Mobile Strike Forces in Vietnam 1966–70

Combat mission

MIKE Forces and their predecessors were primarily organized to serve as reaction forces to reinforce or otherwise aid remote CIDG camps under or in danger of attack. Prior to 1964 there were no reaction forces under USSF command. The camps were manned by often understrength, lightly armed, moderately trained self-defense forces. They were recruited locally and their degree of motivation varied. The ARVN viewed these camps as being under US control, even though they were ostensibly under the command of the LLDB. Local ARVN commanders were reluctant to commit forces to relieve or reinforce these camps. The same applied to the local provincial and district chiefs who seldom committed their Provincial or Popular Force units, which were also locally recruited and poorly trained and armed. Often they lacked the mobility to conduct a relief. There was also a very real concern that any ground relief force would be ambushed en route. US Army and Marine units too proved to be reluctant to respond to endangered camps. While US units possessed the airmobility necessary to rapidly respond, they had little inclination to conduct risky, usually at night, relief operations for what they viewed as “Special Forces-owned” camps not under their operational control.

It was the almost-successful July 1964 VC attack on Nam Dong Camp that accelerated the organization of USSF-controlled reaction forces. CPT (later MG) David E. Watts related the sequence of events leading to the formation of the first reaction force:

In the following days we all devoted much analysis to the Nam Dong episode. As professional soldiers we knew that every combat structure must have some kind of “reserve” and that that we - and I CTZ LLDB - had none. I believe that realization compelled us to begin thinking “Reaction Force.” Our little B-team had no inherent power and no power unit at our disposal. We had to have some “organic power” that could be organized and equipped to fight offensively. Too, it had to be mobile (preferably by air). ARVN had such units called Airborne Rangers. But they belonged to the ARVN and would not be expended to “save” a CIDG camp. Thus it became clear that we would have to create our own force.

The formation of the company-size I CTZ Nung Reaction Force was accomplished with a degree of deception being established as though a new CIDG camp was being built and manned. Nung mercenaries were recruited from Saigon as they already had a reputation of loyalty to USSF, having been used as bodyguards, and they had a soldierly reputation. However, they were accused of being a mafia-like organization, and were not always in the best physical shape. Besides serving as mobile reaction forces, they were soon deployed to conduct raids and recovery operations.

In II CTZ a second effort to create a reaction force developed. The Eagle Flight Detachment was formed in October 1964 under B-210, 1st SFGA as directed by C-2. A-311A (split A-team) at Pleiku was responsible for the Eagle Flight. It consisted of two platoons of selected Rhade Montagnard strikers trained in airmobile operations, small-unit tactics, and weapons. The Eagle Flight was not a USSF-developed concept, but was created in early 1963 by US advisors with ARVN units.