"NUTS!" . . . With one now very famous reply to a German demand for surrender, the American garrisonholed up in Bastogne, Belgium, on 22 December 1944 had sealed its fate. The American commander, Brig.Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, refused to give up. After days of desperate and bloody fighting, the 101st Airborne and combat commands of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions defending Bastogne had prevented German attackers from taking the vital road hub. Despite being surrounded and dangerously low on ammunition and supplies, the "Battlin' Bastards of Bastogne" had essentially circled their wagons much like an Old West wagon train. With the Germans swirling about the city like Indians, the Bastogne defenders waited for the cavalry to come and save them - just like the cavalry's tradition in the Old West.
In fact it would be actual U.S. Cavalry units of Gen. George S. Patton's Third U.S. Army that would help liberate Bastogne and thwart the German winter offensive. These cavalry units not only helped open a southern corridor to a besieged Bastogne, but did so mostly with wheeled vehicles not designed for snow, ice, or heavy combat.
"Drive Like Hell": The Plan to Relieve Bastogne
The effort to relieve besieged and isolated Bastogne fell to Patton and his Third U.S. Army. This was notsomething Patton preferred; he would have much rather continued on his planned drive into Germany. Pattonwheeled his III Corps north into the Ardennes, against the southern face of the German salient —the Bulge. He ordered his favorite division, the veteran 4th Armored, to "drive like hell" for Bastogne,while the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions advanced cross-country on the armored division's right(eastern) flank. These three divisions made up the Third Army's III Corps, under the command ofcavalryman Maj. Gen. John Millikin. In addition, the 6th Cavalry Group, operating independentlyunder III Corps command, would cover the 4th Armored Division's eastern flank and protect thegap between the 4th Armored and the 26th Infantry Division.
The 4th Armored was under-strengthin tanks and had numerous replacements in its ranks. The division even had a new commander, Gen.Hugh J. Gaffey; this would be his first combat mission with the division. Despite theseuncertainties and drawbacks, the 4th Armored simply had to break through. The division wasdivided into three Combat Commands (CC): A, B, and R (Reserve). These ad-hoc combat formationscombined armor, infantry, reconnaissance, and other support elements, giving each combat command added flexibility in the field.
CCA and CCB would essentially attack in line, with CCA advancing up the main Arlon-Bastogne road and CCB up back roads just to the west. CCR would be in reserve. If all went according to plan, CCB would be the first to reach Bastogne.
25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (CRS), 4th Armored Division
Leading 4th Armored's charge towards Bastogne would be the division's cavalry reconnaissance unit, the 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (CRS). Of its four Recon Troops, one would be assigned to CCA(A Troop) and one to CCB (B Troop). These would take the lead in the advance M8 Greyhound armored cars and jeeps, with the mission of reporting enemy dispositions and locations ahead of the stronger, yet slower, tank battalions. The other two troops would stay in reserve with CCR.
At 0600 hours on 22 Dec. 1944, the 4th Armored was given the command to advance north from Arlon. Despite heavy snows blanketing the ground, the division started out making good time. Soon A Troop, 25th CRS reported demolitions on the road ahead; days earlier U.S. engineers had created the mess to thwart any German thrusts to the south. This and another large crater before Martelange delayed the 4th Armored's attack considerably. At Martelange the lead recon units got into a firefight with German fallschirmjäger (paratroopers, fighting as infantry) from the 15th Regt., 5th Fallschirmjäger (FJ) Division. The German paratroops held onto the demolished bridge leading into the village until 0300 on 23 Dec., when American armored infantry were able to finally cross it and drive off the German defenders. Unfortunately for CCA, engineers would now have to come and throw a bridge across the Sûre river.
While CCA was delayed at Martelange, CCB was also slowed by American demolitions as it started out. CCB did advance to Burnon, where a determined German rearguard and the need for bridging slowed the attack. Casualties so far were light; only a few jeeps had been knocked out by German panzerschreck fire (hand-held, anti-tank rocket launchers copied from the American bazooka) throughout the day. After nearly a twelve-hour delay, CCB continued the advance toward Bastogne.
At Chaumont enemy anti-tank guns convinced the Cavalry B Troop to retire and CCB to organize an attack on the village. Brutal fighting erupted in and around the town defended by German fallschirmjäger of 14th Regt., 5th FJ Division and assault guns from the 11th Assault Gun Brigade. The battle for Chaumont would last nearly two days, and the town was finally seized for good by American troops around mid-day on the 24th.
Meanwhile, CCA had moved past Martelange and gotten into a fight of its own at the town of Warnach. This and the general overall slowdown of the division prompted the commitment of CCR into the race for Bastogne. CCR first took a northeasterly road out of Martelange led by C and D Troops, 25th CRS, and secured Bigonville by sunset on Christmas Eve. Millikin and Gaffey then shifted CCR to the west and then, on Christmas Day, to the northeast, opening a new line of attack. On 26 Dec., CCR linked up with Bastogne's American defenders. This occurred at 1650 hours just north of Assenois, approximately four miles southwest of Bastogne proper. There, M4 Sherman tanks of Company C, 37th Tank Battalion linked up with engineers from the 326th Airborne Engineer Company, 101st Airborne Division. The cavalry troops, which had led CCR's bold swing to the west and northeast, had indeed helped to save the day.
6th Cavalry Group
In addition to the Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons advancing as part of the 4th Armored's Combat Commands, the independent 6th Cavalry Group played a critical role in the relief of Bastogne. The 6th Cavalry Group (the 6th Cavalry Regiment before the war) consisted of Group HQ and the 6th and 28th Cavalry Squadrons. Its commander was Col. Edward D. Fickett. It had entered the war with the task of operating as the Third U.S. Army's primary land intelligence unit. Known additionally in this capacity as the Army Information Service, the 6th Cavalry Group roved ahead in armored cars and jeeps and kept Third U.S. Army HQ (called 'Lucky Forward') informed of both German and American troop dispositions and locations. This allowed Gen. Patton to often know more about where his men were than did the corps and divisional commanders. Because of this the 6th Cavalry Group was informally nicknamed 'Patton's Household Cavalry.'
In December 1944 the 6th Cavalry Group ended service as the Army Information Service and entered the line as a combat cavalry unit. Replacing the 5th Infantry Division in the line, the 6th Cavalry Group participated in Third U.S. Army's advance toward the Siegfried Line until ordered north to assist in the liberation of Bastogne. On Christmas Eve the 6th Cavalry Group began moving north. Its mission in the relief attempt would be to cover both flanks of the 4th Armored Division, which had already begun moving towards Bastogne. The Group's 6th Cavalry Squadron would advance from the south in the general direction of Arsdorf, on 4th Armored's right flank and 26th Infantry Division's left flank; a distance of five miles separated the two divisions. Specifically, the 6th Cavalry Squadron would protect and recon the right flank of 4th Armored's CCA (Combat Command A). The remainder of 6th Cavalry Group (Group HQ and the 28th Cavalry Squadron) would protect 4th Armored's left flank, also the extreme left flank of the entire III Corps. This would be hopefully accomplished by screening known German units located between Remagne and Sibret.
On Christmas Day the 6th Cavalry Group moved forward. On the right flank, the 6th Cavalry Squadron experienced slow going due to bitter winter conditions, enemy resistance from the 5th Fallschirmjäger Division, and the slow advance of the divisions on its flanks. The next day the 6th Cavalry Group was formally attached to the 4th Armored Division and was reinforced by a battalion of engineers and a battalion of M10 Tank Destroyers. By day's end, the M8 armored cars and jeeps of the 28th Cavalry Squadron had seized Remagne and Moircy along the Ourthe River (approximately 8 miles due west of Bastogne). This movement threatened the stretched flank of the Germans west of Bastogne. Meanwhile, forward elements of CCR, 4th Armored Division, had linked up with the defenders of Bastogne. The 6th Cavalry Group continued to probe westward on III Corps' flanks and participated in Third U.S. Army's eastward wheeling attacks to consolidate its hold on Bastogne into January 1945.
Despite the dense woods of the Ardennes and the heavy snows, the 6th Cavalry Group successfully carried out its mission in protecting the 4th Armored Division from enemy flank attacks. This helped to enable the 4th Armored to successfully reach Bastogne.
U.S. Cavalry Organization 1943-1945
World War II marked the modernization and development of the U.S. Cavalry into a mechanized force. Prior to the war, the U.S. Cavalry was still relying on horse-mounted troops employed in the traditional cavalry manner. However, with the trading of horses for wheeled and tracked vehicles, the mode of the cavalry would now forever be mechanized. Yet, the missions and importance of cavalry units on the battlefield would change very little. Mechanized cavalry units in World War II were tasked with fulfilling several combat missions, most of which demanded mobility and speed: reconnaissance, security, screening the enemy, and combat support. In addition U.S. cavalrymen often served as infantry, fighting dismounted from their jeeps, armored cars, and light tanks. The core U.S. Cavalry mission of reconnaissance was accomplished by creating cavalry units that could get to a specific point on the battlefield 'the fastest with the mostest' and with sufficient defensive and offensive firepower to survive on their own. U.S. Cavalry units were thus speedy, mobile, armed with light yet effective weapons, and equipped with radios that communicated vital intelligence back to American HQ units.
In execution of their combat missions, U.S. Cavalry units would normally range far ahead of the rest of their own armies. Whether scouring the countryside in search of enemy units or zipping behind enemy lines to capture key locations, the U.S. Cavalry in World War II could normally be relied upon to do their job and to do it well. The U.S. Cavalry truly acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the U.S. Army in World War II: fast 'eyes and ears' that really packed a punch. The largest single U.S. Cavalry unit in World War II was the Cavalry Group. The Cavalry Group was essentially a regiment in strength, and could be permanently assigned to an armored division, but normally was attached to an army (for example, the Sixth Cavalry Group attached to the U.S. Third Army) as a separate and mobile command. Prior to the war, the U. S. Army eliminated the traditional cavalry organization, the cavalry regiment. Instead, the cavalry would fight in what was hoped would be a more flexible command structure suited for the cavalry's new mechanization. The transition resulted in a change from a regimental organization to a larger 'cavalry group.' The HQ Troop (forming the old cavalry regiment HQ) was simply renamed (Cavalry) Group HQ and was permanently attached to a specific cavalry group. This designation and structure now gave U.S. army commanders the ability to interchange cavalry squadrons within a cavalry group (there were two squadrons in each cavalry group) based on unit locations in the field. Reassigning different cavalry squadrons away from their parent cavalry groups was rare, but demonstrated more organizational flexibility. The Cavalry Group HQ was normally commanded by a Colonel and was equipped with communications equipment and numerous radios. On-paper vehicle strength for the Group HQ included seven Jeeps manufactured by American Bantam, three M8 Greyhound Armored Cars, three M3 Halftracks, and one GMC 2.5-ton truck (the 'Jimmy' or 'Deuce and a Half').
The 1943 US Cavalry Squadron, formerly known as a troop, was the largest tactically functioning cavalry unit. Essentially of battalion size, the cavalry squadron featured smaller, fast-moving reconnaissance elements in addition to supporting units. The cavalry squadron was organized into a Squadron HQ, a HQ service troop, three reconnaissance troops (A, B, and C Troops), a light tank company (F Company with 17 M5 Stuarts), and an assault gun troop (E Troop with six M8 Scott Assault Guns, each featuring a 75mm howitzer on an M5 Stuart chassis). This would be the standard cavalry squadron organization employed until the war's end, the traditional designation of 'troop' being reassigned to the smaller units within the squadron.
In addition to this mechanized 'upgrade' of the former horse cavalry troops, armored reconnaissance battalions within the armored divisions were also restructured along these lines. With the advent of the new 'light' armored division structure, also in 1943, each armored division's armored reconnaissance battalion was redesignated a Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (CRS). Each infantry division also had a cavalry troop in its organization. Compared to the troops in a Cavalry Group, the most significant and notable difference was an additional troop added to the squadron (D Troop) and two more M8 Scott Assault Guns added to E Troop, for a total of eight. This latter move allowed the assault-gun troop to break down into platoons of two M8s each - one for each reconnaissance troop. This tactic was normally employed when troops were separated and gave each troop added support from the M8 Scott's 75mm howitzer.
The US Cavalry Troop was essentially of company-level strength. The troops were solely responsible for reconnaissance missions and were the units that truly embraced the horse cavalry tradition of old. The troop formed the eyes and ears for an army or a division and was expected to range far and wide on limited supplies. Lightly armed but riding in fast and reliable combat vehicles, the troop could get out of trouble as fast as they got into it.
The troop was organized into a Troop HQ and 3 Reconnaissance Platoons, almost entirely equipped with jeeps (called 'Bantams' by cavalrymen after the manufacturer's name, Bantam, stamped on the jeeps; cavalry units received a majority of early jeeps made by Bantam for the U.S. Army) and M8 Greyhound Armored Cars.
Each of the three Reconnaissance Platoons in a cavalry troop was divided into two sections: a Scout section and an Armored Car section. The Scout section on paper was to have six jeeps, three for reconnaissance and three each for carrying a portable (not mounted) 60mm mortar and crew. The Armored Car section on paper was to have three M8 Greyhound armored cars for support. Platoon leadership took the form of a Platoon Commander (a Lieutenant in a radio equipped Bantam Jeep) and a Platoon Sergeant commanding one of the M8 Greyhounds. This arrangement helped to give order to the platoon as it was often scattered far and wide on the battlefield.
Platoons could also be divided into three smaller sections. The main 'by the book' reconnaissance tactic called for the platoon to be broken into three smaller sections each comprising one machine-gun-mounted jeep, another with a small, man-portable 60mm mortar, and one M8 Greyhound. The machine-gun-mounted jeep would take the point position, scout ahead and search for enemy units. The M8 Greyhound would provide the lead jeep with cover from its 37mm main gun, while the 60mm mortar crew in its jeep was ready to support the reconnaissance section with indirect mortar fire if needed.
Upon contact with the enemy, the lead, MG-mounted jeep would call the other jeep and the armored car in his section, informing them of the situation. If at all possible, the jeep would then attempt a 'U-turn' while firing its .30 Cal MMG and return to the safety of the rest of the unit. From there the unit could then utilize the M-8 and the 60mm mortar in dealing with the enemy unit. If returning to the rest of the section were impossible, the lead three-man Bantam crew would bail-out of the jeep and seek cover. This was something routinely practiced and could be done with skill and safety. Once good cover was found, the lead jeep crew would then call in mortar fire and have the M8 Greyhound move up and into combat.
During the Battle of the Bulge, cavalrymen were either quick on the move or were in a defensive posture. Because of the harsh winter conditions, U.S. Cavalry units could not employ the normal reconnaissance-type tactics of making contact with the enemy, reporting it, and then speedily getting away from danger. The icy roads made the mostly all-wheeled cavalry vehicles difficult to drive, while deep snows made cross-country manouvering impossible. Crews did fix chains to their tires in hopes of better traction, but this often failed. The dense and thick Ardennes also made sighting the enemy troublesome. As a result reconnaissance units in the lead often smacked right into the enemy and had to fight it out (usually outgunned and under-armored) until reinforcements arrived. Static defensive measures, on the other hand, normally saw cavalry crews digging their armored cars into protective positions. Crews dug foxholes, if possible, in the ice and snow and conducted foot patrols in the freezing weather. During the cold nights, M8 Greyhound crews loaded their 37mm main guns with canister rounds. Basically a large-caliber shotgun round, canister would give an armored car good defense against a night infantry attack. German armored attacks in the dark were rare, but infantry probes very common.
More than anything else, cavalrymen in the Battle of the Bulge tried to stay warm by whatever means possible. The Bantam Jeeps and the M8 Greyhounds both were open-topped and offered little if any protection from the cold and precipitation. Efforts were made to drape blankets (or just about anything) over the vehicle to keep the wet snow out of the crew compartments, but this was not always possible. Most of the time, cavalrymen made whatever heat they could and shivered with only the clothes and equipment on their back.
The U.S. Cavalry units engaged in the Battle of the Bulge were never adequately equipped to conduct their combat mission of reconnaissance and to fight the enemy in the manner they did. However, despite the lack of good winter vehicles, clothing, and equipment, the cavalry of Patton's Third U.S. Army fought bravely and well; they did come to the rescue of the American troops trapped at Bastogne in the middle of the Bulge. In the tradition of the old horse cavalry, the new mechanized American cavalry truly helped save the day in the Ardennes and possibly shortened the war.
by Devin Cooley
Further Reading
Arnold, James, R. Campaign 5: Ardennes 1944 (Osprey Publishing, 1990)
Cooley, D., Sanders, B. & Bland, J. Fury on the Fatherland (Easy Eight Enterprises, n.d.)
Dupuy, T., Bongard, D. L. & Anderson, R. C. Jr. Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 - January 1945 (Harper Collins, 1994)
Eisenhower, John S. D. The Bitter Woods (Da Capo, 1995)
Pallud, Jean-Paul Elite 11: Ardennes 1944 Peiper & Skorzeny (Osprey Publishing, 1987)
Zaloga, Steven J. Campaign 115: Battle of the Ardennes 1994 (1) St Vith and the Northern Shoulder (Osprey Publishing, 2003)
Zaloga, Steven J. Campaign 145: Battle of the Bulge 1944 (2) Bastogne (Osprey Publishing, 2004)