Armored Trains

Armored trains began to reach maturity in the hands of British forces during the colonial conflicts of the late 19th century. The Royal Navy led the way during the Egyptian campaign of 1882, fitting railcars with guns, iron plates, and sandbags. One of the key innovations of these trains was to place an expendable railcar at the head of the train to protect the main element of the train in the event of a mine or a deliberately loosened rail. Armored trains were built by the Royal Marines in 1882 in Egypt, by the army in the Sudan in 1885 during the campaign to relieve Gen. Gordon at Khartoum, and by troops in India in 1886. These early experiments set the stage for the most important use of armored trains in the 19th century, the Boer War (1899–1902) in southern Africa.

Railroads were absolutely vital to the transport and supply of the army in British-controlled areas of South Africa, so before the war some 13 armored trains were built under the direction of the Royal Engineers by the Cape Government Railways (CGR), Natal Railways (NR), and Rhodesian Railways (RR). They were intended to move infantry rapidly to trouble spots and to allow the infantry to fight from within the trains. The trains typically had two or more wagons fitted with steel plates, with loops through which the infantry could fire their rifles.

These armored trains proved useful in the early fighting, though they were far from invulnerable against a determined enemy. The best-known action took place on November 15, 1899, when an NR armored train of the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers was sent on a reconnaissance mission to monitor the southward advance of Boer forces. Gen. Louis Botha ordered a Boer militia force to block the train near Frere, while his troops launched an ambush from behind the train. When the train attempted to withdraw, it ran into a large boulder placed on the tracks by Botha’s task force, and one of the armored infantry wagons was derailed. The armored train was then blasted by the Boers, who were armed with two field guns including a Vickers-Maxim pom-pom. The armored train’s own 7pdr gun was knocked out of action, but the armored locomotive was eventually able to push past the obstruction, leaving behind the derailed truck. Botha’s task force captured over 50 British troops as well as a journalist from the British Morning Post newspaper, the young Winston S. Churchill.

This skirmish highlighted the vulnerability of armored trains to ambush and made it clear that they could not operate independently against a skillful enemy without their own reconnaissance force. Tactics and technology continued to evolve; cavalry was often used to provide the route reconnaissance. The usefulness of armored trains in patrolling the vital railroads led to further construction, and at their peak strength during the war as many as 20 armored trains were operational.

A postwar study of the conflict concluded that the armored train had seven main missions – accompanying and supporting infantry columns attempting to intercept the enemy; serving as flank protection to infantry columns; reinforcing camps and stations on the railroad; escorting ordinary trains; reconnoitering; patrolling day and night; and general protection of the rail-lines. The improvement of train tactics enhanced their effectiveness and one officer later commented that “There is no doubt that the enemy disliked them intensely and that the presence of an armoured train had a great morale effect.” The character of the armored trains in combat was well summarized in the official British history of the campaign:

It was important that the officer commanding the train should be a man of judgment and strong nerve. He was often called upon to act on his own responsibility. His strong armament and defences enabled him to attack superior forces. Yet his vulnerable points were many. He had ever to be alert that the enemy did not cut the line behind him. In addition to his visible foes and the constant risks of traffic in wartime, he had to contend with skillfully-used automatic and observation mines, and had to keep his head even amid the roar which followed the passage of his leading truck over a charge of dynamite, and then to deal with the attack which almost certainly ensued. Officers, therefore, had to be chosen from men of no common stamp. The danger from contact mines was to a certain extent obviated by a standing order that each train should propel a heavily-loaded bogie truck. Such trucks had low sides and ends; they in no way obstructed the view or fire from the trains; and they performed the double purpose of exploding contact mines and carrying railway and telegraph materials [for repair].