Israeli F-4 Phantom II Aces

The arrival of the F-4 allowed the IDF/AF to introduce innovative new mixed formation tactics which fully exploited Kurnass and Mirage III capabilities in ‘planned’ air combats. Israeli air combat superiority resulted in the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) avoiding engagements with IDF/AF fighters, except on favourable terms. These included intercepting inferior IDF/AF attack aircraft or bombers deep inside Egypt, or engaging Israeli aircraft far from home and low on fuel.
To draw Egyptian fighter pilots into combat, the Israelis had to prepare special ambushes. This in turn meant evolving levels of complexity and ingenuity to maintain deception in the face of Egyptian counter-tactics. With a mixed four-ship formation of two F-4s leading and a pair of Mirage IIIs trailing, the two-seat fighter-bombers, with their powerful radar system and two-man crew, acted as the Mirage III pilots’ eyes, but only after visual contact was made.
Mixed formations improved Mirage III pilots’ situational awareness and also offered Kurnass aircrews the opportunity to shot down MiGs. No 201 Sqn’s Yitzhak Peer fully exploited just such a situation on 6 March 1970 while leading a mixed formation CAP that was protecting a reconnaissance mission. When the formation was vectored to engage intercepting EAF MiG-21s, Peer launched two AIM-7 AAMs, both of which missed. The two Mirage IIIs then shot down a MiG-21 and disengaged, leaving the two Kurnass to fight the remaining seven MiG-21s. Egyptian GCI opted for numbers to balance the IDF/AF’s qualitative superiority, but in this case the tactic backfired for eer claimed a MiG-21 kill, firing his cannon from 250 m.
The combination of the Kurnass’ radar, weapon system and the AIM-7 semi-active radar homing AAM shifted the priority of IDF/AF night quick reaction alert missions, and the Kurnass soon supplanted the Mirage III as the preferred nocturnal interceptor.