The prevailing view of the Battle of Midway is simplistic and in many ways simply wrong. Nevertheless, it has survived largely intact until the present day. All of the first accounts of the battle played up the superiority of the Japanese and their expectation of another victory. Even the titles of these books, like Incredible Victory and Miracle at Midway, suggested the inevitability of a Japanese victory. The sole Japanese account of the battle translated into English was easily woven into the standard account.
New books on Midway are a continuing staple of World War II publishing. In the last 40 years, these accounts have become more nuanced. Some have gone to the extreme of placing luck as the primary factor in deciding the battle. The author of this account contends that the battle was not a miraculous American victory, nor was it mainly the product of good fortune, which plays a role in every battle. Rather the author believes that once all the plans, personalities, doctrines, ships and weapons of the two sides are examined, a Japanese defeat was the more likely outcome. However, as Clausewitz pointed out, there is no certainty in war. Given the vagaries of war and the tactical weaknesses of the American forces concerned, an American victory was certainly not inevitable.
The mindsets of the commanders of the time are an essential part of the equation. The Japanese were supremely confident, showing all the signs of what would later come to be called Victory Disease. Overconfidence led to contempt for the Americans and sloppy planning at all levels. American commanders were also confident, none more than Nimitz. Much of this confidence stemmed from an overestimation of their own abilities and an underestimation of Japanese capabilities.
All commanders, whether American or Japanese, and whether commanding a fleet or task force, or sitting in a cockpit, were enveloped in the fog of war. The extent of this is impossible to understand now with the outcome of the battle and its many twists clearly understood. In an era before the wide use of radar and before an array of other high-tech reconnaissance tools, the most reliable means of finding the enemy came down to putting eyeballs on the target. This difficult task was assigned to reconnaissance pilots and crews responsible for searching thousands of square miles of open ocean in varying weather conditions. Even if they did find the enemy, their reports on the location, course, and composition of the enemy were frequently false, incomplete, or not relayed to decision makers in a timely manner. A totally accurate report was a rare occurrence. Reconnaissance was utterly vital, and at crucial times could be corrupted. Commanders were at the mercy of their aviators to generate accurate detection reports. In the words of Midway historian John Lundstrom, “Never have so many depended on so few.” The fog of war was a constant for commanders on both sides.
Closely linked with the fog of war is the friction of war. Even the simplest task relies on many discrete actions going well. Complex actions are dependent upon myriad factors for their success. Invariably, not everything goes according to plan. Many of these factors are beyond the control of commanders. Bad reporting by scout aircraft is part of the friction of war. So are communications problems, maintenance problems, and bad decisions by commanders under pressure to decide quickly with little or no information. Personalities matter, and even accomplished leaders are continually tested.
Much of Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle is devoted to the background of the battle. Forces do not enter combat without being shaped by a host of factors. They operate under a prescribed doctrine and use tactics, techniques and procedures which have been found to work. Doctrine is not law, but it can become restrictive. Under pressure, commanders usually fall back on accepted doctrine. Both sides exhibited doctrinal weaknesses during the battle and each responded differently to these challenges.
It is also important to understand the actual capabilities and performance specifications of the ships, aircraft, and weapons of the forces concerned. In almost all cases, these drove tactics and shaped operations. For both sides, these factors shaped how the battle was fought. Accordingly, two chapters of the book are devoted to the nuts and bolts of carrier warfare.
Midway was only the second carrier battle in history, so both sides were still learning how to fight such battles. Much of what happened at Midway was influenced or directly impacted by the Battle of the Coral Sea which had concluded the month before Midway. It is no exaggeration to say that a Japanese defeat at Midway was only possible after the Japanese defeat at Coral Sea removed a large portion of Nagumo’s carrier force from the Midway operation. It is also instructive to examine the actions of Nagumo’s fleet in the Indian Ocean raid in April 1942. In many ways, this was a virtual dry run for the Midway operation. Both Coral Sea and the Indian Ocean raid are part of the Midway story.
Two more chapters are devoted to the planning and plans of each side for the battle. Understanding the Japanese plan is utterly essential to understanding the outcome of the battle. It is hard to overstate how flawed the plan was. Much space is spent in the book dissecting its problems. How the Japanese violated every principle of war in its formulation still defies belief. Japanese commanders were virtual prisoners to a bad plan given their collective inability to exhibit flexibility and imagination outside the plan.
Conversely, Nimitz had a simple plan. However, executing it in the way he required, without exposing his forces to excessive risk, was not easy. At the crux of the plan was a requirement for the American carriers to avoid detection while at the same time getting close enough to Nagumo’s force to launch a strike. Only then could Nimitz’s plan of “calculated risk” be executed. How this unfolded is a key part of the Midway story.
There are several important themes that will be encountered throughout the book. Perhaps the most important is the influence of intelligence. As a career naval intelligence officer, the author understands what goes into making good (and bad) intelligence assessments and how they should drive the planning process. If the intelligence is bad, then a bad plan almost certainly follows. This was the case as the Japanese planned their Midway operation. American intelligence undoubtedly drove operations at Midway. But the common perception that Nimitz possessed perfect intelligence is wrong. He and his staff had to fill in the gaps for planning purposes where intelligence did not exist. Overall, this was done well, but in the process some mirror-imaging was used. For example, this resulted in the assessment that the Japanese would divide their carriers into two task forces each with two carriers, as the Americans would have done. This incorrect assessment played a large role in the battle. In addition, there were parts of the Japanese plan unknown to Nimitz which, though important, had no bearing on the outcome of the battle. Many accounts of the battle stating that Midway was a victory of intelligence are exaggerating. Good intelligence enabled victory but did not guarantee it. But, without a high level of insight into Japanese plans, there probably would have been no battle.
Command quality was also a key factor. Fortunately for the Americans, it was true that their operational level commanders were just better. Nimitz provided clear guidance and set the conditions for victory. Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance executed his plan as well as they could have done, given the fog of war they were experiencing. Spruance deserves high praise for his performance, but his inaction after the return of the morning strike on June 4 is hard to understand or defend. Not only was he dealing with the fog of war, but he was ill served by his supposedly high-quality staff. Spruance’s strike degenerated into chaos that only excellent squadron-level leadership turned into triumph. Following further complications, Spruance led his force to victory even as his staff melted down.
It needs to be underlined how critical it was for Fletcher and Spruance to use the minimal information they received on Japanese movements and turn it into decisive action. Essentially, two contact reports were sufficient to gain victory. Using the initial detection report from a Catalina flying boat based on Midway on the morning of June 4, Fletcher ordered Spruance to launch his entire strike, intended by Nimitz to be the main punch. After waiting for additional scouting reports that never came, Fletcher decided to launch his strike based on the same report. With so little to go on, Fletcher wisely withheld part of his strike to act as scouts. It was these aircraft that found the last operational Japanese carrier in the afternoon and issued the detection report used by Spruance to complete the American victory. Compare this decisive action with that of Nagumo who failed to act immediately on the contact report he was given on a nearby American carrier. In a carrier battle, the side that strikes first is usually the victor. Nowhere was this truer than at Midway.
Much of the book is concerned with the poor quality of Japanese leadership. The shortcomings of Yamamoto and Nagumo are critical themes. In the consensus-driven Japanese style of command, staffs were very important. Both Yamamoto and Nagumo were let down by their staffs, which were guilty of group think and a general failure of imagination. Nagumo comes across as a very conservative admiral who let his freedom of action be further limited by the limitations of Japanese doctrine. He took what he thought was the safe course of action by delaying his attack on the morning of June 4 against the emergent threat posed by an American carrier task force. Unbeknownst to him, he was no longer in control of events, and his inaction proved fatal.
Midway Atoll played an important part in the battle, much bigger than is usually understood. While planning the operation, Yamamoto was warned by the Naval General Staff that it was foolish to fight a battle beyond the range of friendly air cover. This turned out to be prophetic. Nimitz knew that Midway was going to play a key role and stacked it with everything he could. When attacked, Midway inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese – these had unforeseen consequences later in the day. The hodge-podge of strike aircraft positioned on the island, defended by a poorly trained fighter squadron, were willing participants in the battle, but Midway’s attacks on the Japanese fleet were pre-ordained to be ineffective. On the other hand, the long-range flying boats performing reconnaissance from the atoll provided Nimitz with the locational data required to execute this ambush.
In the final analysis, the Americans assembled the bare minimum ingredients for victory. The first ingredient was excellent intelligence, which provided the bedrock of victory. The second ingredient was long-range scouting aircraft from Midway, which provided a single contact on the Japanese carriers that Fletcher and Spruance used to set their massive strike in motion. The third ingredient was a capable dive-bomber force flown by well-trained crews. Against a weak Japanese air defense system operating without radar, it was simply good enough to get dive-bombers over the Japanese and let the rest care of itself. In a nutshell, that was how the Americans gained victory at Midway.
You can find out more in Mark Stille's new book Midway: The Pacific War’s Most Famous Battle. Out now!
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