I suspect that many potential readers of this book will be a bit surprised by its contents. For much of today’s general public, knowledge of World War II tank operations is shaped by video wargames such as “World of Tanks” or “War Thunder”. These games are fun to play, but they have little to do with actual WWII tank tactics. 

    The Army field manuals were sometimes unrealistic or out-of-date. As a result, the US Army dispatched General Board Observers to the combat theaters to examine actual tactical lessons. Their reports form another aspect of this book, comparing the formal doctrine to the actual tactics that had been locally adapted by combat experience.

    In this book, the evolution of US tank tactical doctrine is laid out in the context of the organizational development of the US Army’s Armored Force. The US Army entered the war shortly after the Cavalry’s combat car units and the Infantry’s tank units were amalgamated into a new, unified combat arm, the Armored Force. The US Army had no practical experience for creating new armored divisions and spent the better part of two years trying to learn lessons from the war in Europe. As a result, Army tank tactics changed from a concentration on infantry tank support, then to a new enthusiasm for the cavalry’s exploitation mission, and finally to a more balanced combined-arms approach. On top of this, there was the added complication of global warfare that required specialized tactics such as tank tactics in amphibious landing operations.