Vietnam ANZACs

An extract from ‘The ANZAC way’

Operational doctrine

The initial secondment of 1RAR to the US 173rd Airborne Bde had quickly shown up the differences in operating procedure followed by the two allies. The young paratroopers and Diggers were each confirming the military adage that armies will fight a new war in the same way that they fought the closing stages of the last. In simplified terms, the Americans tried initially to fight the war in Vietnam as a Korean War with the addition of helicopters; the Australians fought in the same way as they had in Malaya in the 1950s–60s. Neither method was entirely suited to the unique and evolving situation in Vietnam, and a certain amount of fast learning was required on both parts and at all levels.

The first forays of the ANZUS Bde in War Zone D in 1965 highlighted these fundamental differences in both training and operational thinking. The Americans took to the field in large, noisy units, deliberately looking for contact and relying on tactical mobility and overwhelming fire support. They were sending out a clear message to the enemy: ‘Here we are; take us on, and pay the price’. The Australians, on the other hand, patrolled silently and cautiously, dispersing their forces over much wider areas. Their message to the enemy was ‘You will never know where we are, but we will find you’.

With the dissolution of the ANZUS Bde and the formation of 1ATF the two armies went their separate ways, and continued to fight the war each in their own manner; their brief association had been a microcosm of how the war would be fought over the next decade. The Americans would continue to fight a conventional ‘big’ war, and the Australians a counter-insurgency ‘patrol’ war. The commanding officer of the US 2/203rd Parachute Infantry Regt of the 173rd Abn Bde recognized the differences in 1965: ‘When we [the Americans] found something, we shot at it; we did not wait, establish the patterns, look for opportunities after out-thinking the local VC commander. We were just not patient enough – there was too much to do in too little time. We did not use reconnaissance enough. Our ambushes were there for security, not to kill. The Australians were quiet hunters – patient, thorough, trying to out-think the Viet Cong. I would not have liked to operate at night and know there was a chance of ending up in an Aussie ambush.’