The regrettable and violent events in East Timor have attracted much attention from the world's media in recent months. However, it is not only news gatherers who have been drawn to this former Portuguese colony. A United Nation's peacekeeping force comprised of soldiers from Australia, New Zealand, Britain and many other countries, including several hundreds from Canada, has also assembled there.
East Timor occupies the eastern half of Timor, an island situated to the east of Java and north of Australia, and which forms part of the Lesser Sunda Islands archipelago. For over 400 years it was a Portuguese colony, but in December 1975 it was invaded by Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesia - formerly the Dutch East Indies - surrounds East Timor to the point where one wonders how the island came to be a Portuguese colony and how it managed to remain a separate entity. Recent events on the island have been monitored with great interest by the author of this article, who is working on a series of three Osprey Men-at-Arms titles on the Portuguese Army during the Napoleonic Wars - the first of which will be published later this year.
The Portuguese Arrive
The island of Timor first became known to Western Europeans in the 16th century as one of the evocatively named 'Spice Islands'. The Portuguese, who had discovered the sea route to India at the end of the 15th century, wandered further eastwards, reaching present-day Indonesia in 1509. They quickly realised the islands were rich in products which would fetch high prices in Europe and sought permanent bases. The objections of native rulers were brushed aside and the Portuguese attacked and occupied Malacca in 1511. A number of local rulers in Sumatra, Java and the Moluccan islands joined forces in an effort to drive off the Portuguese, but not all the kingdoms in the archipelago were united in these endeavours. Some saw advantages in trading and finding accommodations with the men from Europe. So, alternating persuasion with force, the Portuguese established links and more cordial relations with local kings. The missionaries arrived close behind the traders and soldiers, eager to bring Catholicism to this far corner of the known world. Many native rulers were later baptized along with their subjects. By 1566, the Portuguese missionaries, soldiers and traders had reached the island of Solor, just north of Timor, and there they built a stone fort.
By the last quarter of the 16th century, the Portuguese were no longer the only Europeans in the Spice Islands. The Dutch had appeared in force and gradually drove the Portuguese out. A forced union with Spain between 1580 and 1640 weakened the Portuguese and many of its overseas bases fell to the Dutch.
The early Portuguese forces in Timor would have looked something like these figures taken after naive illustrations drawn in the early 18th century. The leaders, shown mounted or holding a flag, are depicted in European dress, wearing sashes to denote their officer rank. Others are shown in what appears to be a mixture of native and European dress, some wielding muskets, others spears, but all having small round shields. The musician uses his hands to play a European drum. The flags are shown as small square standards bearing either the cross or the arms of Portugal. (Sketch by R. Chartrand after Ms at the Portuguese overseas historical archives)
From the second half of the 16th century, Timor was visited annually by Portuguese traders from Macau - the main Portuguese base in southern China - seeking its valuable sandalwood. There were no Portuguese permanently established on Timor until the Dutch took their fort on Solor Island in 1613. Undaunted, the Portuguese transferred to nearby Flores Island, building a new fort and settlement at Larantuka. Soon, Portuguese Augustinian missionaries (15 are listed in 1635) sought converts in Timor itself. By the 1640s the missionaries had achieved tangible results, with many Timorese converted to the Roman Catholic faith, and some of their formerly pagan tribal chiefs even accepting the Portuguese crown as their supreme earthly ruler. The friars started building a fort at Koepang, Timor's best harbour, but it was taken by the Dutch in 1653. The Dutch completed the building work at Koepang, naming the fort Concordia and making it their main base on Timor.
Dutch attempts to conquer Timor
However, when the Dutch moved to subdue the eastern part of the island, they came up against what they called the 'Black Portuguese'. The Portuguese called these men 'Topasses', a term which had first been applied to the Europeanized mixed-bloods of Portuguese India. The Timor Topasses were Christian mulattos of Portuguese men with native women. They dressed generally in European fashion and often had a European-style education from the friars. Their families bore names such as Da Costa and De Hornay. The Timor Topasses proved fearsome soldiers, one Antonio De Hornay killing a Dutch officer in single combat. They were the men who protected the Portuguese flag on about half of the island.
Eventually in 1661, far away in The Hague, a peace treaty was signed between Portugal and the Netherlands, dividing Timor roughly between both nations. The Dutch received the western half, including Koepang, and the eastern half, along with an enclave in the western end at Lifao - a small harbour which was the favourite stop of the sandalwood ships coming from Macau - went to Portugal.
Administratively, East Timor came under the nominal authority of the Portuguese Viceroy 'of India and Asia', residing at Goa in India. The Viceroy also ruled, nominally, over Macau in China and the other Portuguese posts in the East. However, Goa is some distance away and, in Timor, the Topasses actually controlled and defended the settlements. For instance, Antonio de Hornay, famed for his fighting skills, became chief of the area, ruling East Timor, Solor (taken and retaken several times in the 17th century) and Larantuka like a prince between 1673 and 1693. De Hornay also acknowledged Portuguese suzerainty and sent gifts of gold dust to Goa. The Portuguese Topasses proved to be such a thorn in the side of the Dutch that, by the late 17th century, the Timor area was the only area of the Spice Islands where Portugal's flag flew. The rest had become the Dutch East Indies.
In 1701, the Viceroy at Goa decided to bring the Timor area into more direct rule. He appointed Antonio Coelho Guerreiro as governor for Timor, Solor and Larantuka with powers to consolidate and reorganise Portuguese authority in the area. Few in Goa wanted to travel as far as Timor, and Guerreiro sailed with only 50 soldiers rather than the 687 he had hoped for. He called into Macau to procure various military and construction supplies such as muskets, tools and nails, and he also enlisted another 32 men. He sailed from Macau in January 1702, landing at Lifao on Timor, where he built a small fort, in which eight cannons were mounted. Lifao thus became the colonial capital. Governor Guerreiro later sent enticing reports of rumoured gold and silver mines but, apart from small deposits of gold, the trade mainstays were sandalwood, beeswax, a hardy breed of horses and, for a time in the 18th century, some slaves.
The new 'colonels'
One initiative taken by Governor Guerreiro turned out to be a most important measure for Portugal. In an effort to secure the loyalty and service of local native chiefs - one particularly hostile chief had even blockaded Lifao for three years - he granted commissions as 'Sargento-Mor' to some of them to command their tribes as colonels in the name of the King of Portugal. In Portugal and some other colonies such as Brazil, the Sargento-Mor (literally sergeant-major; a field rank in Portuguese service) was the equivalent of a colonel of an Ordenanza regiment. The Ordenanza was the basic land militia of Portugal mustering all men able to bear arms. This Timorese version of the Portuguese Ordenanza was far less elaborately organised. Its main purpose was to secure influence in the various tribes, especially in the wild interior of the island. The granting of such rank to local chiefs by successive Portuguese governors had the desired effect. The new 'colonels' were intensely proud of their military rank and the practice soon became a custom.
By the 18th century both halves of Timor were almost forgotten by their colonial overlords. There were continual inter-tribal squabbles between various contenders in the tribes of the Dutch and Portuguese parts of the island. Often the Dutch-allied tribes would try to oust, without success, the ferocious 'Portuguese' tribes in endless petty warfare. By the middle of the 18th century, there were some 46 tribes in East Timor mustering about 40,000 men, of whom 3,000 had muskets, while the rest were armed with spears, swords, bows and arrows. Their opposing 25 tribes on the Dutch side had about 25,000 men with some 2,000 musketeers, whose allegiance to the Dutch seems to have been even more tenuous than for tribes in Portuguese Timor. It must be mentioned that each tribe was virtually an independent entity, much like the nation-tribes of the North American Indians.
The Dutch who had more soldiers and more resources on Timor than the Portuguese, steadily extended their influence on the island during the 18th century. In 1719, several tribal chiefs in East Timor reached the end of their tether with the Portuguese - both black and white - and began open warfare in a bid for independence. At first the chiefs did well. The Portuguese were divided between the bishop and the governor about what action to take. However, disagreements soon also appeared amongst the rebel tribes, with some individuals unsure about ousting the Portuguese. Meanwhile the Portuguese, of all shades, mustered some 4,000 loyal tribesmen and, in 1726, punitive expeditions drove the rebel tribes deep into the interior, defeating them at their seemingly inaccessible headquarters at Cailaco. Flushed with their successes against the rebel tribes, the Black Topasses grew over-confident in their strength. In 1749, somewhat foolishly, the Topasses decided to attack their old enemies the Dutch at their main base of Koepang in West Timor. Portugal and Holland were not at war but that mattered little in far away Timor. The Topasses' assault on Fort Concordia was repulsed with disastrous losses that saw nearly all their leaders killed. The metropolitan Portuguese on the island were also all-but wiped out. By the 1750s the Portuguese had only seven or eight Europeans on Timor in addition to the friars. The garrison at the fort of Lifao consisted of unpaid natives provided in turn by various friendly tribal chiefs who had been granted the rank of 'Sargento-Mor'. The governor at this time was practically abandoned to his fate by the Viceroys at Goa.
Lifao was eventually surrounded by the more numerous Dutch and their tribal allies. At this point, the Portuguese, black and white, entertained no hopes of ever conquering the territory that separated the enclave of Lifao from the Portuguese eastern part of the island. Bowing to the inevitable, the town of Lifao was abandoned in 1769 and its 1,200 inhabitants moved by sea further east to Dili.
Dili, which would be the vivid scene of many atrocities by local militias and the Indonesian army in September 1999, thus became something of a remote colonial capital situated on a somewhat unhealthy site far to the east. The Portuguese garrison remained minimal for many decades to come, although there is evidence that a few soldiers were despatched from Goa or from Macau. Details are vague but, in general, there seemed to have been about 100 or so Portuguese with a few friars towards the end of the 18th century. In the 1790s, a number of sepoys were also reportedly posted in Dili, probably detached from Goa.
An era of cooperation
During the Napoleonic wars, the East Timorese must have been uneasy when Holland became an ally of France while Portugal remained loyal to its ancient alliance with Britain. British Royal Navy ships appeared off Timor and attacked Koepang but were repulsed by the Dutch garrison in 1797 and again in 1810. However, the Dutch battalion in Koepang had to surrender peacefully to the British in 1811 as West Timor had been included in the capitulation of Java with the rest of the Dutch East Indies. This naturally delighted the Portuguese in East Timor but the Dutch were back in West Timor by 1816. Fifty years of boundary disputes - usually diplomatic but sometimes the cause of sporadic skirmishes - followed, as the Dutch encouraged the rebellious Timorese to hinder the Portuguese and vice-versa. By the 1850s, however, both colonial powers realised that this tension was undermining the island's economic viability. Centuries of confrontation were now forgotten n an atmosphere of newfound cooperation. Most disputes were settled by treaty between Holland and Portugal in 1859-60.
Larantuka and Solor were ceded to Holland and, though the final settlement did not arrive until 1902, the border between east and west Timor was clearly traced. Under the new treaty, signed at The Hague, Portugal regained the enclave surrounding Lifao (now called Ocussi) which it had abandoned in 1769. The enclave still had a large Roman Catholic community professing Portuguese allegiance.
Into the island's interior
By the middle of the 19th century the local economy was shifting from the exploitation of sandalwood, which had become much rarer, to plantations of coffee, tea and later copra and rubber. This plantation economy called for a more regular infrastructure. Thus, from 1842, East Timor and Solor had a larger regular garrison consisting of a battalion of Cazadores (light infantrymen) and a battery of artillery. The military headquarters was at Dili, the seat of the colonial government where most of the troops appear to have been posted. The garrison was later much reduced and, in 1870, absorbed into the Legiao do Ultramar (Overseas Legion) with only a small detachment left in East Timor. The Overseas Legion was reduced to a regiment in 1876 and disbanded in 1892. Thereafter, an overseas troop depot provided detachments of European regiments to the colonies in emergencies. The colonies increasingly relied on large contingents of native troops for their garrisons, especially in Angola and Mozambique. In Timor, the garrison seems usually to have been made up of small detachments drawn from Portugal and other colonies.
There were increasing clashes with tribes in the centre of the island as the Portuguese moved further into the interior seeking land for new plantations. Petty warfare went on sporadically until the 1890s when the Portuguese government in Lisbon determined to bring East Timor under total control and quell the rebel tribes. From 1894 to 1896, various operations were carried out. A small number of Portuguese troops, assisted by some 10,000 loyal tribesmen, took on this difficult task. Although heavy fighting did occur during 1896, by 1904 hostilities had ceased, with a degree of control also achieved. Some idea of the nature of the terrain encountered by these soldiers was later given by an Australian officer who described it as: 'one lunatic contorted, tangled mass of mountains.'
Portugal's most remote colony had long been under the administrative control of the governors of Goa and, more recently, of Macau. In 1896, East Timor was made a fully-fledged colony whose governor now reported directly to Lisbon. In military terms, this meant a more independent command although the troops were still detached from Europe or other colonies, especially from Mozambique, which had replaced Goa as the main depot of colonial troops.
As colonial officials and planters settled in the interior, the tribes and their chiefs lost their autonomy and influence. Discontent brewed once more, until, in December 1911, a tribal chief named Boaventura plotted an uprising against the Portuguese. Vowing to kill all Europeans, Boaventura and his tribesmen swept the countryside until, in early 1912, the rebels threatened Dili itself. Reinforcements from Macau, Goa and Mozambique were rushed to East Timor to join local volunteers and loyal tribesmen, who had been organised into companies of moradores (residents, meaning local militia). Regaining the initiative, 1,900 men organized into three military columns captured Boaventura in his last stronghold after a gruelling eight-month campaign. Boaventura's rebellion represented the last major tribal revolt on Timor.
During World War I, East Timor remained unaffected by events elsewhere and, despite tensions between some native tribes, the island maintained a largely peaceful existence during the inter-war years. A colonial, plantation economy and society developed between the wars. The Portuguese government retained its modest cadre of colonial officials and a small garrison of 150 at Dili, which acted as an armed constabulary. No measures were taken to develop defences that might guard against a serious assault from a foreign aggressor.
World War II reaches Timor
East Timor's days as a sleepy, colonial backwater were brought to an abrupt and dramatic end in December 1941. Japan's all-out assault was not only against the United States at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines but also against the British and Dutch territories in the east. The local administration in Portuguese East Timor had become embroiled in a controversial and complicated pact signed with the Australian and Dutch governments, whereby their troops would help repel any Japanese attack on East Timor. In Lisbon, however, Portugal reaffirmed its policy of neutrality. In spite of this, on 17 December 1941, Dutch and Australian troops arrived in Dili. Governor Ferreira de Carvalho had no means to retaliate by arms, so he ordered the national flag of Portugal to be hoisted in all of the colony's public buildings. To further mark his position of neutrality he confined himself to his residence and asked to be considered a prisoner. The Australian 2/2nd Independent Company of 250 men was thus posted near Dili while part of the town's population, fearing trouble, moved into the interior. Those who remained were advised by the Portuguese local government to maintain a correct but cool attitude. After a few weeks, tensions abated somewhat and Governor Carvalho made an agreement that the allied troops would retire as soon as a contingent of Portuguese troops could be sent from Maputo in Mozambique. This might have ensured a peaceful transition to Portuguese neutral status such as had been achieved at Macau following the Japanese assault on Hong Kong and southern China. Unfortunately for East Timor, time ran out and the most intense fighting in the island's history was about to start.
The Japanese had seen that Australian and Dutch troops were in both parts of Timor. The presence of Australian troops in Portuguese East Timor meant that Japanese operations would have to be carried out against the whole island to succeed. On 19 February 1942, the Japanese attacked Dutch Timor with overwhelming air, sea and land forces. Within four days, the Dutch and Australian main force at Koepang surrendered. Another strong Japanese contingent of about 1,500 men simultaneously landed at Dili. They found the city almost uninhabited and sacked it. The Australian 2/2nd Independent Company, divided into four platoons of 60 men each, retreated into the interior and, with the help of Timorese who provided them with good intelligence, harassed the Japanese by well-coordinated guerrilla operations.
The 'August Show'
The Australians, under the command of Lt Col B.J. Callinan, who turned out to be an outstanding leader of guerrilla operations, inflicted heavy casualties and soon controlled part of the interior. They were based in Bobonaro (an area high in the central mountain range) with detachments posted as far as the outskirts of Dili. To deal with the Australians, the Japanese force was boosted to some 12,000 men. In August 1942 the Japanese troops mounted a series of powerful attacks to overcome the Australians and their Timorese collaborators. The Japanese strategy for this operation, called the 'August Show' by the Australians, was to surround the Australians with several Japanese columns forcing them to consolidate their positions. They would then crush them by their vastly superior numbers. On 9 August waves of Japanese bombers destroyed mountain villages, and the next day strong Japanese columns moved into the interior from different areas supported by bombers and fighters which strafed anything that moved. The Japanese, who were helped by 'scores of hostile natives', also drove screens of less-cooperative Timorese in front of them - a practice which complicated Australian resistance. The main thrust took place over a 60-mile (97km) front leading to Bobonaro. Here an elite 2,500-man Japanese force, enjoying a superiority of ten-to-one and supported by mule-carried mountain guns and mortars, went after the Australian platoons. Bobonaro was bombed and taken, but the Aussies had vanished into even more forbidding terrain which, according to Callinan, ranged from 'ridges to a mountain range reaching ten thousand feet'. The Japanese followed in a harrowing pursuit, suffering heavy casualties from the Australian's numerous ambushes.
Through it all, the Australians had the vital support of Timorese natives who transported essential equipment, including radios, on mountain ponies. Out of food and ammunition and exhausted after a week of pursuit, Callinan called for assistance from Australia. He was answered the very same day by a daring supply drop from Royal Australian Air Force Hudson bombers. This greatly boosted morale in spite of the Australian's perceived 'desperate position' in the Liltai area, where the Japanese seemed poised for their 'final drive' that was expected to occur on 19 August. But the anticipated assault did not take place. Instead, the exhausted Japanese elite turned back, having suffered significant losses that contrasted with the few casualties suffered by Callinan's force. Thus ended the 'August Show' as Callinan's men, 'hurried after the retreating foe, harassing the stragglers, and telling the natives we were still there and still able to deliver retribution and reward loyalty.'
On 23 September, the 2/4th Independent Company landed in East Timor to join Callinan's men, but the Japanese were not about to give up. More troops were moved into Timor until the Australians, along with small pockets of Dutch resistance, faced some 20,000 Japanese. The odds were now crushingly in favour of the Japanese. The Timorese on both sides of the island, fearful of Japanese retribution methods, gradually became more reluctant to furnish food, shelter and information to the guerrillas. As a result, guerrilla operations became more risky as the excellent intelligence, which had previously been provided by the Timorese, dried up. With heavy fighting in New Guinea at the time, Australia was reluctant to open another front, so most Australians on East Timor were withdrawn by the destroyer HMAS Arunta on 9 January 1943, while the remainder departed on a US submarine on 10 February. After nearly a year of guerrilla operations, 27 Australians had been killed while creating immense problems and inflicting far greater casualties on the Japanese. In that sense, the Australian venture in East Timor was far more successful than similar attempts in Java, Ambon or Rabaul.
The Legacy of war
Lt Col Callinan's memoirs clearly reveal that the Australians' extraordinary success was in large part due to the help they received from the East Timorese natives and a number of Portuguese civil servants. Timor's reluctance to join Japan's 'Greater Asia co-prosperity sphere' resulted in the destruction of all the island's towns and villages, the devastation of its plantations and inumerable of Timorese deaths. Others were interned in terrible camps along with the Portuguese officials and nationals. It is estimated that about 40,000 people perished as a result of Japan's occupation. By any standard, the people of East Timor paid an incredibly high price for Australia's safety.
In August 1945, news came of Japan's surrender. Suddenly, it was all over and the Japanese were leaving the devastated island. Portuguese governor Carvalho and his fellow officials who had survived internment camps quickly restored Portugal's control over East Timor - in marked contrast to the chaos in Dutch Java and elsewhere. The postwar years in East Timor were relatively quiet and devoted to rebuilding dwellings, businesses and lives with, in time, some Timorese peacefully seeking independence from Portugal. With renewed hope for better days, there was a population explosion, to 450,000 in 1950 and peaking at about 800,000 in the 1970s.
In 1950, West Timor became part of independent Indonesia- a nation that claimed many territories including East Timor itself. But Indonesia did not dare move into East Timor while it was under Portugal's dominion even if its garrison was insignificant and more of a constabulary. Back in Lisbon, the country's dictatorship faced increasing opposition after decades in power and a disastrous colonial policy in Angola and Mozambique against liberation fighters. Democratic government was restored in Portugal following the ousting of the old dictatorship on 25 May 1974. Independence was to be granted to the colonies by the new government but, for East Timor and its people, independence was not to be. Various groups advocating complete independence issued a unilateral declaration proclaiming the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November 1975. On 7 December 1975 Indonesia sent a huge contingent of troops to East Timor and took over the province by force. This was accompanied by considerable violence with fierce resistance put up by the Timorese forces in and around the capital Dili. Indonesian troops then reportedly indulged in gratuitous killing of civilians. Indonesia passed a law on 17 July 1976 proclaiming East Timor as its 27th province. The forced annexation of East Timor was not recognised by the United Nations. Thus began a quarter of a century's calvary, which has seen the deaths of up to 300,000 people. The agony of the 27th province finally ended on 20 September 1999 with the arrival of Australian and New Zealand United Nations troops.
René Chartrand
Suggested reading
Information on East Timor's early military history is very scarce. Parts of C.R. Boxer's Fidalgos in the Far East 1550-1770 (The Hague, 1948) and bits out of General Ferreira Martin's Historia do Exercito Portuguese (Lisbon, 1945) are essential. Lt. Col. B.J. Callinan's account of his group in Australia at Arms (Sydney, 1955) and John Coates' Timor entry in The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Oxford, 1995) are equally essential for information about World War II. Data on recent events is accessible from many books, web sites and the world press. John Laffin's Men-at Arms 123 The Australian Army at War 1899-1975 provides information on the uniforms and equipment used during World War II.
About the author
René Chartrand is a military historian and film consultant. He has written many books with Osprey and, after researching in Britain and Portugal, is currently finishing three Men-at-Arms volumes on The Portuguese Army of the Napoleonic Wars which inspired this article.