It is often said that artillery is the king of battle – most frequently by artillerymen. This is true only if the guns have ammunition. Without shells and the other supplies necessary to fire an artillery piece, it is a static monument. In reality, logistics is king. No theater in World War illustrated that more starkly than the CBI – the China¬Burma¬India Theater – over which aerial supply of China was conducted. 

The airlift was one of the outstanding successes of the war, carrying 738,667 tons of supplies to China and ferrying 4,671 aircraft over a three-and-one-quarter year period. What made it even more remarkable was the starting point for the airlift was at the end of the world, literally for the United States. Simply to get to the starting point of the 500-mile flight to China, supplies had to travel 14,700 miles (or 11,200 miles, after the Allies cleared the Mediterranean of Axis forces). This was literally halfway around the world. 

An iconic photo of the Hump run - a C-47 flying over the mountains to China. (US AIr Forces)

It was no easier for the Japanese. It was 3,810 nautical miles (4,572 miles) by sea from Japan to Rangoon, Burma’s major port. Hawaii was closer. After Japan completed the Siam¬Burma Railroad (the infamous “Death Railway”), the trip dropped to 3,600 miles, but the final 260 miles was on an overloaded, rickety single-track line cut through jungle. 

The terrain was some of the world’s worst. Where it was not triple-canopy jungle, it was rugged mountain: the Himalayan foothills, the Naga hills, Shan Hills, and Dawna Range among them. There were no roads and few railroads. The navigable rivers were the main routes of commerce pre-war. The easiest way to get around was by air. In an age before the helicopter, this meant either airdropping supplies or carving an airfield out of the jungle.

Terrain and distance dictated everything. Neither side could easily get forces and resources there. It also held the lowest priority of any theater for both sides. The Allies only interest in the CBI was as a means of supplying China. For Japan, Lower Burma, the area around Rangoon and south of it, was the eastern anchor of their defensive perimeter. Their interest in Upper Burma was non-existent until it became clear it was the key to stopping the China airlift. 

The Hump was fought over some of the worst terrain in the world. This photo shows a treacherous section of the Burma road (Library of Congress)

Even then, they lacked the resources to do the job properly. The Upper Burma airfields, sited close enough to attack the transports flying the Hump or the Indian airfields from which they departed for and returned from China, were primitive. Their runways carved from jungle. They offered rudimentary services; fuel and hangars, but little else. The Japanese lacked the resources to improve them. 

Instead, the aircraft were maintained at Lower Burma airfields. They would be armed at their home bases, staged to Upper Burma airfields and refueled. From there they went out to attack the Hump airfields or the Hump aircraft. This route doubled the amount of fuel and flying time, but it was the only way of attack. Spare parts were short in Burma. Aviation gasoline even more so. As they ran out of both, the Japanese ceased attacking airfields and aircraft. 

All infrastructure had to be built during the war. This fuel pipeline crossing a stream was one example. (US Army Historical Center)

The same thing happened on the ground. Their drive into Upper Burma petered out thirty miles past the end of the railroad lines and the heads of navigation of the navigable rivers. Parts of Upper Burma, including Fort Hertz, remained under British control throughout the war. Eventually an important airfield was built there. 
Similarly, the Japanese drive into India outran supply lines. The Japanese managed to besiege Kohima and threaten Imphal, but their troops were eventually forced back. This was due as much to starvation as to enemy action.

Nor were the Allies less affected by geography, and distance. They were moving supplies three times further than the Japanese to reach the CBI and faced the same challenging terrain. However, the US GDP was five times larger than Japan’s in 1941 and ten times larger in 1945. It could afford the resources to create the infrastructure to support the airlift and the reconquest of Burma. 

The Hump Display at the National Museum of the Air Force (William Lardas photo)

The aircraft committed to the Chinese airlift grew from 75 aircraft averaging three tons per trip in 1942 to 425 aircraft averaging seven-and-one-half tons per trip in 1945, In addition to roads and airfields, the US built fuel pipeline across India, Burma, and China. Pipelines eliminated the need to transport fuel by truck, train, or aircraft, freeing those to carry other supplies. 

In the 17th Century, the Comte de Bussy-Rabutin, a soldier and memorialist, observed, “God is usually on the side of the big squadrons against the small.” It proved true in World War II’s CBI. Behind the ability to field big squadrons lay logistics, the often invisible but critical factor in this campaign.

You can read more in ACM 58: The Hump 1942–45: America's first massive military airlift.

• Aviation
• WWII