 1st Battalion formed to protect the regiment's left flank but they continued to take heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from front, side and partially from the rear, plus they were taking a beating from direct artillery fire from hillocks near St. Étienne. Larsen reported ' . . . am being shelled heavily and mg fire from 270 degrees compass . . . situation is critical.' Large units of German infantry were seen on the left flank, massing for attack. The wilting 2nd and 3rd Battalions were steadily disintegrating under the pounding. Private Mackin recalled that 'the men were stunned; lashed down to earth by flailing whips of shrapnel, gas, and heavy stuff that came as drumfire.' With pistol drawn, Hamilton and his officers had to push faltering Marines of the 2nd Battalion back into line. Seeing the Germans begin their flanking attack, without hesitation Hamilton ordered a counterattack. He went straight for the Germans' Ludwig Rucken position. If he couldn't take the pressure off his regiment, it would surely be crushed.
'God himself could not stop those men.'
The 1st Battalion now became the prime target for the Germans but regardless of loss, momentum carried them irresistibly forward. A French liaison officer watching the attack said ' . . . this is inhuman valor, the good God himself could not stop those men.' The German 213th Division making the flanking attack recoiled from the advancing Marines whose free use of bayonets and rifle-butts made them quickly fall back. Up the gently sloping Lüdwigs Rücken, went the 1/5th Marines, but at a terrible price. Savaged from front and flank, Hamilton's men were trotting towards annihilation in a place they christened 'the Box'. Inspired by the 1st Battalion's advance, the rest of the regiment went forward. Hamilton's men seized Lüdwigs Rücken and taking prone positions they gunned down a retreating 77mm gun battery. The Marines then continued on toward St. Étienne. If anything, German fire redoubled and the Major halted his battalion. Hamilton quickly withdrew them, while they were still viable, to Lüdwigs Rücken.
With the 2nd and 3rd Battalions bled white (60 per cent casualties) and the reduced 6th Marines still fighting to consolidate Blanc Mont, no Marines were coming up to support Hamilton's exposed men. The Army brigade had its own problems dealing with German counterattacks and the French were still nowhere to be seen. Fortunately, except for one counterattack broken up by one of Hamilton's companies, the Germans had enough and were content to pound the three battalions of the 5th Marines until nightfall. Having stopped the German attack and punched a hole in their new defenses, now was the time to leave the exposed slopes of Lüdwig's Rücken. As darkness came, the 1st Battalion withdrew under fire to a position on the flank of the 3rd Battalion. Major Hamilton reorganized his men with a refused left wing because of that damned flanking fire, and dug in. The 1st Battalion had been 1,000-men strong that morning. The evening of 4 October, Hamilton reported his strength as under 170 men. That evening one of Hamilton's 230-man companies, which had been reduced to 22 men, had its rations delivered. They used all the extra canned hash to line the top of their trench. All night the 5th Marines continued to endure artillery and machine-gun fire. They also comprehensively repelled two night attacks on their positions. When advised the next morning of pending orders for the 5th Marines to advance, Major Hamilton wrote his superiors in a remarkable message:
You should understand though that your regiment is now much depleted, very disorganized, and not in condition to advance as a front-line regiment even though the enemy forces in front are found to be small. It is hard to say "can't," but the Division Commander should thoroughly understand the situation and realize that this regiment "can't" advance as an attacking force. Such advance would sacrifice the regiment.
The French at Last
Early morning 5 October, the last German strongpoints on Blanc Mont were struck by the 2nd Division's artillery for close to an hour. At 0615, the 9th Infantry and 6th Marines close-assaulted and finally seized the entire Blanc Mont massif and its western approaches. In excess of 200 Germans and 65 machine-guns were captured. By 1000, French troops were finally seen advancing on the left of the Marine Brigade to cover their open flank. Later in the day, the 6th Marines advanced to support the 5th Regiment in their forward positions. The Division spent the rest of the day consolidating its positions and along with the French, making tentative moves towards the German-held town of St. Étienne. General Lejeune, finally realizing the spent condition of his division, asked General Gouraud for relief.
The morning of 6 October the 23rd Infantry and 6th Marines were ordered to attack. After a one-hour preparatory artillery bombardment, much of which fell on or behind the doughboys and Marines, these two units went forward. The Marines met serious opposition but with the French they were able to reach the edge of St. Étienne. The worn-out 23rd Infantry made only limited progress. Later that day, elements of the 36th (Texas) Division began to appear in the rear of the Division's sector.
That night, the 141st and 142nd Infantry (71st Brigade) of the 36th Division officially took over the 2nd Division's sector. The 36th was short its artillery, machine gunners and engineers so the 2nd Division was tasked to leave theirs. Additionally, a battalion of the 6th Marines and one from the 9th Infantry stayed on to hold this very green division's hand for the next three days. Interestingly, these troops from Texas and Oklahoma had small numbers of cowboys and even Indians among their ranks.
A Forgotten Victory
The 36th Division made further attacks with assistance from the 6th Marines, 9th Infantry, and the French. These moves bore fruit only slowly with the capture of St. Étienne by the 3/6th Marines on 9-10 October. By 10 October, all the Infantry of the 2nd Division was withdrawn and the battle of Blanc Mont had ended for Lejeune's men. The battle cost the Germans over 300 machine-guns, 90 artillery pieces, 2,000 captured and eight weak Divisions wrecked. More importantly, it had cost them the strategic Blanc Mont ridge. The Germans now began a phased withdrawal towards Sedan that would only end with the armistice on the 11th of November.
The Marine Brigade in its famous 'through the wheat' assault on Belleau Woods on 6 June lost about 1,100 men killed, wounded or missing. This was one quarter of the Brigade's casualties for the 20-day battle and exceeded the losses of the entire Corps since its founding. Lejeune reported his Marine casualties for the 10 days of combat at Blanc Mont as about 2,300. Similar losses were reported for the Army brigade. The vast majority of these casualties occurred between 3-5 October. In a war replete with shocking bloodbaths, it is somewhat macabre to compare casualty rates but the losses of the 2nd Division for 3 days at Blanc Mont exceed those of the 6th of June. That is, the casualty rate for Blanc Mont was perhaps more shocking to the 2nd Division than the one day losses to the Marines on the 6th of June. Lieutenant John W. Thomason Jr. of 49th Company, 5th Marines said of the capture of Blanc Mont, that the Division 'paid a price hideous even for this war.'
Certainly, the worn-out and threadbare condition of the German defenders had contributed to the 2nd Division's success. The almost equally exhausted French had made life hard for the Americans. Their lack of determination was especially harmful to the Marine Brigade. Army Historian S.L.A. Marshall called the 4th (Marine) Brigade ' . . . without doubt the most aggressive body of diehards on the Western front.' At Blanc Mont, the 3rd Brigade, US Army showed they were made of similar stuff. It was this pugnacity and bravery that had won the battle at Belleau Woods for the Marines. The Division, now with a strong mix of veterans, had tempered this combativeness with experience and tactical instinct that made the 2nd Division arguably the best assault unit in the AEF. These strengths along with Lejeune's plan to bypass the Viper Woods machine-guns gave the attack on Blanc Mont a good chance of success.
The battle of Blanc Mont is almost unknown in the US and is rarely mentioned by military historians of the First World War. It is, as one writer describes, 'A Forgotten Victory'. General Pershing gives it little mention in his writings and strangely Lejeune's memoir gives it but one paragraph. He had been to a degree tricked into accepting the mission. The story that his Division was to be broken up to provide reinforcements for the French was likely a rumor planted by French staff officers. Regardless, as was well known to the French command, Pershing would not have allowed the French to breakup of one of his finest divisions (or any other). Gouraud and Pétain were almost certainly teasing Lejuene into accepting the Blanc Mont assignment. The first day of the attack had been a triumph. Blanc Mont, however, represents for the future Commandant of the Corps, General Lejeune, somewhat of an embarrassment perhaps best forgotten. It was a battle he had planned and executed with success. The casualties had however taken all the taste from the wine of success. In a letter sent to a fellow Marine in the States, the general spoke of the pre-war Corps and Blanc Mont, ' . . . there isn't much left of the original crowd. (The hospitals) are full of the wounded.' Under Lejeune's direction, official USMC histories of Belleau Woods, Soissons and St. Mihiel were completed soon after the war's end. The official USMC history of Blanc Mont has yet to be written. Lejeune became one of the best Commandants the Corps ever had, but his term as the commander of the 2nd AEF Division was arguably a mixed success. The capture of the Blanc Mont ridge was a strategic victory critical for the French. For Lejeune and his Division, this battle was a Pyrrhic victory in a place one officer described as ' . . . just built for calamities'.
by Mark Henry
Suggested reading
Brannen, C., Over There (Texas A & M, 1996)
Clark, G., Devil Dogs (Presidio Press, 1999)
Mackin, E., Suddenly We Didn't Want to Die (Presidio Press, 1993)
Marix Evans, M., Retreat Hell! We Just Got Here (Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1998)
Stallings, L., Doughboys (Harper & Row, 1965)
Thomason, J., Fix Bayonets (Scribner's/Naval Institute Press, 1929)
Henry, M., Men-at-Arms Series 327 US Marine Corps in World War I 1917-1918 (Osprey Publishing Ltd. 1999)
For readers interested in more information on the battle at Blanc Mont or the Marine Brigade and the 2nd Division, I recommend, and use heavily, George B. Clark's freshly minted Devil Dogs as the best single source on these subjects. I would also strongly recommend Stalling's The Doughboys and Marine John Thomason's classic Fix Bayonets. Good (in print) books from the individual Marine's perspective are Suddenly We Didn't Want to Die by E. Mackin and Over There by C. Brannen. More information is available on Hulbert in Leatherneck magazine's Jan/99 issue (A. Bevilacqua). For the internet-inclined the Doughboy Center's www.worldwar1.com/dbc has an extensive 'Forgotten Victory' article on Blanc Mont.