Any sophisticated AFV has teething problems. This was no less true of the Stryker, even though it had long been in use worldwide as the Piranha and variants. There will always be cost overruns and unforeseen problems. These issues, though, were amplified in some ways by having only just over two years of testing and development rather than the typical eight to ten years. Thus, it was recognized from the outset that problems would emerge and that they would have to be fixed as each block of vehicles was procured. After the testing of LAV IIIs, the first Strykers were delivered in February 2002 and were standardized in May.
Making changes during the manufacture of subsequent vehicles and implementing fixes to fielded vehicles has greatly accelerated the procurement and fielding process. Since the vehicles have been standardized and fielded with operational units the image of a seriously flawed system has been enhanced. Problems are corrected as soon as possible, including the following modifications recommended by soldiers:
- Replace civilian automobile-type seat belts with a more quickly fastened and released aircraft-type belt long enough to accommodate body armor.
- Addition of a bench seat in the CV to accommodate more personnel.
- Fitting a driver’s viewing monitor in the troop compartment to improve situational awareness.
- To prevent RWS drift when firing, add a brace arm and the operating software to be fixed.
- Gun shields should be tested to protect exposed crewmen.
Ultimately, however, a wheeled AFV does have extensive limitations when compared to a full-tracked counterpart. The heavier full-tracked chassis can support a heavier load (armor and armament), has a lower center of gravity, can negotiate rough terrain and obstacles better, and provides enhanced protection from mines. Tracked AFVs are also more compact because less space is required by the tracks as opposed to large wheel wells, and tracked hulls can be made smaller (28 percent more weight/space efficient). The space required for wheels also gives the vehicle a higher profile and center of gravity. Within days of the Strykers’ deployment to Iraq, two rolled over, killing three soldiers and fueling further controversy over the Stryker design.
Many of the arguments outlined against the Stryker are valid, especially those concerning the extent of protection against RPGs, light armament, no vision/firing ports, no amphibious capability, and poor mobility on rough/difficult ground with bar armor. Fuel consumption was reported as 5–6mpg on roads, but it achieves only 2–3mpg in stop-and-go maneuvers on rough terrain and in urban areas. Instead of requiring a refuel every three days it is necessary every two days – this is still better than the 12–18 hours required by an Abrams unit.
The main complaint is that the Stryker simply does not have all of the advantages of a full-tracked AFV. A tracked AFV would be a more effective vehicle, but the overriding reason a wheeled vehicle was adopted was the absolute necessity for a rapidly air-deployable vehicle requiring smaller logistic demands. Yet, the Stryker is border-line on weight limitations.
Cost is another issue. Program costs had increased 22 percent from the estimate in 2000 of $7.1 billion to $8.7 billion in 2003 – the baseline cost for an ICV is $4 million, $5 million for the MGS, and about $4.5 million for other variants. A Marine LAV-25 costs $900,000. To up-armor a $62,000 HMMWV costs up to $150,000. The contract requirement covers the supply of 2,131 vehicles for $4 billion, the number of vehicles increased from the original 2,096.
After testing and evaluation from May 2002 the Stryker entered operational service in November 2003. Vehicles were contracted in blocks sufficient to equip one SBCT at a time. For example, the fourth SBCT block was contracted in March-June 2004 for delivery in 2005-06 and for the fifth SBCT in February 2005 for 2006-07 delivery.
Congress mandated the Medium Armored Vehicle Comparison Evaluation in September 2002 to evaluate the Stryker against the M113A3 APC,9 preferred by many. Testing was between four of each AFV. The first SBCT raised undertook training at the National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, CA, followed by an evaluated exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, LA, and both results were included in the report. The brigade deployed by air, land, and sea to Ft. Polk with 1,500 vehicles, including 293 Strykers. The Secretary of Defense reported the results to Congress concluding, “Current design and training performance of the first SBCT meets the requirements of the Organizational and Operational Concept.” This satisfied few, with many claiming a whitewash. Regardless, SBCTs have been organized, equipped, trained, and employed in combat.