Soviet Field Fortifications 1941–45

An extract from &lsquoSoviet Field Fortifications&rsquo.

The Red Army of Workers and Peasants considered itself an offensive army that followed a doctrine of highly mobile warfare, and which was capable of attacking deep into the enemy's rear. While such doctrine was made possible by Russia's vast open lands, it was often hampered by limited military resources and the mindset of the Soviet officer corps, whose members were resistant to change and often failed to see the wider picture. The Red Army's theory of defensive field fortifications and obstacles was largely based on lessons learned in World War I, all of which affected their design, construction, camouflage, integration into the terrain, and dispositions on the field. Despite the Red Army's reluctance to engage in defensive operations, they were forced to undertake large–scale ones in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg between 1941 and 1945, even though they had benefit of endless depths of country to withdraw into.

This book provides a study of the field fortifications constructed by combat troops defending the frontline during the Great Patriotic War and focuses on temporary, crew–served weapons positions and individual and small–unit fighting positions, built using both local and occasionally engineer–supplied matériel. The frontline soldiers (frontoviki) mostly built these positions and obstacles themselves, sometimes under the guidance of engineers. However, extensive use was made of penal battalions and forced civilian labourers to prepare defences behind the front for units to fall back to, and thousands of men, women, and children turned out to dig trenches, anti–tank obstacles, and other fortifications.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was, in its time, the largest country in the world, spanning 11 time zones. The terrain of the western part was as varied as the ethnic groups that populated the country. In the far north it was rocky with low hills, ridges, ravines, valleys, and lakes, and the countryside could be barren, sparsely vegetated, or forested. Most of the central region was densely forested and in many areas there were swamps and marshes. The approximate southern boundary of the forested areas was on a line running north–eastwards covering Lvov—Kiev—Kursk, although there were some large forested areas below this. The vast Pripet Marshes lay on the southern edge of this region; they partly dried out in summer, but the autumn and spring rains made them all put impassable. In the south and stretching far eastwards were the sprawling, seemingly endless steppes. In the extreme south lay the Caucasus Mountains. The USSR's rivers ran in all directions and were more often bordered on both sides by marshes, swamps, and bluffs, which provided greater obstacles than any river itself. Prior to World War II, its road and rail systems were primitive and spaced far apart, and its towns and villages were widely scattered. Its dirt roads were churned up by German heavy traffic and were turned into quagmires with the coming of the rains. Even the rail system worked against the German invaders, since the Soviets used a wider gauge.

The climatic extremes were just as varied as the terrain. Long, hot, dusty summers were followed by a short, rainy autumn, and a long, brutal winter with heavy snowfall and temperatures plummeting as low as 㫌°C (㫕.6°F). A short spring ensued with more mud caused by snowmelt and rain. The terrain and climate were brutal in equal measure to the attacker and the defender alike, and required both to be highly adaptable in terms of tactics, obstacles, and camouflage methods.

Permanent fortifications were established by the Red Army on the borders with Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania between 1926 and 1939, including around Leningrad and Kiev. There were also permanent fortifications in the Far East facing Japanese–occupied Manchuria, and when the USSR occupied eastern Poland in 1939 they began construction of defences along the new border (the Molotov Line). There were also coastal defences on the Baltic and Black Sea coasts and around the few other key ports. These reinforced concrete and stone fortifications were heavily augmented by field fortifications. Nineteen &lsquofortified region&rsquo (Ukreplennye Raiony) units were established to man these permanent fortifications — brigade–sized units comprising a varied number of machine–gun artillery battalions, armed and equipped with anti–tank rifles, 45mm anti–tank guns, 50mm and 82mm mortars, 76mm field guns, and searchlights. For the most part, though, they were manned by only a small number of battalions, often only a quarter of what was needed. The fortified regions could be 50𤹮km wide and up to 16km deep, including the forward outposts and obstacles. Many of the defences were obsolete by the time of the German invasion; their machinery and equipment were worn out, many of their weapons had been moved elsewhere or placed in storage, their obstacles had deteriorated, and they were overgrown with vegetation.

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