Japanese Infantryman 1937–45

Tactical doctrine focused on attack, surprise, rapid movements, commanders operating well forward, and relatively simple plans. Offensive actions were the norm. In the 1928 edition of Tosui Koryo (Principles of Strategic Command), the words defense, retreat, and surrender were expunged, as they were considered detrimental to morale and the martial spirit. The Japanese had an almost unreasonable abhorrence of defensive actions. If a Japanese officer were confronted with an unexpected, unusual or complicated situation in battle, he would find a way to attack – attack at unexpected times and points, along unanticipated routes and often with force ratios Western armies would not have attempted, all increasing the surprise factor.

Complete annihilation of the enemy (teki) was the primary goal; allowing the enemy to escape to fight again was unacceptable. This of course resulted in the surrender of large numbers of Allied prisoners, who did not fight to the death as the Japanese did and who could not be as easily disposed of as the Chinese. The conquering of Western colonial territories meant large numbers of civilians were interned, a situation for which the Japanese were totally unprepared. The treatment of prisoners and internees varied greatly, with little guidance provided from higher command.