The Yugoslav Wars (2)

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

The conflict can be divided into three phases: low-intensity warfare, 22 Apr 1996–28 Feb 1998; the Serb crackdown of Mar 1998–23 Mar 1999; and NATO intervention, 24 Mar–12 June 1999.

UÇK strategy was to ferment unrest which the Serbs would feel obliged to suppress with brutal force, thereby escalating the conflict and compelling the West to intervene, thus forcing the Serbs to grant Kosovan independence. Its covert agenda was to ‘ethnically cleanse’ Kosovo of Serbs and other minorities.

On 22 Apr 1996 UÇK guerrillas launched four simultaneous attacks on Serb police and civilians; they then began assaulting isolated Serbian police stations, setting up roadblocks in the countryside, attacking Serb and other minority civilians, and assassinating those Kosovo-Albanians considered to be collaborators. Montenegro remained neutral; but President Milosevic retaliated in Mar 1997 by massively reinforcing Serb forces in Kosovo. By Feb 1998 the 10,000-strong VJ Pristina Corps had tripled to 30,000 (30 per cent of total VJ strength), and the 6,500 Serbian Police, PJP and SAJ were tripled to about 19,500 with reservists and extra units. Meanwhile the UÇK employed classic guerrilla hit-and-run tactics while avoiding pitched battles.

In mid-Feb 1998 the UÇK advanced from its Drenica heartland and soon seized control of more than 30 per cent of Kosovo. This prompted Milosevic to order the 49,500 VJ and MUP to take the offensive on 28 Feb 1998, to retake UÇK-held areas and to eliminate the UÇK as a fighting force. This disguised his plan, Operation ‘Horseshoe’ (Potkovica), to restore Serb control over Kosovo by killing the Kosovo-Albanians or driving them into exile in Albania and elsewhere, before repopulating the province with Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. In Mar 1998, MUP forces spearheaded by PJP brigades attacked Drenica, held by III OZ, and later VJ units were deployed to seal off the Kosovo border with Albania and to provide artillery and helicopter-gunship support. The UÇK’s move from guerrilla to conventional tactics proved premature, and by 28 July the Serbs had re-occupied Drenica and stood on the Albanian border. By Aug 1998 they had retaken 90 per cent of Kosovo, forcing the UÇK to abandon most of its territory; hundreds of fighters and civilians were killed, and about 360,000 civilians (36 per cent of the total Kosovar-Albanian population) were driven from their homes, many fleeing to Albania and Macedonia.

Milosevic’s strategy to disguise ethnic cleansing as legitimate Serbian military action against a secessionist guerrilla force could not work indefinitely: the international community reacted, and on 23 Sept 1998 the UN demanded a ceasefire. They also demanded that Serb forces return to barracks, and revert to their peacetime strength of 6,500 Police and 10,600 VJ; and that by 27 Oct they permit access for an international monitoring force, under threat of NATO air-strikes. Milosevic pursued a deadly game of brinkmanship, convinced that he could still execute Operation ‘Horseshoe’ – either because a disunited international community would hang back, or because a few days or weeks of NATO air-strikes would provide a convenient smokescreen. Thus Milosevic initially complied with the UN demands, withdrawing forces into Serbia, and concentrating his remaining units around Malisevo in central Kosovo while the UÇK reclaimed lost territory. Meanwhile the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) on 25 Oct, deploying NATO aircraft and 2,000 OSCE personnel to Kosovo in November to verify compliance with the ceasefire.

During Nov 1998 Milosevic secretly returned some VJ and MUP units to Kosovo, and the next month fighting flared up. NATO’s and the KVM’s lack of reaction emboldened Milosevic, and on 15 Jan 1999 – following two UÇK ambushes and four police deaths in the vicinity - the ‘Magla’ unit, supported by Serbian Police and VJ T-55 tanks, attacked UÇK positions around the village of Racak near Stimplje (15 miles south of Pristina), killing 43 male civilians. Like Srebrenica, the atrocity galvanized international opinion; on 30 Jan NATO threatened air-strikes, and the six-nation Contact Group, formed in Jan 1997, called a peace conference at Rambouillet, France, for 6 Feb. The conference ended on 18 Mar without agreement; KVM monitors withdrew on 22 Mar, and on 24 Mar NATO launched its 79-day Operation ‘Allied Force’ air campaign.

NATO considered any target in Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and neutral Montenegro legitimate, and 730 USAF and 325 other NATO aircraft flew 10,484 strike missions against VJ and MUP concentrations. Although the Serbs – particularly the armoured units – skilfully concealed their positions or offered dummy tanks as targets, the VJ suffered heavy punishment, losing 26 tanks, 153 other AFVs, 389 artillery pieces and about 5,000 dead. The Yugoslav AF was generally unsuccessful; its MiG-29 fighters briefly attacked targets in Kosovo and Bosnia, and AA missiles managed to shoot down a supposedly invulnerable US F-117 Nighthawk Stealth aircraft. Meanwhile bombers and cruise missiles from 13 US Navy and 21 other NATO aircraft carriers, assault ships, destroyers and frigates attacked military, government and ‘dual use’ installations with impunity, since the Yugoslav radar remained switched off to avoid retaliation. NATO ground forces were confined to the US Army’s 2 Bn/505 Parachute Inf Rgt, 82 Abn Div at Tirana Airfield, Albania, ready for a ground invasion of Kosovo.

On 24 Mar 1999, as destruction mounted in Belgrade and Serbia, the MUP was subordinated to the VJ, forming an integrated command under 3 Army commander Gen Pavkovic. More than 50,000 VJ and MUP troops in Kosovo, supplemented by the JSO and Serb militias, launched Operation ‘Horseshoe’, rounding up Albanians in northern and central Kosovo and forcing them – by train, bus, car, cart or on foot – into NE Albania. 15 Armd Bde in Pristina and 211 Armd Bde from Serbia immediately secured the Pristina-Podujevo road, allowing 15 Armd, 37 & 125 Mot Bdes with MUP support to advance from Pristina into Drenica. 125 Mot Bde then advanced into southern Kosovo, joining 243 Mech Bde, which had just devastated Malisevo. By 29 Mar the outclassed UÇK were forced to retreat into Albania, leaving a few units in isolated enclaves. Now Serbian units – particularly 15 Armd and 125 Mot Bdes, SAJ, JSO, and about 2,000 Serb militiamen, joined in early April by 252 Armd, 549 Mot and 52 Mixed Arty Bdes – targeted civilians. They imprisoned many in makeshift detention camps, or killed the men and forced over 200,000 old people, women and children into Albania and Macedonia, sealing the borders to prevent refugees returning. By June 1999 about 15,000 Kosovar- Albanians were dead or missing, often buried in hidden graves.

On 27 May 1999 the ICTY indicted Milosevic for war crimes in Kosovo, and on 4 June Russia withdrew support from Serbia. The prolonged NATO campaign had caused immense damage to Serbia’s infrastructure, and VJ recruits were failing to report for duty. Although MajGen Vladimir Lazarevic, commanding Pristina Corps, remained defiant, revitalized UÇK forces were advancing from NE Albania towards Pec and Prizren, pushing back VJ 125 Mot, 52 Mixed Arty and 63 Para Bdes, which were battered by NATO air-strikes. Milosevic admitted defeat on 4 June, and on the 10th signed a peace agreement with NATO; next day a ceasefire took force. On 12 June, under Operation ‘Joint Guardian’, NATO ground forces forming a 14-nation Kosovo Force (KFOR) under the British LtGen Michael Jackson advanced into Kosovo from Macedonia and Albania, as the 18,500-strong UÇK fanned across Kosovo to be greeted by the Kosovar-Albanians as liberators. Meanwhile, VJ and MUP forces retreated to Serbia – to the dismay of the Kosovar-Serb and some other minorities.