Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940–43

European colonial armies in North Africa mostly settled themselves along the coasts and in major towns, rarely venturing into the deep desert. A military presence in the inland regions was established, but only following a defensive pattern. Key positions were the oases, soon turned into fortified positions, which represented the bedrock of the European presence in the desert. These strongholds provided a focal point for garrisons and a shelter for columns and patrols in a way unchanged since Kitchener's campaign in the Sudan that culminated in the battle of Omdurman in 1898. Unlike the local Arab tribes, European armies were bound to slow–moving supply chains that, coupled with the lack of adequate movement capabilities, slowed the pace of movement right down. A suitable solution was found in 'hopping' from one fort to another, a doctrine Kitchener developed by establishing large supply dumps that moved forward with the bulk of the troops. In this way his forces, though still 'hopping' from one oasis to another, could be grouped together in a stronger force than the small columns previously used.

The widespread diffusion of motorization during and after World War I brought a change to the practice of desert warfare. In 1916 British troops had to face a revolt by the Arab tribe of Senussi in Libya, where Italian forces only garrisoned the coastal towns. Fast–moving and well–armed armoured cars were used not only to lead the way for regular British forces, but also to perform 'special missions' (like the rescue of the crews of two British ships held by the Senussi), which involved deep penetration into the desert. Most noticeably these armoured cars served with Duke of Westminster's No. 2 Armoured Motor Squadron, whose personnel transferred en bloc from the Navy to the Army and formed up to six light car patrols. Although these patrols never penetrated too deeply into the desert, it is they who are the true antecedents of the LRDG rather than Lawrence and his guerrilla forces in Arabia.

When the Italian Army undertook the 'reconquest' of Libya in the 1930s (actually its first penetration into the deep desert) they made use of a large number of motor vehicles, yet still with a tactical doctrine based on 19th–century colonial principles. Motorized units were still used in the desert in the same manner as fast–moving camel–mounted troops — hopping from one oasis to another and from one stronghold to another.

When World War II broke out in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the European armies faced the problem that this time their opponents would not be poorly armed tribesmen, but other modern European forces. The French and Italians stayed true to their 19th–century–style doctrines, which ruled out any chance of effectively waging war in the deep desert. This was a conscious decision as in the vastness of Sahara those who controlled the strongpoints in the oases enjoyed major advantages against any attacker in that they had plenty of water, food and ammunition. Although weapons issued to such posts were often old, they were deemed suitable enough to face the unlikely eventuality of attacks coming from and through the desert. There had been some motorization but not a substantial amount, and the available vehicles were largely unsuitable, either because they lacked cross–country capabilities and reliability, or because their payload was insufficient to carry men, weapons and all the supplies needed.

Although the Italians now faced very different enemies to the Senussi tribesmen they had fought in the 1930s, they simply improved their old doctrines rather than seeking any new solutions. Shortly before Italy's entry into war, the staff led by the Governor of Libya elaborated the directives for the defence of the colony in the case of, particularly, a French attack from Tunisia that might outflank their border defences. Their strategy relied heavily on static troops tied to strongpoints, though they were also assigned the role of carrying out sudden attacks against enemy bases and supply columns; true 'mobile' warfare was only left to the five 'sahariana' companies, whose task was to take the war into enemy territory.

Given this tactical situation, Ralph Bagnold's concepts were inventive and innovative. Surprisingly, behind them lay a gross overestimation of the capabilities of the Italian forces in the area. Bagnold had encountered the Italian Auto–Saharan during his travels in the desert, and warned the British staff in Egypt that, as soon as it entered war, Italy could start large–scale actions using 'light mobile forces in desert cars' in the Libyan—Egyptian desert. The aim of these attacks would be to divert British attention from the main front, as well as to carry out special operations such as the sabotage and harassment of the British lines of communications, or even to establish landing grounds in the desert and bring agents and supplies for the many pro–Fascist Italians then living in Egypt. The fall of France in June 1940 made the picture even gloomier: now the Italians could easily move to the south and the south–east, threatening the Takouradi air route and even linking up with their forces in East Africa, a move that would endanger the British position in Sudan. Though completely devoid of any basis in reality, these evaluations offer a clear perspective of the motives behind the LRDG's doctrine for desert warfare. Rather than limiting themselves to hopping from one oasis to another in the attempt to establish advanced bases from which carry out their missions, Bagnold's LRDG was to perform long–range missions penetrating deeply into the desert and well behind the enemy lines. This wasn't simply a modernization of guerrilla tactics used in the Sahara for centuries, as the LRDG wasn't bound to a specific territory or tribe. Bagnold relied on modern means: reliable vehicles, smart equipment, good weaponry and an original approach to desert navigation.

Although the LRDG was born with the aim of preventing Italian long–range activities in the desert, it soon devoted itself to offensive capabilities, either carrying out deep–range reconnaissance missions &# 40'road watching') or performing acts of sabotage and harassment behind enemy lines. Despite this change of direction, the focus of the LRDG remained fixed on its ability to function in the desert: not only fulfilling its assigned tasks but, above all, learning and perfecting the skills necessary to survive in such a dry and inhospitable region. Unsurprisingly, training focussed on survival skills, navigation and the ability to repair any damaged or broken–down vehicle: in addition to this specific technical skills like wireless communications were vital. A look at the breakdown of specializations in the LRDG is revealing. According to the November 1940 war establishment, each LRDG patrol (comprising one captain, one subaltern, one staff sergeant and 27 other ranks) should include one Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) fitter and one driver/mechanic, two navigators, two gunners, 14 drivers and only seven general–duty men. These percentages remained unchanged in 1942, when a single patrol (comprising one officer, one warrant officer or sergeant, and 13 other ranks) was made of one driver/mechanic, one navigator, two gunners, seven drivers and only two general–duty men.

The flexibility of the LRDG led to further developments in late 1941 when it began a fruitful cooperation with the Special Air Squadron (then 'L' Detachment), which developed into relationships with the various other Allied special forces operating in the region — Commandos (both European and Arab), 'Folboats' and various kinds of intelligence agent. The joint LRDG/SAS missions proved the potential of deep desert penetration warfare: targets could be reached well behind enemy lines, either for sabotage or reconnaissance purposes; enemy patrols could easily be avoided whilst the oasis–based strongpoints became obsolete.