US Airborne Units in the Pacific Theater 1942–45

While the Marine parachute battalions did not conduct any airborne operations, they did fight as light infantry, conducted raids and diversionary operations, and participated in amphibious assaults. The first amphibious landing and offensive ground operation conducted by the US in World War II featured the 1st Parachute Battalion.

The 1st MarDiv was tasked to land on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942 to seize an airfield under construction by the Japanese. Operation Watchtower comprised near simultaneous landings on Guadalcanal and smaller islands 23 miles north-northeast across The Slot and just off the south-central coast of Florida Island. These included Tulagi (site of the Japanese headquarters), and smaller Gavatu and Tanambogo connected by a 300 yard-long causeway. Some 3,000 Japanese construction, air service, and Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) troops were working on the airfield. SNLF and communications detachments were also present on Tulagi 鶞) and Gavatu-Tanambogo 鹦).

The 1st MarDiv had just over 19,000 personnel, but was barely adequate for the mission. The multiple, simultaneous objectives plus the need to maintain a reserve meant there were too few battalions. Two Marine regiments with five battalions would land on Guadalcanal to take the airfield. One regiment (less elements) was held in reserve and the parachute, raider, and two infantry battalions would seize the smaller islands — the 3,900-man Northern Group under the assistant division commander. The use of the paratroopers and raiders as first-wave assault troops was not how they were envisioned for deployment. While possessing substantial automatic firepower, they were lacking in heavier weapons and were not nearly as strong as infantry battalions. Rather than attacking at three-to-one odds, the 361 paratroopers were outnumbered by the Gavatu-Tanambogo defenders by at least 200. Gavatu is only 250 x 500 yards and Tanambogo just 250 yards across, topped, respectively, by 148ft-high and 175ft-high central coral hills. These were honeycombed with caves and covered by dense brush and trees. The battalion rear echelon had been left in New Zealand. Company C had only two platoons. While well trained, it was less than proficient at amphibious landings.

The first landing was conducted by 1ǘ Marines at Hᆨ minutes 񡵤 hours); they searched points on Florida's south coast, but found no enemy troops. The 1st Raider Battalion landed against strong opposition on Tulagi at H-Hour 񡶠 hours) followed by 2Ǜ Marines at 0916 hours. The 1st Parachute Battalion, as the Gavutu Group, was to land on Gavutu's northeast side at HƲ hours 񡼰).

The islands had been heavily hammered by naval 5in. guns and dive-bombed. The shell damage to the seaplane ramp forced the paratroopers of Company A to land on a small beach and pier. They made it ashore experiencing only light fire. Four minutes later when Company B landed, the enemy had recovered and inflicted casualties, as it did on Company C following three minutes later. Company A only advanced 75 yards before it was halted. Company C took up positions to fire on Tanambogo, from where punishing fire was being directed against the Marines en enfilade. The paratroopers were unprepared to deal with cave defenses, and had to learn how to defeat them the hard way. Casualties mounted, and Maj Robert H. Williams was wounded 20 minutes after landing; the XO, Maj Charles A. Miller, took over. By 1430 hours the eastern half of the island was secure, but the fire from Tanambogo kept the Marines from clearing the western portion. After US destroyers and dive-bombers had worked over Tanambogo, Gavutu was secured at 1800 hours. Reinforced by Company B, 1ǘ Marines, the attack on Tanambogo commenced in the evening, with the rifle company attempting an amphibious landing on the island's north side while the paratroopers assaulted across the causeway. The attack was driven off and the island was not taken until the next day by 3ǘ Marines.

The 1st Parachute Battalion had lost 28 killed in action (KIA) and 50 wounded in action (WIA) including key officers and NCOs. The 1st Raider Battalion on Tulagi had suffered only 10 percent casualties. On August 9, the battalion was moved to larger Tulagi and took up defensive positions. The Reising submachine guns were found wanting and many paratroopers rearmed themselves with Springfield rifles collected from other units' casualties. At the beginning of September the 1st Parachute Battalion was brought over to the Henderson Field Perimeter and placed in reserve. There many paratroopers were taken ill, and the battalion's effective strength dwindled. As so many of its leaders were casualties or ill, including the acting commander, the battalion was attached to the 1st Raider Battalion on September 3 to become the Raider-Parachute Battalion under the Raider battalion commander, Lt Col Merritt A. Edson. The Raider and parachute companies retained their identities, though.

The Japanese navy was landing reinforcements and supplies at points on both sides of the Marine perimeter. To keep the enemy off balance, the battalion executed an amphibious harassing raid 18 miles east of the perimeter at Tasimboko on September 8. The Raiders landed east of the enemy position at dawn; soon contact was made, and the fighting intensified. The 208 paratroopers (less Company C) came ashore at 1130 hours and went into defensive positions to the Raiders' left. An enveloping landing to the west was requested, but 1st MarDiv could not reduce the overextended units defending the perimeter and recommended that the force withdraw. They continued to fight on against a rearguard, but it withdrew and the Marines gained the village and destroyed supplies and equipment. The force was extracted that afternoon losing two KIA and six WIA.On September 10 the Raider-Parachute Battalion dug in on a grass-covered ridge on the south-central portion of the perimeter, with the Raiders on the west side and the paratroopers on the east. Evidence found at Tasimboko and other intelligence indicated the Japanese would launch an attack on the perimeter. Surrounded by dense jungle and running perpendicular to the perimeter, the ridge pointed toward Henderson Field and might have been a main Japanese attack route. Most Marine units were defending the perimeter's flanks and its beaches against counterlandings. The inland perimeter was only thinly outposted.

The 2,500-man Kawaguchi Force conducted uncoordinated attacks on the night of the 12th after Japanese ships had shelled the ridge. Small bands of Japanese infiltrated through Marine strongpoints. Efforts were made to clear the infiltrators in the morning, but resistance was heavy. The battalion pulled back further to the north of the ridge. After dark the Japanese launched repeated attacks. They created gaps and the understrength Marine companies were forced back into a tight perimeter. The position began to crumble and the parachute battalion acting Commanding Officer (CO) broke down to be replaced by the XO, Capt Harry L. Torgerson. He and other officers managed to rally the troops. The enemy disengaged at first light. The Marines attempted to regain lost positions, but were driven back and established a new line. Japanese attacks began again at nightfall, and continued through the night. At 0400 hours Edson requested the reserve 2Ǜ Marines be committed, and it moved up as artillery pounded the Japanese. Air strikes were called in at dawn and the Japanese effort was broken.

The Raiders suffered 135 casualties and the paratroopers 15 KIA and 113 WIA. Only 100 effectives remained. The Japanese lost 700 KIA and an estimated 500 WIA. Edson received the Medal of Honor for the defense of what became known as Edson's or Bloody Ridge. On September 17 the Raider-Parachute Battalion was dissolved and the 1st Parachute Battalion departed a couple of days later.